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Abstract
With the ever-growing production of data coming from multiple, scattered,
and highly dynamical sources, many providers are motivated to upload their
data to the cloud servers and share them with other persons for different
purposes. However, storing data on untrusted cloud servers imposes serious
concerns in terms of security, privacy, data confidentiality, and access con-
trol. In order to prevent privacy and security breaches, it is vital that data is
encrypted first before it is outsourced to the cloud. However, designing ac-
cess control models that enable different users to have various access rights
to the shared data is the main challenge. To tackle this issue, a possible
solution is to employ a cryptographic-based data access control mechanism
such as attribute-based encryption (ABE ) scheme, which enables a data
owner to take full control over data access. However, access control mech-
anisms based on ABE raise two challenges: (i) weak privacy: they do not
conceal the attributes associated with the ciphertexts, and therefore they
do not satisfy attribute-hiding security, and (ii) inefficiency: they do not
support efficient access policy change when data is required to be shared
among multiple users with different access policies. To address these issues,
this thesis studies and enhances inner-product encryption (IPE ), a type of
public-key cryptosystem, which supports the attribute-hiding property as
well as the flexible fine-grained access control based payload-hiding prop-
erty, and combines it with an advanced cryptographic technique known as
proxy re-encryption (PRE ).
The first part of this thesis discusses the necessity of applying the inner-
product proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) scheme to guarantee secure data shar-
ing on untrusted cloud servers. More specifically, we propose two extended
schemes of IPE : in the first extended scheme, we propose an inner-product
proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) protocol derived from a well-known inner-
product encryption scheme [1]. We deploy this technique in the healthcare
scenario where data, collected by medical devices according to some ac-
cess policy, has to be changed afterwards for sharing with other medical
staffs. The proposed scheme delegates the re-encryption capability to a
semi-trusted proxy who can transform a delegator’s ciphertext associated
with an attribute vector to a new ciphertext associated with delegatee’s at-
tribute vector set, without knowing the underlying data and private key.
Our proposed policy updating scheme enables the delegatee to decrypt the
shared data with its own key without requesting a new decryption key. We
analyze the proposed protocol in terms of its performance on three differ-
ent types of elliptic curves such as the SS curve, the MNT curve, and the
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BN curve, respectively. Hereby, we achieve some encouraging experimen-
tal results. We show that our scheme is adaptive attribute-secure against
chosen-plaintext under standard Decisional Linear (D-Linear) assumption.
To improve the performance of this scheme in terms of storage, communi-
cation, and computation costs, we propose an efficient inner-product proxy
re-encryption (E-IPPRE ) scheme using the transformation of Kim’s inner-
product encryption method [2]. The proposed E-IPPRE scheme requires
constant pairing operations for its algorithms and ensures a short size of
the public key, private key, and ciphertext, making it the most efficient and
practical compared to state of the art schemes in terms of computation and
communication overhead. We experimentally assess the efficiency of our pro-
tocol and show that it is selective attribute-secure against chosen-plaintext
attacks in the standard model under Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman assumption. Specifically, our proposed schemes do not reveal any
information about the data owner’s access policy to not only the untrusted
servers (e.g, cloud and proxy) but also to the other users.
The second part of this thesis presents a new lightweight secure data
sharing scheme based on attribute-based cryptography for a specific IoT -
based healthcare application. To achieve secure data sharing on IoT devices
while preserving data confidentiality, the IoT devices encrypt data before
it is outsourced to the cloud and authorized users, who have corresponding
decryption keys, can access the data. The main challenge, in this case, is on
the one hand that IoT devices are resource-constrained in terms of energy,
CPU, and memory. On the other hand, the existing public-key encryption
mechanisms (e.g., ABE ) require expensive computation. We address this
issue by combining the flexibility and expressiveness of the proposed E-
IPPRE scheme with the efficiency of symmetric key encryption technique
(AES ) and propose a light inner-product proxy re-encryption (L-IPPRE )
scheme to guarantee secure data sharing between different entities in the IoT
environment. The experimental results confirm that the proposed L-IPPRE
scheme is suitable for resource-constrained IoT scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emerging trend of sharing information among different users (esp. busi-
nesses and organizations) aiming to gain profit, has recently attracted a
tremendous amount of attention from both research and industry communi-
ties. However, despite all benefits that data sharing inevitably provides [3],
many organizations are reluctant to share their data with others due to the
large initial investments of expensive infrastructure setup, large equipment
and daily maintenance cost [4]. With the advent of cloud computing, data
outsourcing paradigm makes shared data much more accessible as users can
retrieve them from anywhere with significant cost benefits. There are major
concerns, with data confidentiality in the cloud as organizations lose control
of their data and disclose sensitive information to a service provider that
is not fully trusted. In addition, most organizations do not wish to grant
full access privilege to other users. To this purpose, many research efforts
have been dedicated to solve these issues by proposing cryptographically
enforced access control mechanisms to set access policies for encrypted data
such that only users with appropriate authorization can have access. In this
thesis, we advance research in the area of cloud data sharing (i) Providing
fine-grained access control over encrypted data, (ii) Minimizing the amount
of computation used for sharing data between users with different access
rights (policy change) adopting a novel re-encryption (PRE ) method, and
(iii) Verifying the feasibility and practicability of the proposal schemes for
constrained devices in the Internet-of-Things (IoT ).
1.1 Data sharing on cloud computing
With the growing popularity of cloud computing, more and more enterprises
are motivated to outsource their data to the cloud. Cloud data sharing has
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found many practical applications in healthcare, where patients are willing
to share their personal health records among a group of users (e.g., doctors,
nurses, care-practitioners, and etc.,) for remote monitoring and diagnosis
without having to leave their home. In one particular scenario, a patient
is equipped with smart objects to collect his health data that is analyzed
through his mobile phone and outsourced to a cloud service provider. Then
authorized healthcare professionals monitor patient’s health status remotely
without visiting the patient hence saving costs and time. The benefits of
cloud data sharing paradigm are many for users as providing unlimited and
elastic storage resources, low costs and time due to provide services on de-
mand anywhere and at anytime, lowering the chance of data loss and high
scalability computing resources with high reliability and availability since
data is usually replicated among the number of servers [3]. On the other
hand, when cloud cannot be trusted enough to have data in plaintext, the
data privacy becomes a primary concern [5]. In addition, it is that only
authorized users have access to stored data in the cloud. Hence, the ma-
jor requirements of secure data sharing in the cloud can be summarized as
below [3]:
- Data owner should be able to specify a list of authorized users who
allow having access to their data from anywhere at anytime without
interaction,
- Data owner should have access control over her data,
- Data owner should be able to add new authorized users,
- Data owner should be able to revoke access rights of any member of
the group to access her data,
- No member of the group should be allowed to revoke rights or join
new users to the group.
Achieving the above-mentioned objectives, data owner should employ
a kind of cryptography technique to enforce security policies on her data
satisfying: (a) Confidentiality, that only authorized users are able to get ac-
cess to the data, (b) Authentication, that an entity is who or what it claims
to be, (c) Authorization, that a user has sufficient rights to perform the re-
quested operation, (d) Integrity, that data is protected from unauthorized or
unintentional alteration, modification, or deletion, (e) User revocation, that
revoked users are not able to get access to the data, and (f) Collusion resis-
tance that when users collude, they are not able to access the data without
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the permission of data owner. In order to preserve data confidentiality, a
possible solution is to employ some kind of public key infrastructure (PKI).
In a traditional PKI, a data owner encrypts its data based on a user’s pub-
lic key before outsourcing it to the cloud (i.e., payload-hiding) and the user
then can decrypt the encrypted data with her private key. However, this
manner has some disadvantages: the data owner requires the public keys of
users to encrypt its data and then sends the encrypted data separately to
the cloud, which increases the computational overhead and lots of storage
overhead would spend for storing the same plaintexts with different public
keys belonging to different users. On the other hand, the data owner needs
to obtain the list of authorized users before encryption and the cloud re-
quires to specify and enforce the access control policies for stored data to
control “who can have access to what?”.
To meet these challenges, many cryptographic-based approaches have
been proposed and among them, attribute-based encryption (ABE ) schemes
look very promising, since it binds fine-grained access control policies to the
data and it does not require an access control manager to check the access
policies in real time. Initially, access to data in the cloud is provided through
access control list (ACL) [6] for fine-grained access control. However, this
mechanism would introduce an extremely high complexity when it is en-
forced by cryptography schemes, the complexity of each data in terms of its
ciphertext size and corresponding data encryption operations is linear to the
number of system users; therefore, it makes the system less scalable and is
just able to provide coarse-grained access control to data [7]. ABE scheme
[8] provides a more flexible and scalable fine-grained access control to data
compare to ACL.
In ABE, data is encrypted based on the set of attributes (key-policy
ABE ) or according to an access control policy over attributes (ciphertext-
policy ABE ), such that the decryption of ciphertext is possible only if a set
of attributes in the user’s private key matches with the attributes of the
ciphertext, so that the data can be encrypted without exact knowledge of
the users set that will be able to decrypt. Moreover, in ABE scheme senders
and recipients are decoupled because they do not need to pre-share secrets,
which simplifies key management for large-scale and dynamic systems and
which makes data distribution more flexible. In particular, in group-oriented
publish-subscribe systems like IoT, ABE does not require a shared group
key to be updated for every new group member who joins, which causes
improving scalability. Furthermore, ABE is more strongly resistant to col-
lusion attacks than traditional public key encryption schemes [9].
Although access control systems based on ABE schemes present advan-
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tages regarding reduced communication, storage management and provide a
fine-grained access control, along with a decentralized access control mech-
anism, they are not suitable for scenarios in which data must be shared
among different parties with different access policies. For example, think of
a healthcare scenario in which, once data is collected by medical devices, it
is encrypted according to some access policy that has to be changed after-
wards since the data has been shared with other medical staff. Therefore,
one of the challenges of secure data sharing is: “How can we change access
policies, under which the data is encrypted, efficiently?”.
A simple solution for applying a new access policy to the data is to de-
crypt the data and then re-encrypt it with a new access policy. However,
this approach is very time-consuming and causes much computational over-
head that could be a challenging issue when using on resource-constraint
IoT devices such as smartphone or tablet.
Attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE ) scheme offers a good so-
lution for this drawback by delegating the re-encryption capability to a semi-
trusted proxy who can transform the encrypted data to those encrypted un-
der a different access policy by using the re-encryption key, which reduces
the computational overhead of the data owner and the sensitive information
and the decryption key cannot be revealed to the proxy. Therefore, this
approach is an efficient way of preserving the privacy for shared data among
users; however, the security issue still remains, i.e., the attributes that are
associated with each ciphertext can reveal to users who can not decrypt. For
example, in a healthcare scenario medical data requires a high degree of pri-
vacy since they are accessed by many parties such as the patient or staff (e.g.
doctors, nurses, care practitioners, etc.,) from the different department or
belonging to different hospitals. Therefore, even partial exposure of those at-
tributes could hurt the patient’s privacy. Thus, access control system based
on ABE are not enough to provide appropriate protection for sensitive data
in some scenario like healthcare. Instead, predicate encryption (PE ) scheme
[10] can solve the above problems by offering the “attribute-hiding”property
(which means that is not possible to determine the set of attributes with
which the ciphertext is encrypted) as well as the “payload-hiding” property.
1.2 Thesis Statement
The major goal of this research effort is to perform a realistic evaluation of
the security and efficiency issues of data sharing schemes on cloud comput-
ing. Based on the findings of these evaluations, we also propose a technique
to make data sharing paradigm more practical so that it can be adapted to
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IoT environment.
Four main research objectives of this thesis are described below:
Objective 1: Efficient and Secure Access Control for Outsourced
Data
Protecting data stored on cloud server from unauthorized access is another
important issue to be addressed. Users with different roles should be granted
different level of access privilege. Many papers [8, 11, 9] have been devel-
oped to propose techniques for cryptographically enforced access control to
outsourced data. These techniques are mostly designed for implementing
fine-grained access control via attribute-based encryption [8], which do not
allow updating attribute set without re-encryption, making policy extremely
inefficient. To this purpose, we evaluate the existing data sharing schemes in
terms of several metrics (e.g, computation costs, execution time and etc.,) to
identify and design scalable data sharing schemes with fine-grained access
control among both data owners and their authorized users and different
users with different access rights while preserving the security of encrypted
message and its associated attribute set.
Objective 2: Lightweight Fine-grained Access Control in IoT
Due to the limited computational capability of mobile devices, there is a
strong need to oﬄoad the intensive data access operations on the cloud
server for execution and adopt lightweight access control mechanisms to ac-
cess shared data [12]. Hence, the plan is to improve the proposed schemes
(Objective 1) using lightweight symmetric encryption version in order to get
significant improvement in results while preserving data privacy.
Objective 3: Correctness and Security Analysis
We aim to prove the correctness of the proposed schemes and provide a for-
mal mathematical security proof.
Objective 4: Performance Analysis
The effort is to conduct experimental performance assessments of the pro-
posed schemes in emulated platforms.
1.3 Main Contribution of this Research
This research contributes original ideas to the data sharing schemes on cloud
computing. We identify an extensive evaluation for data sharing and used
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that to determine which schemes work best for IoT scenario and constrained
devices in terms of privacy and efficiency. We conduct several experiments
to assess designed schemes in terms of computation cost and execution time
and to show that the proposed schemes perform well compared to the previ-
ous relevant approaches. We propose an effective deployment IoT scenario
namely EVOTION to deploy the lightweight version of the proposed data
sharing techniques.
The main contributions of this research are:
1. Fine-grained Access Control. The protocols proposed in this thesis
are differs from attribute-based encryption (ABE ) schemes used for fine-
grained access policies since they do not sufficiently protect the attributes
associated with the message ciphertext. The proposed schemes are based
on using inner-product encryption (IPE ) that is a well-known functional
encryption primitive that allows decryption when the inner-product of the
attribute vectors upon which the encrypted data and the decryption key de-
pend is equal to zero. With using the proposed IPE protocols it is possible
to define fine-grained access policies over encrypted data whose enforcement
can be outsourced to the cloud where the data is stored.
2. Policy Change. Current IPE schemes do not support efficient access
policy changes. The proposed scheme in this thesis adopts a novel inner-
product proxy re-encryption scheme that provides the proxy server with a
transformation key with which a ciphertext associated with an attribute
vector can be transformed to a new ciphertext associated with a different
attribute vector, providing a policy update mechanism whose performance
is suitable for many practical applications.
3. Attribute Hiding. A common limitation of ABE approaches is that
the ciphertexts do not conceal their corresponding attributes set, and there-
fore they do not guarantee attribute-hiding property. Furthermore, to the
best of our knowledge, this concern has not yet been addressed satisfacto-
rily in previous inner-product proxy re-encryption schemes. The proposed
inner-product proxy re-encryption protocols in this thesis do a better job
in hiding the vector used for data encryption than previous inner-product
proxy re-encryption proposal.
4. Lightweight Fine-grained Access Control. Due to the limited
computational power of mobile devices, it is important to design lightweight
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ABE schemes. This thesis proposes a lightweight inner-product proxy re-
encryption scheme using a symmetric key for data encryption/decryption.
1.4 Overview of Thesis
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents some basic notations, cryptographic primitives and
security assumptions that are used throughout this thesis.
Chapter 3 outlines the primary data sharing techniques available on cloud
computing and their privacy and performance issues. It reviews the relevant
solutions to mitigate the limitations of the primary data sharing techniques
including the state of the art discussed in cloud computing. The existing
techniques are compared in terms of computation costs and execution time
to investigate which schemes appear most promising for IoT environment.
Chapter 4 states the system model in which the proposed protocols are
built upon and the details of problem statements. It also addresses Ob-
jective 1 and illustrates our access control system for securely sharing data
stored at honest-but-curious servers and proposes an efficient approach man-
aging access policy changes among users with different access rights.
Chapter 5 addresses Objective 2 and determines the constraints of the
proposed techniques (Objective 1) in IoT domain. It states how the pro-
posed techniques can be improved using lightweight cryptographic technique
providing fine-grained access policies for a considered IoT case study.
Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and outlines future
work.
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Chapter 2
Cryptographic Background
In this chapter, we will provide a brief review of cryptographic background,
which is necessary for understanding the rest of this thesis. We first in-
troduce two encryption algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric encryption
algorithms. Then, we present the background on different cryptographic
preliminaries, including cyclic group, elliptic curve cryptography, pairing-
based cryptography and bilinear map. Finally, we present the complexity
assumptions which are used in our proposed protocols.
2.1 Encryption
Encryption is one of the most popular and effective data security methods
used by organizations to protect the confidentiality of data stored on com-
puter systems or transmitted via the Internet. In cryptography, encryption
is the process of encoding a message/file in such a way that only authorized
users can access it. In an encryption, the intended message often referred to
as plaintext, is encrypted using an encryption algorithm. This process gen-
erates a ciphertext that can be decrypted with the proper key. Encryption
algorithms are divided into two categories: symmetric key encryption and
asymmetric key encryption (public key encryption).
2.1.1 Symmetric Key Encryption
Symmetric key encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption
and decryption are performed using the same key. It is also known as con-
ventional encryption or single key encryption. Symmetric key encryption
is simple and much faster than asymmetric key encryption and you require
quite small key-sizes to get good cryptographic strength. But its main draw-
back is that the sender has to exchange the key used to encrypt the data with
8
the recipient before he can decrypt it; therefore, there has to be a second
secure channel to transmit this key from one end to the other. In IoT en-
vironment, symmetric cryptography is a good choice, since most of the IoT
device platforms already have hardware blocks for symmetric cryptography.
But getting the symmetric key to the decrypting entity is a hard problem,
because the key has to be transmitted via the unsecured wireless connection
as a second channel. To secure the symmetric key in transit, asymmetric
approaches are used. One of the most common symmetric key encryption
is advanced encryption standard (AES ) that can process data blocks of 128
bits, using cipher keys with lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
2.1.2 Asymmetric Key Encryption
Asymmetric key encryption (public key encryption) uses pairs of keys, a
public key, and a private key. A user’s public key is public and anyone in
the system can access it and a user’s private key should be kept private.
A message that is encrypted with a particular public key can only be de-
crypted by the corresponding private key. This type of encryption does
not need the pre-determined shared secret to begin secure communication
because only the intended recipient can decrypt the message. Security of
the public key is not required because it is publicly available and can be
passed over the Internet. Asymmetric key encryption has a far better power
in ensuring the security of information transmitted during communication.
The asymmetric key encryption requires significantly more computational
effort than the symmetric key encryption. Popular asymmetric key encryp-
tion includes EIGamal, Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC ).
2.2 Hybrid Encryption
Hybrid encryption is a cryptographic paradigm which combines the effi-
ciency and large message space of symmetric key encryption techniques with
the advantages of public key encryption techniques. In hybrid a encryption
scheme first, a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM ) is used to fix a random
session key that is then fed into a highly efficient data encapsulation mech-
anism (DEM ) to encrypt the actual message. A ciphertext output from
a hybrid cryptosystem has two components: A hybrid encryption scheme
consists of two independent cryptosystems:
• A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM ). This cryptosystem gen-
erates simultaneously a random symmetric key together with its en-
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cryption (encapsulate the symmetric key). Basically, this cryptosys-
tem is a public key encryption scheme, except that the encryption
algorithm generates the encryption of a random symmetric key.
• A data encapsulation mechanism (DEM ). This cryptosystem en-
crypts the message under the obtained symmetric key from the KEM )
using symmetric key encryption techniques.
Both the KEM and DEM ciphertexts are then sent to a user. First, the
user decrypts the KEM ciphertext to get the symmetric key using his own
private key and then uses that key to decrypt the message.
2.3 Security Level
In cryptography, a security level is a measure of the strength that a crypto-
graphic primitive, such as a cipher or hash function, achieves. The security
level is often measured in bits, e.g., 80-bit security. This measure origins
from the key length of a symmetric key. If there is no structural weakness of
the symmetrical encryption algorithm, then an attacker makes an exhaus-
tive search by trying all possible keys in the entire key space. Exhaustive
key search for the λ-bit key may involve up to 2λ different keys. In general,
a cryptographic system offers security level λ if a successful general attack
can be expected to require effort approximately 2λ [13]. For example, an
80-bit key length means that the key space consists of 280 different keys. By
increasing the key length, the number of possible keys grows exponentially
and the security level is increased as well. In asymmetric encryption, the
key length does not directly correspond to the security level. Instead, the
security of asymmetric encryption is dependent on the intractability of the
underlying mathematical problems such as integer factorization. However,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST ) and other insti-
tutes have guidelines for translating the key size of asymmetric encryption
algorithms to a security level in terms of symmetric key length. For exam-
ple, NIST guidelines state that for 80-bit security RSA a prime modulus of
1024-bit is needed.
2.4 Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section, some cryptography preliminaries needed for the understand-
ing of our proposed schemes are introduced.
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2.4.1 Cyclic Group
In mathematics, a group G is an algebraic structure consisting of a set of
elements equipped with an operation  (called the group law of G) that
combines any two elements a and b to form a third element in the group,
denoted a b or ab. To qualify as a group, the set and operation, (G, ), must
satisfy four conditions called the group axioms:
1. Closure: if a, b ∈ G, then a  b ∈ G.
2. Associativity: for all a, b, c ∈ G, (a  b)  c = a  (b  c).
3. Identity element: there exists an element e in G such that, for every
element a in G, the equation e  a = a  e = a holds. Such an element
is unique, and this one of the identity element.
4. Inverse element: for each a in G, there exists an element b in G,
commonly denoted a−1 (or −a, if the operation is denoted “+”), such
that a  b = b  a = e, where e is the identity element.
The result of an operation may depend on the order of the operands.
In other words, the result of combining element a with element b need not
yield the same result as combining element b with element a; the equation
a  b = b  a may not always be true.
In algebra, a cyclic group or monogenous group is a group that is gen-
erated by a single element g in the group G. That is, it consists of a set
of elements with a single invertible associative operation, and it contains an
element g such that every other element of the group can be obtained by
repeatedly applying the group operation or its inverse to g. Each element
can be written as a power of g in multiplicative notation, or as a multiple of
g in additive notation. This element g is called a generator of the group [14].
Definition 2.1. A group G is called cyclic if it is generated by an ele-
ment g ∈ G such that every element in G has the form gn for some integer
n: G = 〈g〉 = {gn | n is an integer}.
2.4.2 Finite Fields
A finite field is a mathematical group with a finite number of elements. An
example of a finite field is all the integers modulo a number p, this finite
field is denoted Zp.
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2.4.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC ) is a type of public key cryptosystem
based on elliptic curve groups over finite fields. ECC encryption systems
are based on the idea of using points on a curve to define the public/private
key pair. An elliptic curve is the set of points defined by the following
equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p, (2.1)
where a and b are parameters that determine the shape of the curve and
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (this is required to exclude singular curves). Each point on
the elliptic curve can be represented as a vector in affine coordinates such
as P = (px, py), where px and py must satisfy the equation 2.1. The only
difference is that all coordinates must be integers in modular p.
An elliptic curve group G consists of the elliptic curve and a group op-
eration called addition, denoted by “+”. Furthermore, a point at infinity is
needed, denoted 0 which serves as the identity element. In addition to the
four group axioms the addition operation of elliptic curve groups has the
property of being commutative, i.e. if P,Q ∈ G then P + Q = Q + P . For
the purposes of this thesis, a high-level understanding of the elliptic curve
group is sufficient, for more detailed information see [15].
Compared to other public key cryptosystems like RSA, elliptic curve
cryptography requires less computing power. This type of public key has
the advantage to reach a high-security level with rather small key sizes.
A key of 160-bit ECC correlates to a 1024-bit RSA key, or 512-bit ECC
correlates to 15,360-bit RSA. Computing 160-bit mathematical operations
save a lot compared to 1024-bit operations [16].
2.4.4 Multiplicative and Additive Notations
There are two main notational conventions for abelian groups 1: multiplica-
tive and additive notation. The multiplicative notation is used for the oper-
ation in an arbitrary group, while the additive notation is used for modules
and rings. The additive notation may also be used to emphasize that a par-
ticular group is abelian, whenever both abelian and non-abelian groups are
considered, some notable exceptions being near-rings and partially ordered
groups, where an operation is written additively even when non-abelian.
1An abelian group (commutative group), is a group in which the result of applying the
group operation to two group elements does not depend on the order in which they are
written.
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Table 2.1 shows that how the operations of the different notations cor-
respond to each other.
Convention Operation Powers Inverse Identity
Addition x+ y nx −x 0
Multiplication x · y or xy xn x−1 e or 1
Table 2.1: Comparison between multiplicative and additive notations
2.4.5 Pairing-based Cryptography
In a multiplicative notation a pairing between elements of two cryptographic
groups to a third group can be written as:
e : G1 ×G2 → GT ,
where G1, G2, and GT are three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order
p and e is a bilinear map. Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator
of G2. The bilinear map e satisfies the following properties:
- Bilinearity: for all g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have:
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab.
- Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
In some instances the pairing is symmetric if G1 = G2; otherwise, is an
asymmetric pairing i.e. when G1 6= G2.
If the map e is symmetric, then we have: e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab = e(gb1, g
a
2).
2.4.6 Bilinear Map
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and g be
a generator of G. A pairing (or bilinear map) e : G×G→ GT is a function
that has the following properties [17]:
1. Bilinear: a map e : G×G→ GT is bilinear if e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab for
all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p.
2. Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1. The map does not send all pairs in G×G
to the identity in GT . Since G and GT are groups of prime order, this
implies that if g is a generator of G then e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
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3. Computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute the map e(u, v)
for any u, v ∈ G.
A map e is an admissible bilinear map in G if satisfies the three properties
above. Note that e( , ) is symmetric since e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
2.4.7 Asymmetric Bilinear Pairing Groups
Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e) [18] are tuples
composed of a prime order p, cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of a prime order
p, g1 6= 1 ∈ G1, g2 6= 1 ∈ G2, and a polynomial-time computable non-
degenerate bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT (e.g., e(gs1, gt2) = e(g1, g2)st
and e(g1, g2) 6= 1).
The term asymmetric refers to the fact that the groups G1 and G2 are not
the same. It is well-known that when G1 = G2 then Decision Diffie-Hellman
(DDH ) problem in G is easy; however when G1 and G2 are distinct and there
is no efficiently computable map from G1 to G2 and the DDH problem in
G can still be hard [19].
2.5 Complexity Assumptions
This thesis uses the following complexity assumptions.
- Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption [17]
Let a, b, c ∈ Z∗p be chosen at random and g be a generator for G. The
Decisional BDH assumption is defined as follows: given (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) ∈
G4 × GT as input, determine whether Z = e(g, g)abc or Z is a random in
GT .
- The Decision Linear (D-Linear) Assumption [20]
Let z1, z2, z3, z4 ∈ Z∗p be chosen at random and g be a generator for G. The
Decision Linear assumption is defined as follows: given (g, gz1 , gz2 , gz1z3 , gz2z4 ,
Z) ∈ G6 as input, determine whether Z = gz3+z4 or Z is random in G. We
consider an equivalently modified version such as: given (g, gz1 , gz2 , gz1z3 , gz4 ,
Z) ∈ G6 as input, determine whether Z = gz2(z3+z4) or Z is random in G.
Definition 2.2. We say that the {Decision BDH, Decision Linear} as-
sumption holds in G if the advantage of any polynomial-time algorithm is
solving the {Decision BDH, Decision Linear} problem is negligible.
14
- Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)
[21], [22]
Consider the following two distributions for g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2, a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, and
T ∈ GT chosen uniformly at random:
- PA := (g, ga, gc, h, ha, hb, e(g, h)abc) ∈ G31 ×G32 ×GT
- RA := (g, ga, gc, h, ha, hb, T ) ∈ G31 ×G32 ×GT .
For an algorithm A, we let AdvDBDHA be the advantage of A in distin-
guishing these two distributions:
AdvDBDHA = |Pr[A(D) = 1]− Pr[A(R) = 1]|,
where is sampled from PA and R is sampled from RA. We say that an
algorithm B that outputs a bit in {0, 1} has advantage AdvDBDHA =  in
solving the DBDH problem with asymmetric pairing if:
|Pr[B(g, ga, gc, h, ha, hb, e(g, h)abc) = 0]− Pr[B(g, ga, gc, h, ha, hb, T ) = 0]|≥ ,
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G1 and
h ∈ G2, exponents a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, T ∈ GT , and the random bits used by B.
As usual, to state the assumption asymptotically, we rely on a bilinear group
generator G that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs the de-
scription of a bilinear group.
Definition 2.3. Let G be a bilinear group generator. We say that the
DBDH holds for G if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time PPT algorithms
A, the function AdvDBDHA (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
- P-Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (P-DBDH)[19],
[23]
For g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2, a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, and T ∈ GT chosen uniformly at random,
we consider the following two distributions:
- DN := (g, ga, gab, gc, h, ha, hb, gabc) ∈ G41 ×G32 ×G1
- DR := (g, ga, gab, gc, h, ha, hb, T ) ∈ G41 ×G32 ×G1.
For an algorithm A, let AdvP−DBDHA be the advantage of A in distin-
guishing these two distributions:
AdvP−DBDHA = |Pr[A(N) = 1]− Pr[A(P ) = 1]|,
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where N is sampled from DN and P is sampled from DR. We say that an
algorithm B that outputs a bit in {0, 1} has the advantage AdvP−DBDHA = P
in solving the P −DBDH problem in asymmetric pairing if:
|Pr[B(g, ga, gab, gc, h, ha, hb, gabc) = 0]− Pr[B(g, ga, gab, gc, h, ha, hb, T ) = 0]|≥ P,
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g ∈ G1 and
h ∈ G2, exponents a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, T ∈ G1, and the random bits used by B.
Definition 2.4. Let G be a bilinear group generator. We say that the
P − DBDH holds for G if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time PPT algo-
rithms A, the function AdvP−DBDHA (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
In this chapter, we present a review of the research literature related to
secure and confidential data sharing in the cloud computing. We first in-
troduce a type of public-key encryption, namely attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE ) scheme, which is used to enable secure data sharing in the
cloud. Then, we present two types of ABE scheme: key-policy attribute-
based encryption (KP-ABE ) and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (CP-ABE ) schemes and compare both of these schemes in terms of
the size of keys, ciphertext, and computational overhead. We then describe
an advanced cryptographic technique known as proxy re-encryption (PRE )
scheme and introduce the different types of this scheme.
3.1 Attribute-based Encryption
The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE ) was proposed by Sahai
and Waters [8] as an extension of identity-based encryption (IBE ) scheme
[24], to express and enforce complex access control policies in both a simple
and a flexible way to achieve the privacy-preserving goal. In their scheme
(called fuzzy IBE (FIBE )) identities are viewed as a set of descriptive at-
tributes where a data owner can encrypt a message to all users who have a
certain set of attributes and a user can decrypt a message when at least d
attributes overlap between the encrypted data and his private key. Although
this scheme can prevent the collusion attacks, it only supports threshold ac-
cess policies, which limits its applicability to large systems due to the lack
of expressibility.
In an ABE system, both ciphertexts and user’s private keys are asso-
ciated with an attribute set. This system allows any user to decrypt a
ciphertext if and only if the set of attributes in his private key matches the
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attributes of the ciphertext. Based on whether the access policy is embedded
in the private key or the ciphertext, ABE schemes can be classified into two
categories: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE ) scheme [11]
and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE ) scheme [9].
3.1.1 Properties of Attribute-based Encryption Schemes
Some fundamental properties of a well-designed ABE scheme are listed as
follows [25]:
1) Data confidentiality: the data is encrypted by the data owner be-
fore outsourcing to the cloud. Therefore, unauthorized users cannot
learn any information about the encrypted data.
2) Fine-grained access control: by providing different private keys
for users, the system authority is able to restrict user access rights to
specific resources. This property achieves flexible access control, even
for users in the same group, their access rights are not the same.
3) Scalability: the number of authorized users cannot affect the perfor-
mance of the scheme. Therefore, the scheme can deal with the case
that the number of authorized users increases dynamically.
4) User/attribute revocation: if a user quits the system, the scheme
can revoke his access right. Similarly, attribute revocation is inevitable.
6) Collusion resistance: if users combine their private keys they should
not be able to decrypt ciphertexts which they could not decrypt indi-
vidually. Because each private key is generated with a random seed,
combining keys cannot create a new meaningful key.
3.1.2 Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption Scheme
The idea of key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE ) system for
fine-grained access control over encrypted data was proposed by Goyal et
al.[11]. A fine-grained access control system allows that different authorized
users can decrypt different pieces of encrypted data based on the access pol-
icy. In KP-ABE, where access policy is built in the user’s private key, a user
can decrypt the message if and only if the encrypted data with attributes
satisfies the access policy of user’s private key.
Although Goyal et al.’s KP-ABE scheme can achieve fine-grained access
control and more flexibility to control users than ABE scheme, the access
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structure in their scheme is a monotonic access structure which cannot ex-
press the negative attribute to exclude the participants with whom the data
owner does not want to share data [25].
To address this issue, Ostrovsky et al. [26] presented the first KP-ABE
scheme with a non-monotonic access structure by adopting the idea from the
broadcast revocation scheme of Naor and Pinkas [27] to the ABE scheme
of Goyal et al. [11]. In particular, their construction can handle any access
structure that can be represented by a boolean formula involving AND, OR,
NOT, and threshold operations. For example, if a teacher in the department
of information management wants to share the data with students, he will
define a set of attributes in the ciphertext and there is an access structure
{MIS1∧Student} in student’s private key. But the teacher does not want
graduates to access this data, he adds “NOT graduate” to the access struc-
ture: {MIS∧Student∧NOT graduate}. So the access structure can let
data not be accessed by graduates. However, their mechanism increases the
private key size by a multiplicative factor of log n, where n is the maximum
number of attributes and adds encryption and decryption overhead at the
same time, since there are many negative attributes in the encrypted data
and each attribute adds a negative word to describe it but they are useless
for decrypting the ciphertexts.
Then Lewko et al. [28] improved the initial construction of Ostrovsky
et al. [26] by using a revocation system with short key instead of Naor and
Pinkas [27] scheme and designed the most efficient non-monotonic KP-ABE
scheme, where the key storage is significantly more efficient than previous
solutions.
In the above KP-ABE schemes, the size of the ciphertext increases lin-
early with the number of attributes in the system. Therefore, to cope with
the ciphertext overhead, Attrapadung et al. [29] proposed the first non-
monotonic KP-ABE scheme with constant size ciphertexts. To achieve this
goal, they applied the technique of Lewko et al. [28] to their efficient identity-
based revocation mechanism and combined it with the monotonic KP-ABE
which is derived from a certain class of identity-based broadcast encryption
(IBBE ) scheme. Although the ciphertext size of their scheme is constant
and decryption just need 3 pairing operations, but the private keys have a
quadratic size in the number of attributes. Table 3.1 compares efficiency
among available expressive KP-ABE schemes that support non-monotonic
access structures.
1Management Information System
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Scheme Private key
size
Ciphertext
overhead
Decryption
cost
Ostrovsky et al. [26] O(t · log n) O(n) O(t)
Lewko et al. [28] O(t) O(n) O(t)
Attrapadung et al. [29] O(t · n) 3 3
n: the maximum number of attributes in the system, n: the number of attributes
for a ciphertext, t : the number of attributes in an access structure for a key.
Table 3.1: Comparison of non-monotonic KP-ABE schemes
Formal Definition of KP-ABE Scheme
A KP-ABE scheme consists of four fundamental algorithms Setup, Encrypt,
KeyGen, and Decrypt with the following functions:
- (PK,MSK)← Setup (sp). This algorithm is run by the trust authority
(TA), which takes as input a security parameter sp and outputs a
public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
- CT← Encrypt (PK, γ,M). This algorithm is run by a data owner who
takes as input the public key PK, a set of attributes γ, and a message
M to output a ciphertext CT associated with the set of attributes γ.
- SK ← KeyGen (MSK,PK,A). This algorithm is run by the TA. It
takes as input the master secret key MSK, the public key PK, and
the access control structure A. It outputs a private key SK associated
with the access control structure A.
- M ← Decrypt (SK,CT). This algorithm is run by the user. It takes
as input the private key SK and the ciphertext CT. It outputs either
a message M if A(γ) = 1 or the distinguished symbol ⊥ if A(γ) = 0.
3.1.3 Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption Scheme
Although KP-ABE scheme can achieve fine-grained access control and re-
duces the communication overhead, the data owner has no control over who
has access to his data, except by his choice of a set of attributes for the
data. Therefore, the data owner must trust the key-issuer to issue the ap-
propriate keys for granting or denying access to the authorized users. This
mechanism is unsuitable in some distributed systems where a user should
only have access to data if he has a certain set of credentials or attributes.
A straightforward method for enforcing such policies is to employ a trusted
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server for storing the data and mediate access control. However, if any server
storing the data is compromised, then the confidentiality of the data will be
compromised.
To address this problem, Bethencourt et al. [9] proposed the first cipher-
text policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE ) scheme based on Goyal et
al.’s scheme [11]. In CP-ABE scheme, access policy is built in the encrypted
data and a user’s private key is associated with a set of attributes. A user will
be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the attribute set in his private
key satisfies the access policy of encrypted data. For example in health-
care application, if a patient encrypts his medical record under the access
policy I = (Physician∧Policlinico of Milan)∨ (Insurance company A ∧
Healthinsurance department). A user who wants to decrypt this file must
be a physician in “Policlinico of Milan” or he must be an employee in the
health insurance department of a particular insurance company. Therefore,
by using CP-ABE technique the data owner is able to decide who should
or should not have access to his data and does not require to know the
exact identities of all authorized users. Moreover, the encrypted data can
be kept confidential even if the storage server is untrusted. Bethencourt et
al. [9] also proposed a novel construction for preventing collusion users at-
tacks. In the technique used by Sahai and Waters [8], collusion resistance is
insured by using a secret-sharing scheme and embedding independently cho-
sen secret shares into each private key. Because of the independence of the
randomness used in each invocation of the secret sharing scheme, collusion-
resistance follows. However, in Bethencourt et al.’s scheme [9], user’s private
keys are associated with sets of attributes instead of access structures over
them, and so secret sharing schemes do not apply. Instead, they propose
a novel private key randomization technique that uses a new two-level ran-
dom masking methodology. While Bethencourt et al.’s construction [9] is
very expressive, but its security proof is in the generic bilinear group model
an artificial model which assumes the attacker needs to access an oracle in
order to perform any group operations. However, it is desirable to propose
a scheme which is provably secure under a more standard assumption.
To address this issue, Cheung et al. [30] presented the first formal chosen-
ciphertext (CCA) security proof for CP-ABE under the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (DBDH ) assumption, in which access structures are AND
gates on positive and negative attributes. Existing ABE schemes [8, 11, 9]
involve some form of threshold secret sharing construction. In [8, 11], shares
of a system master secret are embedded into user’s private keys, while in
[9] shares of the randomness in an encryption are embedded into ciphertext
components. However, Cheung et al. [30] break from this tradition and show
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that by separating threshold secret sharing from the CP-ABE primitive,
they can obtain simple and efficient schemes that are provably secure under
standard complexity assumptions. Furthermore, threshold access policies
can be re-introduced in an independent mechanism; namely, one can con-
struct shares of a message using a standard secret sharing scheme and then
encrypt each share independently using CP-ABE. Cheung et al. [30] also
used a “don’t care” element to indicate the attribute which does not appear
in the AND gate. Therefore, their scheme treats negation and “don’t care”
in a more streamlined fashion. Moreover, their scheme does not involve any
secret sharing construction, therefore no exponentiations are necessary in
their Decrypt algorithm, while the Bethencourt et al.’s Decrypt algorithm
requires “d” (threshold value) exponentiations in order to perform poly-
nomial interpolation. Although Cheung et al.’s scheme [30] improves the
security proof in Bethencourt et al.’s [9], the ciphertext and private key size
and Encryption/Decryption time increase linearly with the total number of
attributes in the system. In contrast, the ciphertext and private key size
and Encryption/Decryption time of Bethencourt et al.’s scheme [9] are linear
in the size of the access structure. Therefore, Cheung et al.’s scheme [30] is
less efficient than Bethencourt et al.’s scheme [9].
Nishide et al. [31] improved the security of Cheung et al.’s scheme [30] by
proposing a recipient-anonymous CP-ABE scheme, where an access struc-
ture associated with ciphertext is hidden and a decryptor cannot obtain the
information about the ciphertext policy. For example, suppose a company
wants to hire certain qualified people who satisfy the policy the company
specified and the policy may contain the useful information about the com-
pany’s business strategy. The company can post a message encrypted by
Nishide et al.’s CP-ABE scheme on a public bulletin board to seek applica-
tions. By doing so, the company can keep the important policy confidential.
Since the policy is hidden, the rival companies cannot know what kind of
policy the company used to hire its employees. Nishide et al. [31] also
generalized their idea to adopt the access structures used in Cheung et al.’s
scheme [30] to the multi-valued attribute setting where an attribute can take
multiple values. They proved the security of their construction based on the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH ) assumption and the Decision
Linear assumption.
In order to design CP-ABE scheme with flexible strategy under DBDH
assumption, Goyal et al. [32] and Liang et al. [33] presented bounded tree
structure.
Goyal et al. [32] designed a bounded ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption (BCP-ABE ) scheme having a secure proof based on a standard
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theoretic assumption and supporting advanced access structures. Their
construction can support access structures which can be represented by a
bounded size access tree with threshold gates as its nodes. The bound on
the size of the access tree is chosen at the time of the system setup and is
represented by a tuple (d, num), where “d” represents the maximum depth
of the access tree and “num” represents the maximum number of children
each non-leaf node of the tree might have. Each access tree satisfies these
upper bounds on the size can be dynamically chosen by the encryptor. Fur-
thermore, they extended their construction to support non-monotonic access
policies which can express any access formula with bounded polynomial size
(including the AND, OR and threshold operations). The drawback of their
scheme is that the depth of the access tree “d” under which messages can
be encrypted is defined in the setup phase. Thus, the message sender is
restricted to use only an access tree which has the depth d′ 6 d. However,
constructing a more efficient CP-ABE scheme based on number-theoretic
assumptions was left as an important open question.
Liang et al. [33] improved the BCP-ABE scheme of Goyal et al. [32]
and presented an efficient BCP-ABE scheme (called BCP1). The security
proof of BCP1 is reduced to DBDH assumption in the standard model. By
eliminating redundant steps, their scheme provided faster Encrypt/Decrypt
algorithm and shortened the length of public key, private key, and ciphertext
compared with Goyal et al.’s scheme [32]. Moreover, they proposed a prov-
ably secure BCP-ABE scheme (called BCP2) in the standard model under
chosen ciphertext secure notion by adopting one-time signature technique.
Later, Ibraimi et al. [34] used the general access tree structure to elim-
inate the boundary constraints in [32, 33]. Firstly, they presented a new
technique to construct a CP-ABE scheme without using Shamir’s thresh-
old secret sharing technique [35]. Their proposed scheme is appropriate for
resource-constrained devices since calculating polynomial interpolations to
construct the secret is computationally expensive. In their scheme, the en-
cryptor specifies the policy in the encryption phase by using an n-ary access
tree which is represented by AND and OR nodes. Their scheme requires
less computation overhead for Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms compared
with Cheung et al.’s scheme [30]. Secondly, they extended their scheme and
presented a second CP-ABE scheme which uses Shamir’s threshold secret
sharing technique [35]. In their modified scheme, the policy can be expressed
as an n-ary access tree which consists of AND, OR and “of ” nodes. They
compared the efficiency of their scheme with Bethencourt et al.’s scheme
[9] and showed that their scheme requires less computation overhead in the
Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms.
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In all previous ABE schemes [8, 11, 9, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34], the length of
the ciphertext and the number of pairing operations depend on the num-
ber of attributes. Therefore, Emura et al. [36] proposed the first CP-ABE
scheme with a constant ciphertext length and a constant number of pairing
operations. In their scheme, the sum of master keys is used to achieve the
constant ciphertext length. The access structure used in their CP-ABE is
constructed by AND-gates on multi-valued attributes, which is a subset of
the access structures used in [30, 31]. However, their scheme is inefficient in
that the size of public key grows linearly with the number of attributes.
Waters [37] proposed a new methodology for realizing CP-ABE systems
from a general set of access structures that are efficient, expressive, and
provably secure under concrete and non-interactive assumptions. He pre-
sented three constructions which provide a trade-off in terms of efficiency
and the complexity of assumptions. His constructions allow any encryptor to
specify access control in terms of any access formula. His first construction
expressed access control by a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS ) matrix
M over the attributes in the system. This scheme is proven selectively
secure under the decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (PB-
DHE ) assumption which can be viewed as a generalization of the BDHE
assumption [38]. In this most efficient system, the ciphertext size and en-
cryption/decryption overhead increase linearly with the complexity of the
access formula. His scheme achieves the same performance and function-
ality as Bethencourt et al.’s scheme [9] but under the standard model. In
addition, he presented two other constructions which provide performance
trade-off to achieve provable security under the (weaker) decisional Bilinear-
Diffie-Hellman Exponent (d-BDHE ) and decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumptions, respectively.
Previous constructions of ABE schemes were only proven to be selec-
tively secure. To achieve adaptive (non-selective) security, Lewko et al. [39]
used a novel information-theoretic argument to adapt the dual system en-
cryption methodology introduced by Waters [37] to the more complicated
structure of ABE system. Their ABE scheme supports arbitrary monotone
access formulas. They constructed their system in composite order bilinear
groups, where the order is a product of three primes. This causes less prac-
tical efficiency compared with Waters’s scheme. They proved the security
of their system under three static assumptions used by Lewko and Waters
[40].
Until Zhang et al. [41] proposed a CP-ABE from lattice assumptions,
there have been only implementations of ABE schemes based on bilinear
pairings as mentioned above. Previous to their work no other cryptographic
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assumptions than bilinear pairings have been utilized for ABE schemes.
Their construction is defined on q-ary lattices and supports AND-gate ac-
cess structure on positive and negative attributes. Their proposed scheme
has a very strong security proof under the learning with error (LWE ) as-
sumption. Although their construction seems to be not much efficient, it
gives light to the possibility of constructing attribute schemes under other
hard problem assumptions (e.g., lattice problems), instead of the pairing-
related assumptions. They remain an open problem to obtain a CP-ABE
scheme that can support more general access structure from lattices.
3.1.3.1 Formal Definition of CP-ABE Scheme
A CP-ABE scheme also consists of four fundamental algorithms Setup,
Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt with the following functions:
- (PK,MSK)← Setup (sp). This algorithm is run by the trust authority
(TA), which takes as input a security parameter sp and outputs a
public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
- CT← Encrypt (PK,A,M). This algorithm is run by a data owner who
takes as input the public key PK, an access control structure A, and
a message M to output a ciphertext CT associated with the access
control structure A.
- SK ← KeyGen (MSK,PK, γ). This algorithm is run by the TA. It
takes as input the master secret key MSK, the public key PK, and the
set of attributes γ. It outputs a private key SK associated with the
set of attributes γ.
- M ← Decrypt (SK,CT). This algorithm is run by the user. It takes
as input the private key SK and the ciphertext CT. It outputs either
a message M if A(γ) = 1 or the distinguished symbol ⊥ if A(γ) = 0.
3.1.4 Comparison between ABE schemes
The basic ABE scheme, KP-ABE, and CP-ABE schemes are different in
terms of complexity hypothesis, strategic flexibility, and applications. The
basic ABE scheme, which only supports threshold policy, is suitable for
simply policy-required applications. On the other hand, KP-ABE and CP-
ABE, which support complex policies, are appropriate for the applications
of fine-grained data sharing.
In KP-ABE schemes, the access policy is built into the user’s private key;
therefore, the data owner cannot choose who decrypts his data. However,
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in CP-ABE schemes, a ciphertext is associated with an access policy and
makes them more suitable for the realistic application compared with KP-
ABE schemes. In general, KP-ABE schemes apply to query applications
such as pay-TV system, audit log, targeted broadcast, and database access;
while, CP-ABE schemes are used for access control applications such as
social networking site access and electronic medical system.
The comparison of the keys size and ciphertext and the computational
overhead of Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms of different ABE schemes are
shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, respectively.
Scheme Public Key Private Key Ciphertext
Sahai et al. [8] n|G|+|GT | AU |G| AC |G|+|GT |
Goyal et al.[11] n|G|+|GT | AU |G| AC |G|+|GT |
Bethencourt et al.
[9]
3|G|+|GT | (2AU + 1)|G| (2AC+1)|G|+|GT |
Cheung et al. [30] (3n+ 1)|G|+|GT | (2n+ 1)|G| (n+ 1)|G|+|GT |
Nishide et al. [31] (2N ′+1)|G|+|GT | (3n+ 1)|G| (2N ′ + 1)|G|+|GT |
Ibraimi et al. [34] (n+ 1)|G|+|GT | (AU + 1)|G| (AC + 1)|G|+|GT |
Emura et al. [36] (N ′ + 2)|G|+|GT | 2|G| 2|G|+|GT |
Waters [37] (n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (AU + 2)|G| (2AC+1)|G|+|GT |
Lewko et al. [39] (n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (AU + 2)|G| (2AC+1)|G|+|GT |
|G|: bit length of element in G, |GT |: bit length of element in GT , n: the number
of attributes in the system, N ′ = Σni=1ni: the total number of possible values for
attributes, where ni is the number of possible values for attribute i, AC (|AC |=
AC): a set of attributes associated with the ciphertext, AU (|AU |= AU ): a set of
attributes associated with the private key.
Table 3.2: Comparison of the size of keys and ciphertext of ABE schemes
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Scheme Encrypt Decrypt
Sahai et al. [8] ACG+GT AUP + (AU + 1)GT
Goyal et al.[11] ACG+GT AUP + (AU + 1)GT
Bethencourt et al. [9] (2AC + 1)G+ 2GT (2AU )P + (2|S|+2)GT
Cheung et al. [30] (n+ 1)G+ 2GT (n+ 1)P + (n+ 1)GT
Nishide et al. [31] (2N ′ + 1)G+ 2GT (3n+ 1)P + (3n+ 1)GT
Ibraimi et al. [34] (AC + 1)G+ 2GT (AU + 1)P + (AU + 1)GT
Emura et al. [36] (n+ 1)G+ 2GT 2P + 2GT
Waters [37] (4AC + 1)G+ 2GT (2AU )P + (3AU )GT
Lewko et al. [39] (4AC + 1)G+ 2GT (2AU )P + (3AU )GT
G: operation in group G, GT : operation in group GT , P : paring computation,
n: the number of attributes in the system, AC (|AC |= AC): a set of attributes
associated with the ciphertext, AU (|AU |= AU ): a set of attributes associated with
the private key, N ′ = Σni=1ni: the total number of possible values for attributes,
where ni is the number of possible values for attribute i, |S|: least number of
interior nodes satisfying an access structure (including root node).
Table 3.3: Comparison of computation overhead of ABE schemes
From these comparisons, we conclude that Emura et al.’s scheme [36]
is more efficient compared to other ABE schemes since its private key size
and ciphertext length and the number of pairing operation in its Decrypt
algorithm are independent of the number of attributes. Hence, their Decrypt
algorithm requires constant pairing operations. In addition, Bethencourt et
al.’s scheme [9] has the shortest public key that its size does not depend
on the number of attributes. Furthermore, the computation overhead of
Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms in Ibraimi et al.’s scheme [34] are lower
than Waters scheme[37].
According to different access structures, they can be divided into four
kinds: threshold structure, tree-based structure, AND-gate structure, and
LSSS matrix structure. The comparison of complexity assumptions, secu-
rity models and supported access structures of different ABE schemes are
shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, respectively.
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Scheme Policy Recipient
Anonymity
Assumption Model
Sahai et al. [8] - No DBDH Selective
Goyal et al.[11] Key No DBDH Selective
Bethencourt et al.
[9]
Ciphertext No Generic
group
Adaptive
Cheung et al. [30] Ciphertext No DBDH Selective
Nishide et al. [31] Ciphertext Yes DBDH,
D-linear
Selective
Goyal et al. [32] Ciphertext No DBDH Selective
Liang et al. [33] Ciphertext No DBDH Selective
Ibraimi et al. [34] Ciphertext No DBDH Selective
Emura et al. [36] Ciphertext No DBDH Selective
Waters [37] Ciphertext No PBDHE Selective
Lewko et al. [39] Ciphertext No 3P-SDP Adaptive
DBDH : Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, D− linear: Decision Linear, PBDHE :
Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent, 3P −SDP : Subgroup Decision Problem
for 3 Primes.
Table 3.4: Comparison of security proof and some properties of ABE schemes
Scheme Access Structure
Sahai et al. [8] Threshold structure
Goyal et al. [11] Tree-based structure without bound
Bethencourt et al. [9] Tree-based structure without bound
Cheung et al. [30] AND-gate on positive and negative attributes with
wildcards
Nishide et al. [31] AND-gate on multi-valued attributes with wildcards
Goyal et al. [32] Bounded tree
Liang et al. [33] Bounded tree
Ibraimi et al. [34] Tree-based structure without bound
Emura et al. [36] AND-gates on multi-valued attributes
Waters [37] LSSS matrix
Lewko et al. [39] LSSS matrix
LSSS : Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme.
Table 3.5: Comparison of access structure of ABE schemes
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3.2 Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE ) was first proposed by Mambo
and Okamoto [42] as a way to support the delegation of decryption rights.
Since then, many proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed in the
literature. A seminal paper by Blaze et al. [43] proposed a bidirectional PRE
scheme (BBS proxy re-encryption scheme) based on ElGamal cryptosystem
[44] and introduced the notion of “re-encryption key”. Using this key, a semi-
trusted party called proxy can transform a ciphertext that encrypted under
user A’s (delegator) public key (PKA) into another ciphertext of the same
plaintext that encrypted under user B ’s (delegatee) public key (PKB) with-
out revealing the underlying plaintext and user private key. In their scheme,
the data owner (part A) chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗p and encrypts
the message M using his pair of private\public key (SKA = a,PKA = ga)
to obtain ciphertext CA = (g
r · M, (ga)r) and computes b · a−1 as the re-
encryption key (rkA→B = b/a = b · a−1), where b is the user’s private
key, and then transfers the ciphertext CA and rkA→B to the proxy. The
proxy uses the rkA→B to transform CA to CB = (gr · M, (gar)rkA→B ) =
(gr · M, gar)b/a) = (gr · M, gbr). When the user (part B) receives the new
ciphertext CB, he decrypts it with his private key b and gets the message:
M = g
r·M
(gbr)(1/b)
. Although BBS proxy re-encryption scheme is secure against
chosen plaintext attacks (CPA); however, it requires pre-sharing private key
between parties in order to compute re-encryption key and has bidirectional
and transitive properties and exposed to collusion attacks. As such, the
proxy can compute (rkA→B)−1 = a/b to obtain the re-encryption key for
transforming ciphertexts in the opposite direction, from part B to part A
(bidirectional property), therefore it is only useful when the trust relation-
ship between involved parties is mutual. Moreover, the proxy can combine
the two re-encryption keys rkA→B = b/a and rkB→C = c/b that have never
agreed on this and gets the valid re-encryption key from part A to part C :
rkA→C = c/a = (b/a) ·(c/b) (transitive property). Furthermore, if the proxy
colludes with one party (e.g, part A) they can recover the private key of the
other party ((a/b) · b = a) (collusion attack).
To tackle these disadvantages, Ateniese et al. [45] proposed the first
unidirectional and collusion resistant proxy re-encryption scheme without
requiring pre-sharing between parties, based on bilinear maps (e : G1×G1 →
G2). In their scheme, the data owner A computes proxy re-encryption key
using his private key (SKA = a) and user’s public key (PKB = g
b) in the form
of rkA→B = (gb)1/a = gb/a; therefore, the user B does not need to share his
private key. Such configuration provides non-interactive property since re-
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encryption key is created without any interaction with the user. Moreover,
the possession of two re-encryption keys, rkA→B = gb/a and rkB→C = gc/b,
the proxy cannot find out rkA→C = gc/a due to the Decision Diffie-Hellman
problem [46] (non − transitive property). Furthermore, their scheme is
collusion-resistant, it is hard for the proxy to collude with one of the parties
and extracts the private key of another party from rkA→B = gb/a.
The notion of proxy re-encryption approaches have been extended to
adopt different cryptographic settings and creates various data encryption
techniques such as type-based proxy re-encryption (TBPRE ), identity-based
proxy re-encryption (IBPRE ) and attribute-based proxy re-encryption
(ABPRE ). The main advantages and disadvantages of the above-mentioned
approaches are summarized in Table 3.6.
3.2.1 Properties of Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
Proxy re-encryption schemes are characterized based on different criteria
[43, 47], which are listed as follows:
• Unidirectionality: the proxy is only able to transform a ciphertext
C into ciphertext C
′
in one direction (C → C ′) and does not allow a
transform from (C
′ → C).
• Non-interactive: the re-encryption key can be computed by the key
generator without any interaction with the users or the proxy.
• Non-transitive: the proxy cannot combine provided re-encryption
keys to re-delegate decryption rights. If the proxy has two re-encryption
keys, rkA→B and rkB→C , it can not generate the re-encryption key
rkA→C from rkA→B to rkB→C .
• Multi-use: the proxy (or proxies) can re-encrypt a ciphertext multi-
ple times (e.g, re-encrypt from A to B, then re-encrypt the result from
B to C and etc).
• Collusion resistance: the proxy and user cannot collude their se-
crets to generate a new private key also, two users cannot combine
their private keys to extend their decryption power.
3.2.2 Type-based Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
The concept of type-based proxy re-encryption scheme (TBPRE ) was pro-
posed by [48] to address the inefficiency issues of traditional proxy re-
encryption schemes in practical applications. In this scheme, a delegator
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decrypts his message based on his public key and the message type which
is used to identify the message subset. Then the delegator categorizes his
ciphertexts into different subsets and delegates the decryption right of each
subset to a specific delegatee. The type-based proxy re-encryption enables
the delegator to implement fine-grained policies with one key pair without
any additional trust on the proxy. This scheme has the following promising
features:
• Simplifies key management problem since the delegator only needs one
key pair.
• The delegator can choose a particular proxy for a specific delegatee,
which might be based on the sensitiveness of the delegation. Compro-
mise of one proxy key will only affect one subset of messages.
3.2.3 Identity-based Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
Identity-based encryption (IBE ) [24] scheme allows a data owner encrypts
a message using the user’s identity as the public key without exchanging
private or public keys and without keeping key directories, which simplifies
key management and reduces transmission overhead.
In identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme [49] a proxy with re-encryption
key can translate a ciphertext computed under one identity into a new ci-
phertext under another identity. This scheme ensures that no reasonable
set of colluding key holders will obtain an advantage against non-colluding
users.
Scheme Advantages Disadvantages
Proxy re-encryption Secure against plaintext
attack
Collusion problem and
plaintext attack
Type-based
proxy re-encryption
Semantic security and ci-
phertext privacy control
Encoding operations over
encrypted messages is not
possible
Identity-based
proxy re-encryption
Secure against an adap-
tive chosen plaintext at-
tack
Difficult to find efficient
constructions for multiuse
CCA-secure
Attribute-based
proxy re-encryption
Fine-grained access con-
trol on encrypted data
Average efficiency and
flexibility
CCA: Chosen Ciphertext Attack.
Table 3.6: Comparison of different proxy re-encryption schemes
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3.2.4 Attribute-based Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
Attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE ) scheme is one of the proxy
cryptography, which extends the traditional proxy re-encryption to the
attribute-based encryption scheme. The ABPRE scheme delegates the re-
encryption capability to the proxy who can re-encrypt a ciphertext to the
new ciphertext with the same plaintext by using the re-encryption key.
The ABPRE scheme has some advantages: (i) the proxy executes the re-
encryption operation, which reduces the computation overhead of the data
owner, (ii) the authorized user just uses his private key to decrypt the en-
crypted data, and he does not require to store an additional decryption key
for deciphering, and (iii) the sensitive information and the decryption key
cannot be revealed to the proxy in re-encryption procedure.
The concept of attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE ) was first
introduced by Guo et al. [50] based on key-policy attribute-based encryption
(KP-ABE ) scheme [11] and a general proxy re-encryption scheme. Further-
more, they proved the security of their scheme in the standard model based
on DBDH assumption. Under this scheme, a semi-trusted proxy server
transforms a ciphertext associated with a set of attributes into a new ci-
phertext associated with different attributes set, but not vice versa, while
preserving the privacy of the underlying plaintext and user private key. This
scheme can be used for sharing encrypted data between users and supports
fine-grained access control, but the general proxy re-encryption scheme can-
not do it, so the proposed scheme can be thought as an improvement of
general traditional proxy re-encryption scheme.
Generally speaking, a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE ) is more appropriate for proxy-based techniques than KP-ABE be-
cause in CP-ABE the encryptor uses the access policy in the ciphertext and
has control over the user access.
The seminal paper of Liang et al. [51] proposed the first ciphertext-
policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption (CP-ABPRE ) scheme by adopt-
ing identity-based proxy re-encryption [49] to the construction of CP-ABE
scheme [30]. In Liang’s scheme, a proxy transforms a ciphertext generated
under an access policy to another one corresponding to the same plaintext
but to a different access policy. Liang et al.’s scheme satisfies multi-use
property and supports only access policies with AND-gates on positive and
negative attributes (NOT). However, in this scheme, the size of the cipher-
text increases linearly with the number of attributes in the system.
Later, Luo et al. [52] presented a ciphertext-policy ABPRE, which sup-
ports AND-gates access policies on multi-value attributes, negative attributes,
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and wildcards (which means the attributes don’t appear in the AND-gates,
therefore they are not considered in decryption algorithm). Their scheme
satisfies the properties of PRE, such as unidirectionality, non-interactive,
and multi-use. Moreover, their scheme provides two improvements: (i) re-
encryption control enabling the encryptor to decide whether the ciphertext
can be re-encrypted or not, and (ii) extra access control that lets the proxy
to add its own access policy to the ciphertext during re-encryption process.
Furthermore, their scheme can be modified to have constant ciphertext size
in original encryption and constant number of pairing computations in orig-
inal decryption process, by removing wildcards in the access policy.
Yu et al. proposed two different policy types of ABPRE scheme [53, 54].
The scheme presented in [53] addressed the user’s attribute revocation is-
sue by integrating the technique of proxy re-encryption with the CP-ABE
scheme proposed by Cheung et al. [30]. They considered practical appli-
cation scenarios of data sharing, in which semi-trusted servers are always
available for providing various types of content services. In their scheme,
the authority delegates most laborious tasks of user’s attribute revocation to
proxy servers without leaking any confidential information to them. When-
ever an attribute revocation event occurs, the authority redefines the master
secret key components for involved attributes. Corresponding public key
components are updated accordingly. Then, data will be encrypted with
the new public key and user private keys should be updated accordingly
for data access. For this purpose, the authority generates several proxy re-
encryption keys for updating master secret key components and transmits
them to the proxy servers. By using these proxy re-encryption keys, the
proxy servers are able to securely update user private keys to the latest
version for all users except for the one to be revoked. This removes the
involved attributes from that users attribute set since their corresponding
private key components no longer comply with the new master secret key.
The proxy re-encryption keys also allow the proxy servers to re-encrypt ex-
isting ciphertexts stored on them to the latest version without disclosing
any plaintext information. This construction enables the authority to freely
revoke any user’s attribute at any time while placing a minimal load on it.
Their proposed scheme is provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
under the DBDH assumption.
The scheme in [54] combined techniques of KP-ABE [11], proxy re-
encryption [43], and lazy re-encryption [55] in order to guarantee scalability,
data confidentiality, and fine-grained access control in cloud computing. To
achieve fine-grained access control, they used KP-ABE scheme. However,
this construction, if deployed alone, would introduce heavy computation
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overhead and cumbersome online burden towards the data owner, as he is
in charge of all the operations of data/user management. Specifically, such
an issue is mainly caused by the operation of user revocation, which in-
evitably requires the data owner to re-encrypt all the data files accessible
to the leaving user, or even needs the data owner to stay on-line to update
private keys for users. To resolve this challenging issue and make the con-
struction suitable for cloud computing, they combined PRE with KP-ABE
and enable the data owner to delegate most of the computation-intensive
operations to cloud servers without disclosing the underlying file contents.
Such a construction allows the data owner to control access to his data
with a minimal overhead in terms of computation effort and on-line time,
and thus fits well into the cloud environment. Data confidentiality is also
achieved since cloud servers are not able to learn the plaintext of any data in
their construction. For further reducing the computation overhead on cloud
servers and thus saving the data owner’s investment, they took advantage of
the lazy re-encryption technique and allowed cloud servers to aggregate com-
putation tasks of multiple system operations. The computation complexity
on cloud servers is either proportional to the number of system attributes,
or linear to the size of the user access structure, which is independent to
the number of users in the system. Thus, scalability is achieved. Although
their proposed scheme is secure under standard cryptographic models, it is
not secure against collusion attack of a revoked user in the system and cloud
server.
Do et al. [56] proposed a key-policy ABPRE scheme to prevent the
collusion attack of the Yu et al.’s scheme [54]. They created a trust authority
called the privilege manager group. Then, they divided the data stored on
the cloud servers into a header and a body and stored to the trust authority
and the cloud server, respectively. Moreover, they introduced a data access
privilege management model using type-based proxy re-encryption scheme
for mobile cloud environments. According to the level that the data owner
trusts the user group, the data is divided into the whole part or parts, and
type information is granted to each and is encrypted. Through this, the data
owner can selectively delegate decryption right for decrypting the whole or
part of the data to the user group. Furthermore, they detailed a scenario
involving privacy-preserving data sharing in health cloud environments and
analyze security against collusion attack.
The computation cost of the previous ABPRE schemes is according to
the number of attributes in the system, which implies huge computational
overhead. Based on Emura et al.’s [36] CP-ABE scheme which has a con-
stant ciphertext length, Seo et al. [57] presented a CP-ABPRE scheme with
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a constant number of pairing operations, which reduced significantly the
computational cost and ciphertext length compared to previous ABPRE
schemes. They reduced the number of pairing operation by using an expo-
nential operation which can easily calculate the summation of the exponent.
Therefore, they calculated the exponent and then computed the pairing
operation just once. Their scheme can be adapted to various applications
including e-mail forwarding and distributed file systems.
Li [58] presented a new CP-ABPRE scheme, which supports LSSS ma-
trix access structure on multi-value attributes, negative attributes, and wild-
cards. Their scheme satisfies some properties of PRE, such as unidirection-
ality, non-interactive, and multi-use. Moreover, this scheme supports other
three properties: (i) re-encryption control allows the encryptor to decide
whether the ciphertext can be re-encrypted or not, (ii) extra access control
allows the proxy to add extra access policy to the ciphertext during re-
encryption process, and (iii) secret key security provides a guarantee for the
delegator, even if the proxy and all delegatees collude, they can not recover
his master secret key. Furthermore, they described the security model called
Selective-Policy Model for their CP-ABPRE scheme.
The aforementioned CP-ABPRE schemes are only secure against selec-
tive chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). The CPA security might not be suf-
ficient enough in an open network since it only achieves the very basic re-
quirement from an encryption scheme, which only allows an encryption to
be secure against “passive” adversaries. Nevertheless, in a real network sce-
nario, there might exist “active” adversaries trying to tamper an encryption
in transit and next observing its decryption such that to obtain useful infor-
mation related to the underlying data. Accordingly, a CP-ABPRE system
being secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) is needed. Because
CCA security not only helps the system to prevent the above subtle attacks
but also enables the system to be further developed. Especially, when the
CP-ABPRE is implemented within a large protocol/system, where a much
wider array of attacks are possible. Moreover, the expressiveness of access
policy is another critical factor for a practical CP-ABPRE system. Most
of the previous CP-ABPRE schemes only support AND-gates access struc-
ture on (multi-valued) positive and negative attributes. This limits their
practical use. Therefore, it is desirable to propose a CP-ABPRE system
supporting more expressive and flexible access policy. To tackle these is-
sues, Liang et al. [59] proposed the first secure CP-ABPRE scheme against
selective chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) with supporting any monotonic
access structures. They chose the Waters’s CP-ABE scheme [37] as a basic
building block of their scheme because the construction of the Waters’s ABE
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scheme is able to convert their scheme to be an ABE Key Encapsulation
in the random oracle model. Moreover, the Waters’s ABE scheme utilizes
LSSS to support any monotonic access formula for ciphertexts. It is a desir-
able property for CP-ABPRE systems when being implemented in practice.
Despite their scheme is constructed in the random oracle model, it can be
proved CCA secure under the decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman
exponent (q-parallel BDHE ) assumption.
However, a CP-ABPRE system with selective security limits an adver-
sary to choose an attack target before playing security game. This might
not scale in practice because a realistic adversary can adaptively choose
his attack target upon attacking a cryptosystem. Therefore, an adaptively
CCA secure CP-ABPRE scheme is needed in most of the practical net-
work applications. Thus, Liang et al. [60] formalized the notion of adaptive
CCA security for CP-ABPRE systems and proposed the first adaptively
CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme by integrating the dual system encryption
technology with selective proof technique. Compared to the selective CPA
security notion, their new notion enables an adversary to commit to a target
access policy in the challenge phase and gains access to re-encryption and
decryption oracles additionally. Their scheme supports any monotonic ac-
cess structure such that users are allowed to fulfill more flexible delegation
of decryption rights. Although their scheme is built in the composite order
bilinear group, it is proven adaptively CCA secure in the standard model
without jeopardizing the expressiveness of access policy. However, their
scheme demands a number of paring operations that implies huge computa-
tional overheads.
Li et al. [61] proposed an efficient and adaptively secure CP-ABPRE
scheme basing on Waters’ dual system encryption technology [62]. This
scheme is constructed in composite order bilinear groups and supports any
monotone access structure. They proved that their scheme was secure under
the complexity assumptions of the subgroup decision problem for 3 primes
(3P-SDP). Compared with the existing schemes, their scheme requires a con-
stant number of paring operations in Re-encryption and Decryption phases,
which reduces the computational overhead.
3.2.4.1 Formal Definition of ABPRE Scheme
An ABPRE scheme consists of six fundamental algorithms Setup, KeyGen,
Encrypt, Re-KeyGen, Re-Encrypt, and Decrypt with the following functions:
- (PK,MSK)← Setup (sp). This algorithm is run by the trust authority
(TA), which takes as input a security parameter sp and outputs a
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public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
- SK ← KeyGen (M SK, L1). This algorithm is run by the TA. It takes
as input the master secret key MSK and the set of attributes L1. It
outputs a private key SK associated with the set of attributes L1.
- CT← Encrypt (PK,M,W1). This algorithm is run by the data owner
who takes as input the public key PK, a message, and a set of attributes
W1 to output a ciphertext CT associated with the set of attributes W1.
- RKL1→L2 ← Re-KeyGen (SK, L2). This algorithm is run by the TA.
It takes as input the private key SK and a set of attributes L2. It
outputs a re-encryption key RKL1→L2 that can be used to transform a
ciphertext that could be decrypted by SK into a ciphertext encrypted
with L2.
- CT
′ ← Re-Encrypt (RKL1→L2 ,CT). This algorithm is run by the
proxy server. It takes as input a re-encryption key RKL1→L2 and
a ciphertext CT to output the transformed ciphertext CT
′
.
- M ← Decrypt (SK,CT). This algorithm is run by the user. It takes
as input the ciphertext CT and the private key SK and returns the
message M if a set of attributes in the user’s private key matches with
the attributes of the ciphertext; otherwise, it returns the distinguished
symbol ⊥.
3.2.4.2 Comparison between ABPRE schemes
In the section 3.2.4, we surveyed two various access policy attribute-based
proxy re-encryption schemes: key policy and ciphertext policy and analyzed
these schemes. In this section, we list the comparisons of them by some
criteria.
The comparison results of different ABPRE schemes are summarized in
Tables 3.7- 3.10. The comparison of the keys size and ciphertext and the
computation overhead of Encrypt, Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt al-
gorithms of different ABPRE schemes are shown in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8,
respectively. In addition, the comparison of complexity assumptions, secu-
rity models, and supported access structures of different ABPRE schemes
are shown in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, respectively.
From Tables 3.7-3.10, we can draw the following conclusions. As shown
in Table 3.7, the size of public/private key and ciphertext increases linearly
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Scheme Public Key Private Key Ciphertext
Liang et al. [51] (6n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (2n+ 1)|G| (2n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Luo et al. [52] (N ′ + 2n +
4)|G|+|GT |
(4n+ 1)|G| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Seo et al. [57] (3n +
2)|G|+|GT |+3n|Z∗p|
(n+ 1)|G|+|Z∗p| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Li [58] (n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (AU + 2)|G| (2AC + 2)|G|+|GT |
Liang et al. [59] 3|G|+|GT |+6Hash (AU + 2)|G| (2AC + 3)|G|+|GT |
Liang et al. [60] (n+ 6)|G|+|GT | (AU + 3)|G| (2AC + 5)|G|+|GT |
Li et al. [61] (n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (AU + 2)|G| (2AC + 2)|G|+|GT |
|G|: bit length of element in G, |GT |: bit length of element in GT , n: the number
of attributes in the system, N ′ = Σni=1ni: the total number of possible values for
attributes, where ni is the number of possible values for attribute i, |Z∗p|: bit length
of element in finite field Z∗p, AC (|AC |= AC): a set of attributes associated with
the ciphertext, AU (|AU |= AU ): a set of attributes associated with the private key.
Table 3.7: Comparison of the size of keys and ciphertext of ABPRE schemes
with the number of attributes. On the other hand, the computation over-
head of the schemes in [51] and [52] increases linearly with the number of
attributes, as shown in Table 3.8.
Also in these schemes, the number of pairing operations increases with
the number of attributes, resulting in high computation overhead for De-
crypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms. Promising results have been
achieved by Seo et al. [57] whose scheme requires a constant number of
pairing operations for Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms and,
therefore reduces the computation cost compared to [51] and [52]. Li et al.’s
scheme [61] also requires a constant number of pairing operations for De-
crypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms. Their scheme greatly reduces
the computation overhead compared to Seo et al.’s scheme [57].
From Tables 3.9 and 3.10, we can see that Liang et al. [51], Luo et al. [52],
and Seo et al. [57] proposed their schemes based on the CP-ABE in which
the ciphertext is associated with AND-gates access structure. However, the
access policy in these schemes is not flexible enough because it only supports
AND operation on attributes. However, the ciphertext policy in Li [58],
Liang et al. [59], Liang et al. [60], and Li et al. [61] schemes is LSSS matrix
access structure which supports any monotonic access formula. Different
from Li [58] and Liang et al. [59] schemes, the schemes of Liang et al. [60]
and Li et al. [61] are adaptively secure.
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Scheme Encrypt Decrypt Re-Encrypt Re-Decrypt
Liang et al. [51] (n+ 2)G+
2GT
(n + 2)P +
2GT
(n+ 1)P +GT (n+3)P+4GT
Luo et al. [52] (n+ 2)G+
2GT
(2n)P + 3GT (2n+1)P+(n+
1)GT
(2n + 1)P +
5GT
Seo et al. [57] (n+ 2)G+
2GT
(3n + 2)G +
2P + 2GT
(3n)G + 2P +
GT
(3n)G + 3P +
4GT
Li [58] (4AC +
2)G+ 2GT
(2AU+1)P+
3GT
(4AU )G +
(2AU + 1)P +
(3AU )GT
(2AU + 1)P +
(3AU + 2)GT
Liang et al. [59] (4AC +
2)G+GT
(2AU+1)P+
(3AU )GT
(2AU + 2)P +
(3AU + 1)GT
(2AU + 2)P +
(3AU )GT
Liang et al. [60] (4AC +
4)G+ 2GT
(2AU+1)P+
(2AU + 1)GT
(2AU + 2)P +
(2AU + 2)GT
(2AU + 3)P +
(2AU + 4)GT
Li et al. [61] (4AC +
2)G+ 2GT
(4AU−1)G+
2P + 2GT
(4AU − 1)G +
2P + 2GT
(4AU − 1)G +
3P + 4GT
G: operation in group G, GT : operation in group GT , P : paring computation,
n: the number of attributes in the system, AC (|AC |= AC): a set of attributes
associated with the ciphertext, AU (|AU |= AU ): a set of attributes associated with
the private key, N ′ = Σni=1ni: the total number of possible values for attributes,
where ni is the number of possible values for attribute i.
Table 3.8: Comparison of computation overhead of ABPRE schemes
From the above analysis, we can conclude that Li et al.’s scheme [61] is
more efficient and secure than previous ABPRE schemes.
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Scheme Policy Assumption Model
Liang et al. [51] Ciphertext ADBDH & CTDH Selective
Luo et al. [52] Ciphertext DBDH Selective
Yu et al. [53] Ciphertext DBDH Selective
Yu et al. [54] Key - Selective
Do et al. [56] Key - Selective
Seo et al. [57] Ciphertext ADBDH & CTDH Selective
Li [58] Ciphertext DPBDHE Selective
Liang et al. [59] Ciphertext DPBDHE Selective
Liang et al. [60] Ciphertext DPBDHE Adaptive
Li et al. [61] Ciphertext 3P-SDP Adaptive
ADBDH: Augment Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, CTDH: Complex Triple
Diffie-Hellman, DBDH : Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, DPBDHE: Decisional
q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent, 3P −SDP : Subgroup Decision Prob-
lem for 3 Primes.
Table 3.9: Comparison of security proof and some properties of ABPRE schemes
Scheme Access Structure
Liang et al. [51] AND-gates on positive and negative attributes with wildcards
Luo et al. [52] AND-gates on multi-valued and negative attributes with
Yu et al. [53] AND gates on positive and negative attributes with wildcards
Seo et al. [57] AND gates on positive and negative attributes with
Li [58] LSSS matrix access structure which supports any monotonic
access formula
Liang et al. [59] LSSS matrix access structure which supports any monotonic
access formula
Liang et al. [60] LSSS matrix access structure which supports any monotonic
access formula
Li et al. [61] LSSS matrix access structure which supports any monotonic
access formula
LSSS : Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme
Table 3.10: Comparison of access structure of ABPRE schemes
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Chapter 4
Secure Data Sharing with
ABE in Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a cost-efficient paradigm providing seemingly unlimited
data storage and computing resources application scenarios in which vast
amounts of data are collected and have to be properly accessed and pro-
cessed. Cloud data sharing has found many practical applications in health-
care where patients are willing to share their personal health records among
a group of care practitioners to improve availability and coverage of remote
assistance [63]. Due to the high sensitivity of medical records, outsourcing
raises strong confidentiality and privacy concerns since this information is
shared among different entities and can be extracted by intentional attackers
such as legitimate insurance, financing or governmental organizations.
A straightforward solution is to encrypt data (i.e., payload-hiding) before
outsourcing it to the cloud to ensure confidentiality, but this manner causes
much computational overhead. However, existing cryptographic techniques
do not support access control models where different users have different
access rights to the shared data. To achieve the encryption-based support
of access control policies [64], an attractive solution is to adopt attribute-
based encryption (ABE ) [8], which enables fine-grained access control over
encrypted data using access policies and associates attributes with private
keys and ciphertexts. In ABE scheme, a data owner (e.g., a patient) can
share his data with users (e.g., doctors, nurses, care practitioners, etc.,) only
if a set of attributes in the user’s private key matches with the attributes of
his ciphertext. Several research papers have been devoted to implementing
fine-grained access control via ABE cryptosystems [8, 11]. However, access
control mechanisms based on ABE raise two challenges: (i) they do not
sufficiently protect the attributes associated with the ciphertexts, potentially
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jeopardizing the data owner’s privacy, and (ii) do not support updating
attribute sets without decrypting the encrypted data, making policy updates
extremely inefficient.
To address the first challenge, a variety of solutions have been proposed
[65, 1] adopting the inner-product encryption (IPE ) scheme [10], where a
ciphertext corresponding to an attribute vector ~x can be decrypted by any
key SK~v such that < ~x,~v >= 0. Inner-product encryption schemes gener-
ally offer the attribute-hiding property, meaning that it is not possible to
determine the vector with which the ciphertext is encrypted. However, cur-
rent IPE schemes do not support efficient access policy changes. To address
the second challenge, proxy re-encryption (PRE ) scheme offers a good solu-
tion by allowing a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext into a new
ciphertext without leaking any information about the encrypted data and
user’s private key, as discussed in Section 3.2.
To address the above-mentioned issues, in this chapter we enhance ABE
scheme and combine it with PRE scheme. We proposed two proxy-based
inner-product schemes: (i) a novel inner-product proxy re-encryption (IP-
PRE ) scheme, and (ii) an efficient inner-product proxy re-encryption (E-
IPPRE ) scheme. Both schemes guarantee secure data sharing over un-
trusted cloud service provider.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1,
we first introduce the predicate encryption inner-product scheme. Section
4.2 presents an overview of our system. Then, we present two new IPPRE
schemes in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Finally, we present the summary of this
Chapter in Section 4.5.
4.1 Predicate Encryption Inner-product
Attribute-based encryption (ABE ) schemes have desirable functionality (see
Section 3.1.1), but a common limitation of these schemes is that the cipher-
texts do not conceal their corresponding attributes set and therefore they do
not guarantee attribute-hiding property. For example, in a CP-ABE scheme,
a user who cannot decrypt can still learn the access policy associated with
the ciphertext. For applications where the access policy must also be kept
secret, this is undesirable.
Katz et al. [10] introduced the notion of predicate encryption (PE ) as a
generalized (fine-grained) notion of public key encryption that allows one to
encrypt a message as well as attributes. In predicate encryption scheme, a
ciphertext associated with attribute set I ∈ Σ can be decrypted by a private
key SKf corresponding to the predicate f ∈ F if and only if f(I) = True.
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Security notion of predicate encryption is considered in two aspects: payload-
hiding and attribute-hiding. Generally, attribute-hiding requires that a ci-
phertext conceal the associated attributes as well as the plaintext so that
no information about attributes is revealed during the decryption process,
while payload-hiding only requires that a ciphertext conceal the plaintext.
Katz et al. [10] also presented a special type of predicate encryption for a
class of predicates called inner-product encryption (IPE ), which is obtained
by having each attribute correspond to a vector ~x and each predicate f~v
correspond to a vector ~v, where f~v(~x) = 1 iff < ~x,~v >= 0 (here, < ~x,~v >
denotes the standard inner-product). The inner-product predicates repre-
sent a wide class of predicates that includes an equality test, disjunctions or
conjunctions of equality tests, and, more generally, arbitrary CNF or DNF
formulas (ABE schemes) and polynomial evaluations. Therefore, realizing a
predicate encryption supporting inner-product is the main goal of predicate
encryption, because such schemes can achieve high flexibility in terms of
access control.
Following Katz et al., a hierarchical IPE scheme was proposed by Okamoto
et al. [65], which used n-dimensional vector spaces in prime order bilinear
groups and achieves full security under the standard model. In [39], Lewko
et al. showed a fully secure IPE scheme based on composite bilinear groups
resulting low practical efficiency. Although these IPE constructions achieve
attribute-hiding property, the security of their schemes is not under well-
known standard assumptions. A different work of Park [1] presented an
efficient IPE scheme supporting the attribute-hiding property. His scheme
is based on prime order bilinear groups and secure against the well-known
Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH ) and Decision Linear assumptions.
Chen et al. [66] improved the scheme of Katz et al. [10] to imple-
ment a fully secure ABE scheme with constant size ciphertexts. Their
scheme supports threshold access policies with constant operations inde-
pendent of the number of attributes. Chen et al.’s approach was improved
by Backes et al. [67] who proposed an efficient inner-product proxy re-
encryption scheme with constant size ciphertext adopting Green et al.’s
technique [68]. Their scheme requires a constant number of pairing opera-
tions encryption/decryption and the length of ciphertext is also independent
of the length of the attributes’ vector. Compared to the original Liang et al.
[51] scheme, Backes et al.’s method is more suitable cloud storage systems
because the private key is no longer needed generating a re-encryption key.
However, like the method of Chen et al. [66], Backes et al.’s scheme does
not hide the attributes used in encryption procedure.
Kim et al. [2] proposed an efficient IPE scheme to compute inner-product
43
operations using exponentiation instead of pairing computations; therefore,
their scheme requires constant pairing operations decryption with shorter
sizes of the public key, private key, and ciphertext as well as reduces the
time needed key generation. Furthermore, Kim et al.’s scheme supports the
evaluations of polynomials, disjunctions, conjunctions, and threshold.
4.1.1 Inner-Product Encryption
In this section, we formally define the syntax of inner-product encryption
(IPE ) and inner-product proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) schemes and their
security properties. Our IPE definition follows the general framework of
that given in [1]. Throughout this section, we consider the general case
where Σ denotes an arbitrary set of attribute vectors and F denotes an ar-
bitrary set of predicates involving inner-products over Σ.
Definition 4.1. An inner-product predicate encryption scheme (IPE ) for the
class of predicates F over the set of attributes Σ consists of PPT algorithms
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt such that:
- SetupIPE: takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive dimen-
sion n of vectors. It outputs a public key PK and a master secret key
MSK.
- KeyGenIPE: takes as input a public key PK, a master secret key MSK,
and a predicate vector ~v ∈ F . It outputs a private key SK~v associated
with vector ~v.
- EncryptIPE: takes as input a public key PK, an attribute vector ~x, and
a message M ∈M. It outputs a corresponding ciphertext CT~x.
- DecryptIPE: takes as input a private key SK~v and the ciphertext CT~x.
It outputs either a massage M if f~v(~x) = 1, i.e., < ~x,~v >= 0, or the
distinguished symbol ⊥ if f~v(~x) = 0.
Definition 4.2. An inner-product predicate encryption scheme for predi-
cate F over attributes Σ is attribute-hiding secure against adversary A under
chosen-plaintext attacks is given as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and it gives the public
key PK to the adversary A.
Phase 1. The adversary A is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial
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number of key queries. For a private key query ~v, the challenger gives SK~v
to A.
Challenge. For a challenge query (X0, X1, ~x0, ~x1), subject to the following
restriction:
1. < ~v, ~x0 >=< ~v, ~x1 >6= 0 for all private key queries ~v, or
2. two challenge messages are equal, i.e., X0 = X1, and any private key
query ~v satisfies < ~v, ~x0 >=< ~v, ~x1 >.
The challenger flips a random b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the corresponding
ciphertext as CT~xb ← Encrypt (PK, ~xb, Xb). It then gives CT~xb to the ad-
versary.
Phase 2. The adversary A is allowed to adaptively issues polynomial num-
ber of key queries. For a private key query ~v, subject to the aforementioned
restrictions.
Finally, A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b and wins the game if b = b′.
An advantage A in attacking IPE is defined as AdvIPE-AHA (λ) = Pr[b =
b′]− 12 . Therefore, an IPE scheme is attribute-hiding if all polynomial-time
adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the above game. If the
restriction 1 in challenge is allowed for A, an IPE scheme is payload-hiding
if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
game.
Definition 4.3. An inner-product proxy encryption (IPPRE ) scheme cre-
ates a re-encryption key ReKey that gives the possibility of transforming a
ciphertext associated with a vector ~x into a new ciphertext encrypting the
same plaintext but associated with a different vector ~w, while maintaining
the confidentiality of the underlying plaintext. IPPRE scheme for the class
of predicates F over n−dimensional vectors Σ for message spaceM, consists
of seven PPT algorithms Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Re-KeyGen, Re-Encrypt,
and Decrypt such that:
- SetupIPPRE: takes as input a security parameter λ and a dimension n
of vectors. It outputs a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
- EncryptIPPRE: takes as input the public key PK, a vector ~x ∈ Σ of
attributes and a message M ∈M to output a ciphertext CT~x.
- KeyGenIPPRE: takes as input the master secret key MSK, the public
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key PK, and a predicate vector ~v ∈ F . It outputs a private key SK~v
associated with vector ~v.
- Re-KeyGenIPPRE: takes as input the master secret key MSK and two
vectors ~v and ~w. It outputs a re-encryption key RK~v,~w that trans-
forms a ciphertext that could be decrypted by SK~v into a ciphertext
encrypted with vector ~w.
- Re-EncryptIPPRE: takes as input a re-encryption key RK~v,~w and a ci-
phertext CT~x to output a re-encrypted ciphertext CT
′
~x.
- DecryptIPPRE: takes as input the ciphertext CT~x and the private key
SK~v. It outputs either a message M if f~v(~x) = 1, i.e., < ~x,~v >= 0, or
the distinguished symbol ⊥ if f~v(~x) = 0.
From here on, we use the terms Level-1 (L1) and Level-2 (L2) to denote
ciphertexts obtained as the output of Encrypt and Re-Encrypt algorithms,
respectively.
Correctness. The correctness property requires to decrypt the ciphertext
by the appropriate private key. More precisely, for the two levels L1 and L2
we have:
L1: Decrypt (KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v),Encrypt (PK, ~x,M)) = M;
L2: Decrypt (KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v′),Re-Encrypt (Re-KeyGen (KeyGen (MSK,
PK, ~v), ~w),CT~x)) = M,
where ~x satisfies ~v, ~w satisfies ~v′, MSK is a master secret key, PK is
a public key, CT #»x is a ciphertext related to message M and an attribute
vector ~x.
4.1.2 Security Model IPPRE
The IPPRE protocol should satisfy the following security requirements in
adaptive security game:
• Attribute-hiding Security of Original Ciphertext: an original
ciphertext (Level-1 ) of a message M with vector ~x releases no infor-
mation regarding (M, ~x) against a user not in possession of matching
private key SK~v such that < ~x,~v >= 0 or having a matching key pair of
a re-encryption key and a private key (RK~v,~w,SK~v′) with < ~x,~v >= 0
and < ~v′, ~w >= 0. It also releases no information regarding ~x against a
46
user in possession of matching private key SK~v except that < ~x,~v >= 0
or a matching key pair (RK~v,~w,SK~v′) except that < ~x,~v >= 0 and
< ~v′, ~w >= 0.
• Attribute-hiding Security of Re-encrypted Ciphertext: a re-
encrypted ciphertext (Level-2 ) of a message M, original vector ~x, and
re-encryption key RK~v,~w with vector ~w release no information regard-
ing (M, ~x,~v, ~w) against a user not in possession of a matching private
key SK~v′ for ~w, and no information regarding ~w against a user in
possession of a matching private key SK~v′ except that <
~v′, ~w >= 0.
Definition 4.4 (Attribute-hiding for Level-1 Ciphertexts (AH-L1)).
An inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme, predicate F over vectors Σ is
attribute-hiding secure Level-1 against adversary A under chosen-plaintext
attacks (CPA) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time PPT, the advantage
of A in the following security game Γ is negligible in the security parameter.
Setup. The challenger B runs Setup(λ, n) algorithm and gives the pub-
lic key PK to A.
Phase 1. A adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries as:
(a) Private key query: for a private key query ~v, the challenger gives
SK~v
R←− KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v) to A, where R indicates that SK~v is
randomly selected from KeyGen according to its distribution.
(b) Re-encryption key query: for a re-encryption key query with (~v, ~w),
the challenger computes RK~v,~w
R←− Re-KeyGen (MSK, ~v, ~w) where
SK~v
R←− KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v) and gives the re-encryption key to the
adversary.
(c) Re-encryption query: for a re-encryption query (~v, ~w,CT~x), B com-
putes the re-encryption key RK~v,~w
R←− Re-KeyGen (MSK, ~v, ~w), where
SK~v
R←− KeyGen(MSK,PK, ~v) and CT′~x R←− Re-Encrypt(PK,RK~v,~w,CT~x,
~w).
Challenge. For a challenge query (~x0, ~x1,M0,M1) under the condition that:
- Any private key query ~v and re-encryption key query (~vl, ~wl), for l =
1, . . . , p1 where p1 is the maximum number of private key queries requested
by the adversary, M0 = M1 if < ~v, ~x0 >=< ~v, ~x1 >= 0 and < ~vl, ~x0) >=
< ~vl, ~x1) >= 0 in the case that < ~v, ~wl >= 0.
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The challenger B samples a random bit b U←− {0, 1}, where U indicates that
b is uniformly selected from {0, 1} and gives CT~xb
R←− Encrypt (PK, ~xb,Mb)
to A.
Phase 2. A may continue to request private key queries, re-encryption
key queries, and re-encryption queries subject to the same restrictions as
before and the condition for the re-encryption queries.
Re-encryption Query: for a re-encryption query of the form (~vt, ~wt,
CTt), for t = 1, . . . , p2 where p2 is the maximum number of re-encrypted
queries, under the condition that M0 = M1 if< ~vt, ~x0 >=< ~vt, ~x1 >= 0
and < ~v′, ~wt >= 0 for any decryption key query for ~v′ if CTt = CT~xb .
The challenger computes RK~vt, ~wt
R←− Re-KeyGen (MSK, ~vt, ~wt) and
CT
′
~wt
R←− Re-Encrypt (PK,RK~vt, ~wt ,CTt), and it gives CT
′
~wt
to the ad-
versary.
Guess. A outputs a bit b′ and succeeds if b′ = b.
Hence, we define the advantage A as AdvAH-L1A (λ) := Pr[b = b′] − 12 . The
IPPRE scheme is attribute-hiding Level-1 ciphertext if all polynomial-time
adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
Definition 4.5 (Attribute-hiding for Level-2 Re-encrypted Cipher-
texts (AH-L2)). An inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme, predicate
F over vectors Σ is attribute-hiding secure Level-2 against adversary A un-
der chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
PPT, the advantage of A in the following security game Γ is negligible in
the security parameter.
Setup, Phase 1. These algorithms are defined as the same as those we
defined in Definition 4.4, respectively.
Challenge. Upon receiving the query ( ~x0, ~x1,M0,M1, ~v0, ~v1, ~w0, ~w1) from
the adversary with the restrictions that (M0, ~x0, ~v0) = (M1, ~x1, ~v1) if
< ~v′, ~w0 >=< ~v′, ~w1 >= 0, for any private key query ~v′, the challenger B
samples a random bit b
R←− {0, 1} and gives:
CT
′
~wb
R←− Re-Encrypt(PK,Re-KeyGen(PK,KeyGen(PK,SK, ~vb), ~wb),Encrypt(
PK, ~xb,Mb)). Then the challenger gives the result to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary A may continue to request private key queries,
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re-encryption key queries, and re-encryption queries under the restrictions
we mentioned in challenge phase.
Guess. A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} b and wins the game b = b′.
We define the advantage of A as AdvPAH-L2A (λ) := Pr[b = b′]− 12 . Hence,
the scheme is predicate- and attribute-hiding for re-encrypted ciphertexts
if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
above game. To prove this statement for each run of the game, we define a
variable sM,~x,~v := 0 if (M0, ~x0, ~v0) 6= (M1, ~x1, ~v1) for challenge (Ml, ~xl, ~vl) for
l = 0, 1 and sM,~x,~v := 1, otherwise.
4.2 An Overview of our System
In this section, we first describe our problem statement and then we give a
general overview of our system model that our protocols are built upon.
4.2.1 Problem Statement
For the sake of conciseness and clarity, we demonstrate a simplified version
of secure data sharing scenario in the healthcare environment in which pa-
tient’s data is collected through multiple medical sensing devices. Consider
a patient (data owner) who is willing to store and share his medical records
with a physician (user) via the cloud. Before data outsourcing, the (medical
sensing device on behalf of a) patient encrypts its own data M under a set of
associated attributes Ipatient (i.e. EncIpatient(Mpatient)), where Ipatient indi-
cates access privilege on the patient’s data. Then, the physician who satisfies
Ipatient can access to the patient’s data using its own private key related to
an attribute set. Now suppose some cooperation is required during patient’s
treatment and the physician needs to share the patient’s medical data with
a group of care professionals in another hospital holding a different access
policy I
′
patient. Hence the problem is how a proxy is allowed to translate
patient’s data encrypted under access policy Ipatient to the one under access
policy I
′
patient in an efficient way without revealing the patient’s data and
its corresponding attributes.
4.2.2 System Model
In this section, we present a streamlined version of secure and private data
sharing system in a healthcare environment to show how to deploy an inner-
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Figure 4.1: The proposed healthcare data sharing system model.
product proxy re-encryption scheme in such real-world scenarios. A inner-
product proxy re-encryption-based data sharing healthcare system including
five entities Data Owner, Authorized Users Owner, Cloud Storage Server,
Trust Authority, and the Proxy Server works as follows:
Initialization. This step is run by a Trust Authority (TA) who is respon-
sible for key issuing and attribute management. As shown in Figure 4.1,
the authority first generates master secret key MSK and public key PK and
then distributes PK and access policy Ai to each data owner i (e.g., Owner
1 from hospital 1 and Owner 2 from hospital 2). It also generates private
keys for Authorized Users (User 1 (e.g., a group of care practitioners) and
User 2 (e.g., specialist)).
Data Upload. This step is run at data owner side. Consider that the
owner 1 from hospital 1 is willing to store and share its medical records via
the Cloud Storage Server in such a way that only care practitioners from
hospital 1 can have access. The owner 1 encrypts its own data (e.g., message
M1) under a set of associated attributes A1 (e.g., EncryptA1(M1)), where A1
indicates access privilege on the owner 1’s data. In a similar way, the owner
2 uploads its encrypted message (M2).
Data Access. This step is run between the authorized users and the cloud
server (Level-1 ) or between authorized users through the cloud using a proxy
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server (Level-2 ).
1. Level-1. User 1 who satisfies A1 can access to the owner 1’s data using
its own private key associated with a vector ~v.
2. Level-2. There are some situations in which the user 1 needs to share
the owner 1’s medical data with the user 2 from hospital 2 who is
able to decrypt only the ciphertexts associated with an access policy
A2 (attribute vector ~w in Figure 4.1), but not the access policy A1
(attribute vector ~x in Figure 4.1). In this case, a Proxy Server is
used to translate the data encrypted with access policy A1 to the one
under access policy A2 in an efficient way without revealing the data
(payload-hiding property) and its corresponding attributes (attribute-
hiding property).
In our system model, we assume that the cloud and proxy server are
honest-but-curious i.e., they will correctly execute the protocol, and will
not deny services to the authorized users. But they are curious to learn
information about data contents.
4.3 A Novel Inner-product Proxy Re-encryption
Scheme
Here, we address the challenge of secure data sharing between users with
different access policies in cloud computing by introducing a novel inner-
product encryption (IPE ) scheme adopting proxy re-encryption method.
We modified the IPE scheme presented in [1] to construct a secure inner-
product proxy re-encryption scheme which is called IPPRE. The proposed
scheme delegates the re-encryption capability to a semi-trusted proxy who
transforms a ciphertext under an access policy to the new ciphertext with the
same plaintext but under another access policy. The proxy learns nothing
about the underlying message, the associated attributes in the ciphertext,
and the private key. The proposed IPPRE scheme satisfies attribute-hiding,
fine-grained access control, supporting dynamic environment, collusion re-
sistance, unidirectionality,non-interactivity, and multi-use properties.
4.3.1 The Main Construction
In this section, we construct our IPPRE scheme in detail. The scheme
consists of six algorithms namely Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Re-KeyGen, Re-
Encrypt, and Decrypt. We describe our construction with considering the
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following assumptions:
Assumptions:
• some positive integer n, Σ = (Z∗p)n is the set of attributes,
• a vector ~v = (v1, · · · , vn) ∈ Σ, each component vi belong to the set Z∗p,
and
• a message M ∈M and a vector ~v, each ~v belongs to Σ and M = GT .
4.3.1.1 Proposed IPPRE Scheme
(PK,M SK) ← Setup (λ, n). On input a security parameter λ ∈ Z+ and
the number of attributes n, Setup algorithm runs init(λ) 1 to get the tuple
(p,G,GT , e). It then picks a random generator g ∈ G, random exponents
δ1, δ2, θ1, θ2, {w1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {f1,i, f2,i}ni=1, {h1,i, h2,i}ni=1 in Z∗p. It also
picks a random g2 ∈ G and a random Ω ∈ Z∗p to obtain {w2,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1
in Z∗p under constraints that:
Ω = δ1w2,i − δ2w1,i , Ω = θ1t2,i − θ2t1,i.
For i = 1, . . . , n, the setup algorithm first computes:
W1,i = g
w1,i , W2,i = g
w2,i , T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i ,
F1,i = g
f1,i , F2,i = g
f2,i , H1,i = g
h1,i , H2,i = g
h2,i ,
and then sets:
U1 = g
δ1 , U2 = g
δ2 , V1 = g
θ1 , V2 = g
θ2 , g1 = g
Ω, Λ = e(g, g2).
Finally, the Setup algorithm outputs the public key PK (including (p,G,GT ,
e)) and master secret key MSK as:
PK = (g, g1, {W1,i,W2,i, F1,iF2,i}ni=1, {T1,i, T2,i, H1,i, H2,i}ni=1, {Ui, Vi}2i=1, Λ)
∈ G8n+6 ×GT,
MSK = ({w1,i, w2,i, t1,i, t2,i, f1,i, f2,i, h1,i, h2,i}ni=1, {δi, θi}2i=1, g2) ∈ Z8n+4p ×G.
1init is an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1n and outputs a tuple
(p,G,GT , e), where G and GT are groups of prime order p and e : G×G→ GT is a bilinear
map.
52
SK~v ← KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v). On input vector ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (Z∗p)n,
public key PK and master secret key MSK, the algorithm randomly picks
exponents λ1, λ2, {ri}ni=1, {φi}ni=1 in Z∗p to output the private key as:
SK~v = (KA, KB, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1, {K3,i,K4,i}ni=1) ∈ G4n+2, where
{K1,i = g−δ2rigλ1viw2,i , K2,i = gδ1rig−λ1viw1,i}ni=1,
{K3,i = g−θ2φigλ2vit2,i , K4,i = gθ1φig−λ2vit1,i}ni=1,
KA = g2
∏n
i=1K1,i
−f1,iK2,i−f2,iK3,i−h1,iK4,i−h2,i , KB =
∏n
i=1g
−(ri+φi).
CT~x ← Encrypt (PK, ~x,M). On input vector ~x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (Z∗p)n,
a message M ∈ GT and the public key PK, the algorithm selects random
exponents s1, s2, s3, s4 ∈ Z∗p to get ciphertext CT~x as follows:
CT~x = (A, B, {C1,i = W s11,i · F s21,i · Uxis31 , C2,i = W s12,i · F s22,i · Uxis32 }ni=1,
{C3,i = T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V xis41 , C4,i = T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V xis42 }ni=1, D) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
where we define each component of CT~x as follows, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
A = gs2 , B = gs11 = g
s1Ω, D = Λ−s2M,
C1,i = g
w1,is1gf1,is2gδ1xis3 , C2,i = g
w2,is1gf2,is2gδ2xis3
C3,i = g
t1,is1gh1,is2gθ1xis4 , C4,i = g
t2,is1gh2,is2gθ2xis4 .
In this step, the ciphertext is associated with the attribute vector ~x such
that it reveals nothing about ~x to a computationally bounded adversary. It
uses random elements {W s11,i , W s12,i , T s11,i , T s12,i} to mask each component xi
of a vector ~x. For instance, the ciphertext C1,i is in the form W
s1
1,i F
s2
1,i U
xis3
1 ,
which is not easily tested even if we use prime order groups equipped with
a symmetric bilinear map. If we omit W s11,i, the resulting term F
s2
1,i U
xis3
1 is
enough for hiding xi component, however, for the case that xi = 0 in Z∗p, the
term becomes F s21,i that can be tested as e(A, F1,i)
?
= e(g, C1,i) using bilinear
maps.
RK~v,~w ← Re-KeyGen (MSK, ~v, ~w). The algorithm first calls the KeyGen
algorithm and picks a random d ∈ Zp to compute gd2 and gdδ22 , g−dδ12 , gdθ22 ,
g−dθ12 . It then calls the Encrypt algorithm to encrypt g
d
2 under the vector ~w
using Encrypt (PK, ~w, gd2) and outputs CT~w.
To compute the re-encryption key, the Re-KeyGen algorithm picks random
exponents λ
′
1, λ
′
2, {r
′
i}ni=1, {φ
′
i}ni=1 in Z∗P and computes RK~v,~w, 1 ≤ i ≤ n as:
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K ′A = g2
∏n
i=1K
′
1,i
−f1,iK ′2,i
−f2,iK ′3,i
−h1,i
K
′
4,i
−h2,i
, K
′
B =
∏n
i=1g
−(r′i+φ
′
i),
where we have:
K ′1,i = g
−δ2r′igλ′1viw2,igdδ22 , K
′
2,i = g
δ1r′ig−λ′1viw1,ig−dδ12 ,
K
′
3,i = g
−θ2φ′igλ
′
2vit2,igdθ22 , K
′
4,i = g
θ1φ
′
ig−λ
′
2vit1,ig−dθ12 .
The Re-KeyGen algorithm with the inputs vectors ~v, ~w consists of two
parts: a modified decryption key vector ~v and a ciphertext encrypted with
vector ~w. The modified decryption key differs from a normal decryption
key: in the decryption procedure, a normal decryption key combines with
elements of the ciphertext to recover the binding factor that is used for
hiding the message (e.g., e(g, g2)
−s2); the modified decryption key instead
produces the product of the blinding factor with another new binding fac-
tor. This new blinding factor can only be removed with the combination
of a group element encrypted in the Re-KeyGen algorithm (e.g., gd2) and
the element B = gs1Ω in the ciphertext. Therefore, the Level-2 access of
the Decrypt algorithm consists of the original blinded message, the product
with the new blinding factor obtained by decrypting the original ciphertext
with the modified decryption key in the Re-Encrypt algorithm, the element B
from the original ciphertext and the ciphertext component of the Re-KeyGen
algorithm.
CT
′
~x ← Re-Encrypt (RK~v,~w,CTx). On input a re-encryption key RK~v,~w and
CTx, the algorithm outputs CT
′
~x = (A,B,CT~x, CˆT,D), where:
A = gs2 , B = gs11 = g
s1Ω, D = Λ−s2M, ,CT~w = Encrypt (PK, ~w, gd2)
computing CˆT, the algorithm checks if the attributes list in RK~v,~w sat-
isfies the attributes set of CT~x, if not, returns ⊥; otherwise, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it
calculates the following pairings to output CˆT:∏n
i=1 e(C1,i,K
′
1,i) · e(C2,i,K
′
2,i) · e(C3,i,K
′
3,i) · e(C4,i,K
′
4,i),
where we have:
e(C1,i,K
′
1,i) = e(g
w1,is1gf1,is2gδ1xis3 , g−δ2r′igλ′1viw2,igdδ22 )
e(C2,i,K
′
2,i) = e(g
t2,is1gh2,is2gθ2xis4 , gθ1φ
′
ig−λ′1vit1,ig−dθ12 )
e(C3,i,K
′
3,i) = e(g
t2,is1gh2,is2gθ2xis4 , gθ1φ
′
ig−λ′1vit1,ig−dθ12 )
e(C4,i,K
′
4,i) = e(g
t2,is1gh2,is2gθ2xis4 , gθ1φ
′
ig−λ′1vit1,ig−dθ12 ).
54
Hence, we expand the above formula as follows:∏n
i=1 e(C1,i,K
′
1,i) · e(C2,i,K
′
2,i) · e(C3,i,K
′
3,i) · e(C4,i,K
′
4,i)
=
∏n
i=1e(g
w1,is1gf1,is2gδ1xis3 , g−δ2r′igλ′1viw2,igdδ22 ) · e(gw2,is1gf2,is2gδ2xis3 ,
gδ1r
′
ig−λ′1viw1,ig−dδ12 ) · e(gt1,is1gh1,is2gθ1xis4 , g−θ2φ
′
igλ
′
1vit2,igdθ22 )
·e(gt2,is1gh2,is2gθ2xis4 , gθ1φ′ig−λ′1vit1,ig−dθ12 )
=
∏n
i=1e(g
w1,is1 , g−δ2r′i) · e(gf1,is2 , g−δ2r′igλ′1viw2,igdδ22 ) · e(gδ1xis3 , gλ
′
1viw2,i)
·e(gw1,is1 , gdδ22 ) · e(gw2,is1 , gδ1r
′
i) · e(gf2,is2 , gδ1r′ig−λ′1viw1,ig−dδ12 )
·e(gδ2xis3 , g−λ′1viw1,i) · e(gw2,is1 , g−dδ12 ) · e(gt1,is1 , g−θ2φ
′
i)
·e(gh1,is2 , g−θ2φ′igλ′2vit2,igdθ22 ) · e(gθ1xis4 , gλ
′
2vit2,i) · e(gt1,is1 , gdθ22 )
·e(gt2,is1 , gθ1φ′i) · e(gh2,is2 , gθ1φ′ig−λ′2vit1,ig−dθ12 ) · e(gθ2xis4 , g−λ
′
1vit1,i)
·e(gt2,is1 , g−dθ12 )
=
∏n
i=1e(g
−δ2w1,i , gr′is1) · e(gs2 , (g−δ2r′igλ′1viw2,igdδ22 )f1,i) · e(g, g)λ
′
1δ1w2,ixivis3
·e(gw1,is1 , gdδ22 ) · e(gδ1w2,i , gr
′
is1) · e(gs2 , (gδ1r′ig−λ′1viw1,ig−dδ12 )f2,i)
·e(g, g)−λ′1δ2w1,ixivis3 · e(gw2,is1 , g−dδ12 ) · e(g−θ2t1,i , gφ
′
is1)
·e(gs2 , (g−θ2φ′igλ′2vit2,igdθ22 )h1,i) · e(g, g)λ
′
2θ1t2,ixivis4 · e(gt1,is1 , gdθ22 )
·e(gθ1t2,i , gφ′is1) · e(gs2 , (gθ1φ′ig−λ′2vit1,ig−dθ12 )h2,i) · e(g, g)−λ
′
2θ2t1,ixivis4
·e(gt2,is1 , g−dθ12 )
=
∏n
i=1e(g
δ1w2,i−δ2w1,i , gr′is1) · e(gθ1t2,i−θ2t1,i , gφ′is1)
·e(gs2 ,K ′1,i
f1,i
K
′
2,i
f2,i
K
′
3,i
h1,i
K
′
4,i
h2,i
)
·e(g, g)[λ′1(δ1w2,i−δ2w1,i)s3+λ′2(θ1t2,i−θ2t1,i)s4]xivi · e(g−δ1w2,i+δ2w1,i , gds12 )
·e(g−θ1t2,i+θ2t1,i , gds12 )
= e(gΩs1 ,
∏n
i=1 g
(r′i+φ
′
i)) · e(gs2 ,∏ni=1K ′1,if1,iK ′2,if2,iK ′3,ih1,iK ′4,ih2,i)
·e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~x,~v> · e(g−Ω, gds12 ).
Finally, the algorithm outputs CˆT to obtain:
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CˆT = e(A,K
′
A) · e(B,K
′
B) ·
∏n
i=1e(C1,i,K
′
1,i) · e(C2,i,K
′
2,i) · e(C3,i,K
′
3,i)
·e(C4,i,K ′4,i)
= e(gs2g2
∏n
i=1K
′
1,i
−f1,iK ′2,i
−f2,iK ′3,i
−h1,i
K
′
4,i
−h2,i
) · e(gΩs1 ,∏ni=1g−(r′i+φ′i))
·e(gΩs1 ,∏ni=1g(r′i+φ′i)) · e(gs2 ,∏ni=1K ′1,if1,iK ′2,if2,iK ′3,ih1,iK ′4,ih2,i)
·e(g−Ω, gds12 ) · e(g, g)Ω(λ
′
1s3+λ
′
2s4)<~x,~v>
= e(gs2 , g2) · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~x,~v> · e(g−Ω, gds12 ).
M ← Decrypt (CT~x,SK~v). On input the ciphertext CT~x and a private key
SK~v, the algorithm proceeds differently according to two Level-1 or Level-2
access:
1. Level-1 access. If CT~x is an original well-formed ciphertext, then
algorithm decrypts CT~x = (A,B, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1, {C3,i, C4,i}ni=1, D =
e(g, g2)
−s2M) using the private key SK~v = (KA,KB, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1,
{K3,i,K4,i}ni=1) to output message M :
M← D · e(A,KA) · e(B,KB)
·∏ni=1e(C1,i,K1,i) · e(C2,i,K2,i) · e(C3,i,K3,i) · e(C4,i,K4,i).
In this step, the masking elements used in Encrypt algorithm have to
be canceled out. To this purpose, the proposed scheme generates two
relative pairing values, a positive and a negative in order to be re-
moved at the end. This can be checked by the following equality:
e(C1,i , K1,i) . e(C2,i , K2,i) = e(g
w1,is1gf1,is2gδ1xis3 , g−δ2rigλ1viw2,i)
·e(gw2,is1gf2,is2gδ2xis3 , gδ1rig−λ1viw1,i),
where both e(gw1,is1 , gλ1viw2,i) and e(gδ1xis3 , g−δ2ri) are canceled out.
Additionally, we need to remove e(gw1,is1 , g−δ2ri) . e(gw2,is1 , gδ1ri)
that are changed into one pairing as e(gΩs1 , gri). This value is also
eliminated by the additional computation of e(B,KB) in the decryp-
tion procedure.
Correctness. Assume the ciphertext CT~x is well-formed the vector
~x = x1, . . . , xn. Then, we have:
D · e(A,KA) · e(B,KB) ·
∏n
i=1e(C1,i,K1,i) · e(C2,i,K2,i) · e(C3,i,K3,i)
·e(C4,i,K4,i)
= e(g, g2)
−s2M · e(g, g2)s2 · e(g, g)Ω(λ1s3+λ2s4)<~x,~v>
= M · e(g, g)Ω(λ1s3+λ2s4)<~x,~v>.
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It is worth noting that the term e(g, g2)
s2 is generated from the pairing
computation of e(A,KA) = e(g2
∏n
i=1K1,i
−f1,i2,i−f2,iK3,i−h1,iK4,i−h2,i).
Thus, the output of the above result is M if < ~x,~v >= 0 in Z∗p. If
< ~x,~v > 6= 0 in Z∗p, then there is only such case that λ1s3 +λ2s4 = 0 in
Z∗p with probability at most 1/p , as in the predicate-only IPE scheme.
2. Level-2 access (from here on referred to as Re-Decrypt). If CT~x is
a re-encrypted well-formed ciphertext, then it is of the form CT
′
~x =
(A,B,CT~w, CˆT,D = e(g, g2)
−s2M). The algorithm first decrypts CT~w
using SK~v′ as above to obtain g2
d as Decrypt (SK~v′ ,CT~w)→ g2d.
Then, it calculates: C¯T = e(B, g2
d) = e(gs1Ω, g2
d) and obtains the
message as M← D · CˆT · C¯T.
The Level-2 access of the Decrypt algorithm consists of the original
blinded message, the product with the new blinding factor obtained
by decrypting the original ciphertext with the modified decryption
key in the Re-Encrypt algorithm, the element B from the original ci-
phertext and the ciphertext component of the Re-KeyGen algorithm.
To decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext of Level-2 access, the proposed
scheme first decrypts the ciphertext component of the Re-KeyGen algo-
rithm to obtain the group element, then combines this group element
with the element B from the original ciphertext to use the result re-
moving both the original blinding factor of the message and the new
binding factor introduced by the Re-Encrypt algorithm. Finally, the
message is recovered if the vector ~x associated with the ciphertext and
the vector ~v associated with the private key m orthogonal vectors (e.g.,
< ~x,~v >= 0).
Correctness. To verify the correctness, we compute D · CˆT · C¯T as:
e(g, g2)
−s2M · e(gs2 , g2) · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~x,~v> · e(g−Ω, gds12 )
·e(gs1Ω, g2d)
= e(g, g2)
−s2M · e(g, g2)s2 · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~x,~v> · e(g, g2)−s1Ωd
·e(g, g2)s1Ωd
= M · e(g, g)Ω(λ1′s3+λ2′s4)<~x,~v>.
The result outputs M if < ~x,~v >= 0 in Z∗p. If < ~x,~v > 6= 0 in Z∗p, then
there is only such case that (λ′1s3 + λ′2s4) = 0 in Z∗p with probability
at most 1/p, as in the predicate-only IPE scheme.
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4.3.2 Proof of Security
Here, we describe a mechanism to show that our proposed scheme achieves
the security requirements according to the definitions stated in Section 4.1.
For Level-1 and Level-2 ciphertext challenge, an adversary may request
private key, re-encryption key, and re-encryption queries by choosing vec-
tors (~x0, ~x1, ~w0, ~w1) at the beginning of the security game. For instance,
in the case of Level-1 access, the adversary outputs two vectors ~x0, ~x1 and
queries corresponding to a vector ~v such that < ~v, ~x0 >=< ~v, ~x1 >= 0,
where M0 = M1. The adversary goal is to decide which one of the two
vectors is associated with the challenge ciphertext. In the case of Level-2
access, the adversary outputs challenge vectors ~x0, ~x1 along with ~w0, ~w1 for
re-encryption keys. The adversary goal is to decide which one of the two
vectors ~w0, ~w1 is associated with the re-encrypted query.
• To prove the Level-1 access, similarly to [10] we suppose that our
encryption system contains two parallel sub-systems. That is, a chal-
lenge ciphertext will be encrypted with respect to one vector in the
first subsystem and a different vector in a second sub-system. Let
(~a,~b) denote a ciphertext encrypted using ~0 vector (that is orthogo-
nal to everything) in an intermediate game to prove indistinguishably
when encrypting to ~x0 corresponding to (~x0, ~x0) and when encrypting
to ~x1 corresponding to (~x1, ~x1) as:
(~x0, ~x0) ≈ (~x0,~0) ≈ (~x0, ~x1) ≈ (~0, ~x1) ≈ (~x1, ~x1).
This structure allows us to use a simulator (challenger) that will es-
sentially work in one subsystem without knowing what is happening
in the other one [10]. It determines whether a sub-system encrypts the
given vector or the zero vector. Details of this proof are given in [1].
• To prove the Level-2 access, we apply game transformation proof [69]
with multiple sequences of games whose aim are to change components
of the challenge ciphertext to independent ones from challenge bit b
(random form). In the following, we discuss it in details.
In the following, we show that the proposed IPPRE scheme is predicate-
and attribute-hiding re-encrypted ciphertext (Level-2 ) against chosen-plaintext
attacks provided the underlying IPE scheme under the Decision Linear as-
sumption holds in G.
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Proof of Theorem 1 (PAH-L2: Predicate- and Attribute-hiding
Re-encrypted ciphertext)
We consider two cases in the proof of Theorem 1 according to the value of
sM,~x,~v mentioned in the Definition 4.5. This value holds the following claims:
• For any private key query ~v′, the variable sM,~x,~v = 0 when it holds
< ~v′, ~w0 >=< ~v′, ~w1 >6= 0.
• For any private key query ~v′, the variable sM,~x,~v = 1 when it holds
< ~v′, ~w0 >=< ~v′, ~w1 >.
Theorem 1. The IPPRE scheme is predicate- and attribute-hiding for
re-encrypted ciphertexts against chosen-plaintext attacks provided underly-
ing IPE scheme is fully attribute-hiding. For any adversary A, there exist
probabilistic machines 1−1, 1−2, 2−1, and 2−2 whose running times are
essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ:
AdvPAH-L2A (λ) ≤ AdvIPE-AH1−1 (λ) +AdvIPE-AH1−2 (λ) +
1
2
(AdvIPE-AH2−1 (λ) +Adv
IPE-AH
2−2 (λ)).
Proof. We execute a preliminary game transformation from Game 0 (orig-
inal game in Definition 4.5) to Game 0′, which is the same as Game 0 except
flip a coin τM,~x,~v before setup, and the game is aborted at the final step if
τM,~x,~v 6= sM,~x,~v. Hence, the advantage of Game 0′ is a half of that in Game 0.
The value τM,~x,~v is chosen independently from sM,~x,~v, and therefore the prob-
ability that the game is aborted is 12 that is Adv
(0′)
A (λ) =
1
2 · AdvPAH-L2A (λ).
Moreover, Pr[A wins] = 12(Pr(A wins|τM,~x,~v = 0) + (Pr(A wins|τM,~x,~v = 1))
in Game 0′. Hence, we have:
AdvPAH-L2A (λ) ≤ AdvIPE-AH1−1 (λ) +AdvIPE-AH1−2 (λ)
1
2
(AdvIPE-AH2−1 (λ) +Adv
IPE-AH
2−2 (λ)).
Therefore, to show how our scheme is predicate- and attribute-hiding for
re-encrypted ciphertext under the D-Linear assumption, we consider the two
cases as below:
Proof of Theorem 1 in the case τM,~x,~v=0
Lemma 1. The proposed IPPRE scheme is predicate- and attribute-
hiding for re-encrypted ciphertexts against chosen-plaintext attack in the
case τM,~x,~v under the attribute-hiding underlying IPE scheme.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic mechanisms 1−1 and 1−2,
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A such that for any
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security parameter λ in the case τM,~x,~v=0 :
Pr[Awins|τm,~x,~v = 0]− 12 ≤ AdvIPE−AH1−1 + AdvIPE−AH1−2 .
The aim is that CT~w is changed to a ciphertext with random attribute
and random attribute message. We apply the game transformation consist-
ing of three games Game 0′, Game 1, and Game 2. In Game 1, the CT ~wb
under vector ~wb is changed to CT~r = Encrypt (PK, ~r, R) where ~r is chosen
uniformly random from Σ and random value R ∈ GT .
In the case τM,~x,~v=0, the adversary does not request private key query ~v
such that < ~xb, ~v >= 0. Hence, CT ~xb is changed to EncryptIPE (PK, ~r, R) by
using the attribute-hiding security underlying IPE scheme.
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to prove the Lemma 1, we consider the
following games. We only describe the components which are changed in
the other games.
Game 0′. Same as Game 0 except that flip a coin τM,~x,~v
U←− {0, 1} be-
fore setup, and the game is aborted if τM,~x,~v 6= SM,~x,~v. We consider the case
with τM,~x,~v = 0 and rely to the challenge query ( ~x0, ~x1,M0,M1, ~v0, ~v1, ~w0, ~w1)
as the following:
(A = gs2 , B = g1
s1 = gs1Ω, Λ = e(g, g2)
−s2 ,
CT ~xb = Encrypt (PK, ~xb,Mb)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · Uxibs31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · Uxibs32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V xibs41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V xibs42 }ni=1, Λ−s2Mb) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
CT ~wb = Encrypt (PK, ~wb, g2
d)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · Uwibs31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · Uwibs32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V wibs41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V wibs42 }ni=1, Λ−s2g2d) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
CˆT = e(gs2 , g2) · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~xb, ~vb> · e(g−Ω, gds12 )).
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0′ except that the reply to challenge
query for ( ~x0, ~x1,M0,M1, ~v0, ~v1, ~w0, ~w1) is as follows:
CT ~r = Encrypt (PK, ~r, g2
d′)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · U ris31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · U ris32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V ris41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V ris42 }ni=1, Λ−s2g2d
′
) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
CˆT = e(gs2 , g2) · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~xb, ~vb> · e(g−Ω, g2d′s),
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where ~r = {r0, . . . , rn} U←− F and d′ U←− Z∗p.
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 except that the reply to chal-
lenge query for ( ~x0, ~x1,M0,M1, ~v0, ~v1, ~w0, ~w1) is as follows:
CT ~u = Encrypt(PK, ~u,Mb)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · Uuis31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · Uuis32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V uis41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V uis42 }ni=1, Λ−s2Mb) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
CˆT = e(gs2 , g2) · e(g, g)Ω(λ′1s3+λ′2s4)<~u,~u′> · e(g−Ω, gds12 )),
where ~u, ~u′ U←− F . We note that ~u and ~u′ are chosen uniformly and indepen-
dent from ~xb and ~vb, respectively. CT~w is generated as in Game 1.
Let Adv
(0′)
A (λ),Adv
(1)
A (λ) and Adv
(2)
A (λ) be the advantages of A in Games
0′, 1 and 2, respectively. We will use three lemmas (Lemmas 2, 3, 4) that
evaluate the gaps between pairs of neighboring games. From these lemmas
we obtain:
Adv
(0′)
A (λ) ≤ |Adv(0
′)
A (λ)− Adv(1)A (λ)|+|Adv(1)A (λ)− Adv(2)A (λ)|+Adv(2)A (λ) ≤
AdvIPE−AHβ1−1 (λ) + Adv
IPE−AH
β1−2 (λ).
Lemma 2. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine β1−1
and β1−2, whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
for any security parameter λ:
|Adv(0′)A (λ)− Adv(1)A (λ)|≤ AdvIPE−AHβ1−1 (λ) + AdvIPE−AHβ1−2 (λ).
Proof of Lemma 2. We construct probabilistic machines β1−1 and β1−2
against the fully-attribute-hiding security using an adversary A in a security
game (Game 0′ or Game 1) as a block box. To this purpose, we consider the
intermediate game Game 1′ that is the same as Game 0′ except that CT~w
of the reply the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext is of the form of Game 1.
Hence, to prove that |Adv(0′)A (λ)−Adv(1
′)
A (λ)|≤ AdvIPE−AHβ1−1 (λ), we construct
a probabilistic machine β1−1 against the fully attribute-hiding security using
the adversary A in a security game (Game 0′ or Game 1′) as block box as
follows:
1. β1−1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against the
adversary A.
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2. β1−1 generates a public and private key and provides A with the public
key and keeps the private key as details are stated in Section 4.3.1:
PK = (g, g1, {W1,i,W2,i, F1,iF2,i}ni=1, {T1,i, T2,i, H1,i, H2,i}ni=1,
{Ui, Vi}2i=1, Λ),
MSK = ({w1,i, w2,i, t1,i, t2,i, f1,i, f2,i, h1,i, h2,i}ni=1, {δi, θi}2i=1, g2).
3. When a private key query is issued for a vector ~v, β−1 computes a nor-
mal form decryption key and provides A with SK~v = (KA, KB, {K1,i,
K2,i}ni=1, {K3,i,K4,i}ni=1).
4. When a re-encryption key query is issued for (~v, ~w), β1−1 computes a
normal form re-encryption key RK~v,~w = (K
′
A, K
′
B, {K
′
1,i,K
′
2,i}ni=1,
{K ′3,i,K
′
4,i}ni=1) along with CT~w = (PK, ~w, g2d).
5. When a re-encryption query is issued for (~v, ~w,CT~x), the challenger
β1−1 computes a normal form of re-encryption CT
′
~x and provides A
with CT
′
~x = (A,B,CT~w, CˆT,D).
6. When a challenge query is issued for ( ~x0, ~x1,M0,M1, ~v0, ~v1, ~w0, ~w1),
β1−1 picks a bit b
U←− {0, 1} and computes CT~x,CT~w,CT′~x. The β1−1
submits (Xb := g2
d, X(1−b) := R, ~xb := ~wb, ~x1−b := ~r) to the attribute-
hiding challenger underlying IPE scheme (see Definition 4.1) where
R and ~r are chosen independently uniform. It then receives CT ~wβ
for β
U←− {0, 1}. Finally β1−1 provides A with a challenge ciphertext
CT
′
b = (A,B,CT ~wb = CT ~wβ , CˆT,D).
7. A finally outputs b1. β1−1 outputs β = 0 if b = b′, otherwise outputs
β = 1. Since CT
′
of the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext is of the
form Game 0′ (resp. Game 1 if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A
given by β1−1 is distributed as Game 1′ (resp. Game 0′) if β = 0 (resp.
β = 1). Then:
|Adv(0)A (λ)− Adv(1
′)
A (λ)|≤ |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |≤ AdvIPE−AHβ1−1 (λ)
In a similar way, we construct a probabilistic machine β1−2 against the
fully attribute-hiding security using an adversary A in a security game
(Game 1′ or Game 1) as a block box. Game 1 is the same as Game 1′
except that CT ~w of the reply to the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext CT~x
where ~r
U←− F . Hence, we have:
|Adv(1′)A (λ)− Adv(1)A| (λ)|≤ AdvIPE−AHβ1−2 (λ).
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Therefore, we can prove this Lemma by using hybrid argument.
Lemma 3. For any adversary A, Adv(1)A (λ) = Adv(2)A (λ).
Proof of Lemma 3. From the adversary’s view, CT~x of Game 1 and
CT~u of Game 2 where ~u
U←− F are information-theoretically indistinguish-
able.
Lemma 4. For any adversary A, Adv(2)A (λ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. The value b is independent from adversary’s view
in Game 2. Hence, Adv
(2)
A (λ) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 in the case τM,~x,~v=1
Lemma 5. The proposed IPPRE scheme is predicate- and attribute-
hiding for re-encrypted ciphertexts against chosen-plaintext attack in the
case τM,~x,~v=1 under the attribute-hiding underlying IPE scheme.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic mechanisms 2−1 and 2−2,
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A such that for any
security parameter λ in the case τM,~x,~v=1 :
Pr[Awins|τm,~x,~v = 1]− 12 ≤ AdvIPE−AH2−1 + AdvIPE−AH2−2 .
The aim of game transformation here is that CT ~wb is changed to cipher-
text with opposite attribute ~w(1−b). Again, we employ two games Game 0′
and Game 1. In Game 1, the CT ~wb is changed to Encrypt (PK, ~w(1−b), g2
d),
respectively, by using the fully attribute-hiding security of the IPE scheme.
Proof of Lemma 5. To prove this lemma, we consider the following games:
Game 0′. Same as Game 0 except that flip a coin τM,~x,~v
U←− {0, 1} before
setup, and the game is aborted if τM,~x,~v 6= SM,~x,~v. We consider the case with
τM,~x,~v = 1. Again here we only describe the components which are changed
in the other games. The reply to challenge query for (M, ~x,~v, ~w0, ~w1) with
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(M, ~x,~v) = (M0, ~x0, ~v0) = (M1, ~x1, ~v1) is:
CT ~wb = Encrypt (PK, ~wb, g2
d)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · Uwibs31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · Uwibs32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V wibs41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V wibs42 }ni=1, Λ−s2g2d) ∈ G4n+2 ×GT,
where d
U←− Z∗p.
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0′ except that the reply to the chal-
lenge query for (M, ~x,~v, ~w0, ~w1) with (M, ~x,~v) = (M0, ~x0, ~v0) = (M1, ~x1, ~v1)
is:
CT ~w1−b = Encrypt (PK, ~w1−b, g2
d)
= (gs2 , gs11 , {W s11,i · F s21,i · Uwi1−bs31 ,W s12,i · F s22,i · Uwi1−bs32 }ni=1,
{T s11,i ·Hs21,i · V wi1−bs41 , T s12,i ·Hs22,i · V wi1−bs42 }ni=1, Λ−s2g2d) ∈
G4n+2 ×GT.
Let Adv
(0′)
A (λ) and Adv
(1)
A (λ) be the advantage of A in Game 0′ and Game
1, respectively. In order to evaluate the gaps between pairs of neighboring
games, we consider the following Lemmas (6 and 7). We have:
Adv
(0′)
A (λ) ≤ |Adv(0
′)
A (λ)− Adv(1)A (λ) + Adv(1)A (λ) ≤ AdvIPE−AHβ2−1 (λ)+
AdvIPE−AHβ2−2 (λ) + Adv
(1)
A (λ).
The proof is completed from the Lemma 7 since:
Adv
(0′)
A (λ) ≤ 12 (AdvIPE−AHβ2−1 (λ) + AdvIPE−AHβ2−2 (λ)).
Lemma 6. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machines β2−1
and β2−2, whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
for any security parameter λ:
|Adv(0′)A (λ)− Adv(1)A (λ)|≤ AdvIPE−AHβ2−1 (λ) + AdvIPE−AHβ2−1 (λ).
The proof of this lemma is similar to the Lemma 2.
Lemma 7. For any adversary A, Adv(1)A (λ) = −Adv(0
′)
A (λ) The challenge
re-encrypted ciphertext for the opposite bit 1− b to the challenge bit b and
the others components are normal forms in Game 1. Hence, success prob-
ability Pr[Succ
(1)
A ] in Game 1 is 1 − Pr[Succ(0
′)
A ], where Succ
(0′)
A is success
probability in Game 0′. Therefore, we have Adv(1)A (λ) = −Adv(0
′)
A (λ).
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4.3.3 Performance Evaluation
Here, we present our evaluation results of the proposed inner-product proxy
re-encryption (IPPRE ) scheme in terms of computation and communication
costs as well as storage overhead. We present both theoretical and the
experimental results with the assumption that the total number of attributes
in the system is equal to n.
4.3.3.1 Theoretical Results
The computational load, defined in terms of number of computational steps
required to perform a given task, can be described in the following terms,
depending on the party who is performing the task itself:
- Computational Load on the Trust Authority. The trust au-
thority is responsible executing three algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, and
Re-KeyGen. In the Setup algorithm, the main computation overhead
consists of (8n + 5) exponentiation operations on the group G1 and
one pairing operation e(g, g2) that can be ignored since it can compute
in advance (pre-computed ).The main computation overhead of Key-
Gen algorithm belongs to the private key generation, which consumes
(9n) exponentiation operations on the group G2. The Re-KeyGen al-
gorithm requires (12n+ 2) exponentiation operations on the group G1
encrypting gd2 and (13n) exponentiation operations on the group G2
for generating re-encryption key.
- Computational Load on the Data Owner. The computational
overhead on the side of the data owner is caused by the execution of the
Encrypt algorithm, which needs (12n + 2) exponentiation operations
on the group G1 and one exponentiation operations on the group GT .
- Computational Load on the Proxy. The proxy is responsible for
transforming the ciphertext by executing the Re-Encrypt algorithm,
which requires (4n+ 2) pairing operations.
- Computational Load on the Users. The computational overhead
on the user side is mainly caused by the Decrypt algorithm. Accord-
ing to our protocol, we have two Decrypt algorithms: one decrypting
a ciphertext and another decrypting a re-encrypted ciphertext. The
computational overhead of the former consists of (4n+ 2) pairing op-
erations. The computational overhead of the latter consists of (4n+3)
pairing operations.
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- Communication Load. The original ciphertext has four parts: A =
gs2 , B = gs1Ω, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1 and {C3,i, C4,i}ni=1. Each Ci has three
elements. The ciphertext contains (12n + 2) G1 and a (1) GT group
elements in total. The re-encrypted ciphertext contains (4n + 2) GT
group elements.
- Storage Load for Users. The main storage load of each user is for
the private key SK~v, which represents (9n) G2 group elements in total.
4.3.3.2 Experimental Results
We implemented our scheme in C using the Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC )
library [70]. The experiments were carried out on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with
2.60 GHz 8x Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4720HQ CPU and 16 GB RAM.
Using Different Types of Elliptic Curves. The choice of elliptic curve
parameters impacts on the credential, signature sizes, and the computa-
tional efficiency. We measured the execution time of our scheme on three
different types of elliptic curves with 80 bits of security level: SuperSingu-
lar (SS ) curve (type A), MNT curves (type D) and Barreto-Naehrig (BN )
curve (type F ), respectively as defined in PBC [70]. The parameters of each
curve are shown in Table 4.1.
Type of elliptic curve SuperSingular MNT159 MNT201 BN
Bit length of q 512 159 201 158
Bit length of r 160 158 181 158
Embedding Degree 2 6 6 12
Curve y2 = x3 + x y2 = x3 + ax+ b y2 = x3 + ax+ b y2 = x3 + b
Table 4.1: Curve Parameters
Elliptic curves are classified into two categories: symmetric bilinear
group (e : G1 × G2 → GT ,G1 = G2) and asymmetric bilinear group
(e : G1 × G2 → GT ,G1 6= G2). To achieve fast pairing computation, el-
liptic curves from symmetric bilinear groups with small embedding degree
are chosen. On the other hand, elliptic curves from asymmetric bilinear
groups with high embedding degree offer a good operation for short group
element size. For a symmetric bilinear group, we selected the SuperSingular
curve over a prime finite field with embedding degree of 2 and the base field
size of G equal to 512 bits. Then for asymmetric bilinear groups, we con-
sidered two MNT curves (namely MNT159 and MNT201 ) with embedding
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degree of 6 and one BN curve with embedding degree of 12 and the base
2 and 3, the execution time of each algorithm of our scheme considering
an increasing number of attributes from 5 to 30 over 100 runs. The execu-
tion time of each algorithm increases linearly with the number of attributes
according to its computational overhead (see Section 4.3.3.1).
The computational overhead of Encrypt algorithm is dominated by ex-
ponentiation operation on group G1 and therefore MNT159 curve and SS
curve respectively with smaller and larger base field size of G12 have the
best and worst encryption performance. As shown in Table 4.2, for 5 at-
tributes, the Encrypt algorithm takes about 19ms under MNT159 curve and
41ms under SS curve. On the other hand, the computational overhead of
the KeyGen and the Re-KeyGen algorithms is dominated by exponentiation
operation on group G2. As we can see from Table 4.3, the execution time of
the KeyGen and the Re-KeyGen algorithms under BN curve that has smaller
base field size of G23 among other curves is more efficient.
Curve SS MNT159
Attribute.num 5 10 30 5 10 30
Encrypt 41.6 78.6 234 19 33.8 91.5
Keygen 54.6 108.5 318.7 157 308.7 935
Decrypt 13.4 24.9 69.5 33.2 61.5 173.6
Re-encrypt 13.5 24.8 71.1 33 61.6 176.3
Re-keygen 131.1 240.9 715.5 273.5 509.7 1497.3
Re-Decrypt 17.2 28.9 73.9 47.2 76.6 188.9
Table 4.2: Average execution time (ms) of each algorithm of the proposed IPPRE
scheme on eliptic curves SS and MNT159
The embedding degree of elliptic curves directly influences the size of
GT and increases the complexity of pairing computation. Therefore, the
SS curve with embedding degree of 2 has the best execution time for the
algorithms Re-Decrypt, Decrypt, and Re-Decrypt among other curves, as we
can see in Tables 4.2. While, the BN curve with embedding degree 12
has higher execution time for the Re-Decrypt, Decrypt, and Re-Decrypt algo-
rithms. Specifically, from the Tables 4.2 and 4.3 we can see that, in the case
of 5 attributes the Decrypt and Re-Decrypt algorithms take less than 18ms
2The base field size of G1 MNT159, BN, MNT201 and SS curves are 159 bits, 160 bits,
201 bits and 512 bits, respectively [70].
3The base field size of G2 BN, MNT159, SS and MNT201 curves are 320 bits, 477 bits,
512 bits and 603 bits, respectively [70].
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for the SS curve and less than 63ms for MNT curves, while for 10 attributes
these algorithms take about 29ms for SS curve and less than 100ms for MNT
curves.
Curve MNT201 BN
Attribute.num 5 10 30 5 10 30
Encrypt 25 45.4 123.7 34 48.9 106
Keygen 205 403.4 1219 40.2 79.4 241.2
Decrypt 42.8 80 235.6 367.4 691.4 2082.6
Re-encrypt 43.7 80.6 231.2 367.3 700.3 2025.4
Re-keygen 359.7 668.2 1960.9 87.8 153.5 447.4
Re-Decrypt 63.1 100.7 250.4 380.5 711.8 2036.8
Table 4.3: Average execution time (ms) of each algorithm of the proposed IPPRE
scheme on eliptic curves MNT201 and BN
4.3.4 Discussion of the Proposed IPPRE Scheme
We adopted a proxy re-encryption technique to address the problem of data
sharing, where data collected for instance through IoT devices and en-
crypted by an IoT gateway, according to a given access policy, is shared
with other medical staff holding different access policies. We analyzed the
protocol in terms of performance and also we tested the execution time of
each algorithm on different types of elliptic curves. While our proposed pro-
tocol is a first step towards a promising direction in terms of security and
efficiency, it is impractical for adopting in IoT environment as it requires
O(n) computation for decryption with large sized public parameters, private
key, and the ciphertext. To this purpose, in the next section, we introduce
an efficient IPPER scheme, E-IPPRE that requires constant pairing com-
putations with short private key and ciphertext.
4.4 An Efficient Inner-product Proxy Re-encryption
Scheme
In this section, we present an efficient variant of IPPRE scheme developing
an inner-product encryption model presented in [2].
The scheme updates the attribute vectors via proxy server without in-
teraction with the involved data owners. The proxy holds a re-encryption
key to update all ciphertexts encrypted according to attribute vector ~x into
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ciphertexts encrypted according to attribute vector ~w. Our efficient inner-
product proxy re-encryption (E-IPPRE ) scheme is faster in decryption than
the proposed IPPRE since only the attribute is computed as the exponent
of a group for supporting attribute-hiding feature, but not the predicate.
Hence, the E-IPPRE scheme requires a constant number of pairings (as
the result three pairing computations) in decryption. According to the fact
that each predicate is not computed as the exponent of a group, E-IPPRE
scheme results in the shorter size of the private key and the time needed for
key generation compared to the first version of our IPPRE protocol with
the same level of security.
4.4.1 The E-IPPRE Framework
Our E-IPPRE is composed of six algorithms namely Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
Re-KeyGen, Re-Encrypt, and Decrypt. Following, we describe each algorithm
in details.
4.4.1.1 Scheme
We are given a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT over a bilinear group pair
(G1,G2) of prime order p with respective generators g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2.
The size of p is determined by security parameter. The proposed scheme
works as follows:
(PK,M SK)← Setup (λ, n). Given a security parameter λ and n number of
attributes, the TA picks random values (α, β, γ, a1, · · · , an, z) ∈ (Z∗p)n+4 and
sets:
g1 = g
γ , g2,1 = g
a1 , · · · , g2,n = gan , g0 = gz ∈ G1
h1 = h
γ , h2,1 = h
a1 , · · · , h2,n = han , hαβ ∈ G2
to output the public key PK and master secret key MSK as:
PK = (g, g0, g1, g2,1, · · · , g2,n, Y = e(g, hαβ)) ∈ Gn+31 ×GT ,
M SK = (hαβ, h, h1, h2,1, · · · , h2,n) ∈ Gn+32 .
SK~v ← KeyGen (M SK,PK, ~v). Let ~v ∈ F be the predicate the user who
requests the corresponding private key SK~v. Given the master secret key
MSK and user’s predicate ~v with PK, TA chooses random values r,R ∈ Z∗p.
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It then computes the user’s private key SK~v = (K1,K2,K3, ~v) ∈ G32× (Z∗p)n
as:
K1 = h
αβ
∏n
i=1(h2,i)
vir hR1 , K2 = h
r , K3 = h
R.
CT~x ← Encrypt (PK, ~x,M). To encrypt a message M ∈ GT under the at-
tribute ~x ∈ Σ, the data owner chooses a random s ∈ Z∗p and outputs the
ciphertext CT = (C0, C1, C2,i, C3) ∈ GT ×Gn+21 for 1 6 i 6 n as follows:
C0 = M · Y s , C1 = gs , C2,i = gxis0 (g2,i)s for 1 6 i 6 n , C3 = gs1.
(RK~v,~w,C)← Re-KeyGen (MSK, ~v, ~w). On input MSK, the attribute vector
~v, and ~w, the TA outputs a re-encryption key RK~v,~w for ~w. The algorithm
outputs (RK~v,~w ,C) as the following:
a. First, it picks a random value d∈ Z∗p and sets hαβd, where α, β are
value randoms defined in the Setup algorithm. It then encrypts hαβd
under the vector ~w to obtain C← Encrypt (PK, ~w, [hαβd]) where [hαβd]
denotes the encoding of hαβd as an element of GT.
b. Then, it picks random values r′, R′ ∈ Z∗p to compute the re-encryption
key RK~v,~w = {RK1,RK2,RK3}, where RK1,RK2 and RK3 are com-
puted as:
RK1 = h
αβ
∏n
i=1((h2,i)
vih
αβd
r′ )r
′
hR
′
1 , RK2 = h
r′ , RK3 = h
R′ .
CT~w ← Re-Encrypt ((RK~v,~w,C),CT~x). On input RK~v,~w, C and the cipher-
text CT~x = (C0,C1,C2,i,C3), it computes:
a. In the first step, the algorithm computes Cˆ as follows:
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Cˆ = e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,RK2)·e(C3,RK3)
e(C1,RK1)
= e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi , RK2) · e(C3, RK3) · e(C1, RK1)−1
= e(
∏n
i=1(g
xis
0 (g2,i)
s)vi , hr
′
) · e(gs1, hR
′
) · e(gs, hαβ∏ni=1((h2,i)vihαβdr′ )r′hR′1 )−1
= e(
∏n
i=1(g
zxivisgaivis), hr
′
) · e(gγs, hR′) · e(gs, hαβ∏ni=1haivir′hαβdhγR′)−1
= e(gzs<~x,~v>g<~a,~v>s, hr
′
) · e(gγs, hR′) · e(gs, hαβh<~a,~v>r′hαβdhγR′)−1
= e(gzs<~x,~v>, hr
′
) · e(g<~a,~v>s, hr′) · e(gγs, hR′) · e(gs, hαβ)−1
·e(gs, h<~a,~v>r′)−1 · e(gs, hαβd)−1 · e(gs, hγR′)−1
= e(g, h)zsr
′<~x,~v> · e(g, h)<~a,~v>sr′ · e(g, h)γsR′ · e(g, h)−sαβ · e(g, h)−<~a,~v>sr′
·e(g, h)−sαβd · e(g, h)−γsR′ = e(g, h)zsr′<~x,~v> · e(g, h)−sαβ · e(g, h)−sαβd.
b. In the second step, the algorithm outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext
CT~w = (C
′
0, C
′
1, Cˆ, C ′3), where C ′0 = C0, C ′1 = C1, C ′3 = C and Cˆ as
computed in Step a.
M ← Decrypt (SK~v,CT~x). On input the private key SK~v and ciphertext
CT~x, the algorithm proceeds differently according to Level-1 / Level-2 ac-
cess:
Level-1 access. If CT~x is an original well-formed ciphertext, then al-
gorithm decrypts ciphertext CT~x = (C0,C1,C2,i,C3) using the private key
SK~v = (K1,K2,K3, ~v) to obtain message M as:
M← C0 · e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,K2) · e(C3,K3)
e(C1,K1)
∈ GT
Correctness. To see that correctness holds, let CT~x and SK~v be as above.
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Then:
C0 · e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,K2) · e(C3,K3) · e(C1,K1)−1
= M · e(g, h)αβs · e(∏ni=1(gxis0 (g2,i)s)vi , hr) · e(gs1, hR) · e(gs, hαβ∏ni=1(h2,i)virhR1 )−1
= M · e(g, h)αβs · e(∏ni=1(gzxivisgaivis), hr) · e(gγs, hR) · e(gs, hαβ∏ni=1haivirhγR)−1
= M · e(g, h)αβs · e(gzs<~x,~v>g<~a,~v>s, hr) · e(gγs, hR) · e(gs, hαβh<~a,~v>rhγR)−1
= M · e(g, h)αβs · e(gzs<~x,~v>, hr) · e(g<~a,~v>s, hr) · e(gγs, hR) · e(gs, hαβ)−1
·e(gs, h<~a,~v>r)−1 · e(gs, hγR)−1
= M · e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)zsr<~x,~v> · e(g, h)<~a,~v>sr · e(g, h)γsR · e(g, h)−sαβ
·e(g, h)−<~a,~v>sr · e(g, h)−γsR = M · e(g, h)zsr<~x,~v>.
Hence, if < ~x,~v >= 0, then we can recover the message M.
Level-2 access (from here on referred to as Re-Decrypt). If CT~w is a re-
encrypted well-formed ciphertext, then it is of the form CT~w = (C
′
0, C
′
1, Cˆ, C ′3).
The algorithm first decrypts C ′3 using SK~v′ to obtain h
αβd as:
hαβd ← Decrypt(SK~v′ , C ′3).
Then, it computes C¯ = e(C ′1, hαβd) = e(gs, hαβd) = e(g, h)sαβd to recover
the message M← C ′0 · Cˆ · C¯.
Correctness. To see that correctness holds, we have:
C ′0 · Cˆ · C¯ = M · e(g, h)sαβ · e(g, h)zsr
′<~x,~v> · e(g, h)−sαβ · e(g, h)−sαβd
·e(g, h)sαβd = M · e(g, h)zsr′<~x,~v>.
If < ~x,~v >= 0, then we can get the message M.
4.4.2 Security Results
In this section, we prove the security of our scheme under DBDH assump-
tion.
Definition 4.6. The proposed scheme is selectively attribute-hiding se-
cure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model under
the DBDH assumption, if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in
the following security game Γb is negligible in the security parameter.
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- Initialization. A outputs two challenge attribute vectors ~x∗0 and ~x∗1 ∈ Σ
to the challenger B.
- Setup. B runs Setup (λ, n) algorithm and gives a public key PK to A.
- Phase 1. A makes a polynomial number of queries as a block box as
follows:
(a) Private key oracle (OKeyGen): A submits an attribute vector
~v, and the challenger returns SK~v
R←− KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v) to A
if only < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >6= 0 or < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >. Other-
wise it outputs ⊥.
(b) Re-encryption key oracle (ORe-KeyGen): A submits ~v with
new vector ~w and the challenger computes RK~v,~w
R←− Re-KeyGen
(MSK, ~v, ~w), where SK~v
R←− KeyGen (MSK,PK, ~v) if < ~x∗0, ~v >=
< ~x∗1, ~v > 6= 0 or < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >. Otherwise it outputs ⊥.
(c) Re-encryption oracle (ORe-Encrypt): A submits ~v and ~w′, and
the ciphertext CT~x under an attribute vector ~x, if < ~x
∗
0, ~v >=
< ~x∗1, ~v > 6= 0 or < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >. Otherwise it outputs ⊥.
- Challenge. For challenge query ( ~x∗0, ~x∗1,M0,M1) where M0 and M1 are
equal in length. It is required that M0 = M1 if any private key on ~v
satisfying the condition < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >= 0 the challenger ran-
domly samples a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives CT ~x∗b
R←− Encrypt(PK,Mb, ~x∗b)
and sends CT ~x∗b
to A where ~x∗b is hidden.
- Phase 2. A may continue to request private key queries, re-encryption
key queries and re-encryption queries subject to the same restrictions
as before.
- Guess. A outputs a bit b′ and succeeds if b′ = b. Hence, we define the
advantage A as:
AdvIND-sAH-CPAA (λ) := |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
The IPPRE scheme is attribute-hiding (AH ) if all polynomial-time adver-
saries have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
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4.4.2.1 Proof of Security
Our proof proceeds by a sequence of games starting with the actual scheme
stated in Definition 4.6. To this purpose, we argue that the games are indis-
tinguishable to the adversary while preserving attribute-hiding properties.
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is the IND-sAH-CPA model with an
adversary IND such that IND ≤ DBDH.
Lemma 1. Let A be an adversary playing the IND-sAH-CPA attack game.
Then, there exists an algorithm B solving DBDH problem such that:
|Pr[AΓb,0 = 0]− Pr[AΓb,1 = 0]|≤ AdvDBDHB ,
where Γb,0 and Γb,1 are the games according to the chosen bit b that we
will define as follows:
Let C = (A,B,C1, . . . ,Cn,D) ∈ GT ×Gn+21 denote the challenge cipher-
text given to the adversary during two real attacks (Γ0,Γ1). Additionally,
let R be a random element of GT .
- Game Γ0,0: This game is the original security game, where the chal-
lenge attribute and message are ~x0 and M0, respectively. C = (A,B,C1,
. . . ,Cn,D).
- Game Γ0,1: In this game, the element A of the ciphertext is changed to
a random element R of GT . But the challenge attribute and message
are the same as for Γ0,0. Hence, C = (R,B,C1, . . . ,Cn,D).
- Game Γ1,1: This game is almost the same as Γ0,1 except that the
challenge attribute and the message are ~x1 and M1, respectively.
C = (R,B,C1, . . . ,Cn,D).
- Game Γ1,0: This game is almost the same as Γ0,0 except that the
challenge attribute and the message are ~x1 and M1, respectively.
C = (A,B,C1, . . . ,Cn,D).
Γ0,0 and Γ1,0 are the same as games Γ0 and Γ1 in Definition 4.6, respec-
tively. Therefore,
AdvBIND−sAH−CPA(λ) ≤ |Pr[AΓb,0 = 0]− Pr[AΓb,1 = 0]|.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose A has the advantage  in distinguishing
games Γb,0 from Γb,1. We build an algorithm B that solves the DBDH
problem in asymmetric pairing. B is given as input a random 7-tuple
(g, ga, gc, h, ha, hb,T) that is either sampled from PA, where T = e(g, h)abc
or from RA where T is uniform and independent in GT . Algorithm B’s goal
is to output “1” if T = e(g, h)abc and “0” otherwise. Algorithm B works by
interacting with A in a selective attribute game as follows:
• Initialization. A begins the selective attribute game by outputting two
attribute vectors ~x0, ~x1 ∈ Σ that it intends to attack.
• Setup. B generates the system’s parameters randomly choosing z′, γ′,
δ, a′1, . . . , a′n ∈ Z∗p to define the following parameters:
~x = ~xb, g0 = g
z ′gaδ, g1 = gγ ′,
g2,1 = g
−aδx1ga′1 , . . . , g2,n = g−aδxnga
′
n , Y = e(ga, gh),
where α = a, β = b, γ = γ′ and a1 = −aδx1 +a′1, . . . , an = −aδxn+a′n,
B sends to A the pubic key PK = (g, g0, g1, g2,1, . . . , g2,n,Y) and keeps
the corresponding master secret key MSK = (hab, h, h1 = h
γ′ , h2,1 =
h−aδx1ha′1 , . . . , h2,n = h−aδxnha
′
n). Note that hab is unknown to B.
• Phase 1. A issues a polynomial number of queries, once at a time.
– Private key query (OKeyGen (~v)): suppose A requests for a
private key corresponding to vector ~v. We only consider the
case where < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >6= 0 according to our defini-
tion on security model, the message M0 is equal to M1 only if
< ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >. As a result, this game is the same as the
game in Definition 4.6 and there is no difference between advan-
tages in these two games for the adversary A.
In the case that < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >6= 0, B picks randomly
r,R ∈ Z∗p, and computes:
k1 =
n∏
i=1
(h−aδxih
a′i )virh
a′ivib
δI hγ
′R, k2 = h
rh
b 1
γI , k3 = h
R,
with I =< ~x,~v >.
The generated SK~v = (k1, k2, k3, ~v) is a valid private key for ~v.
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To see this, let’s consider r˜ = r + bβI ∈ Z∗p. We have:∏n
i=1 (h
−aδxiha
′
i )
vir
h
a′ivib
δI
=
∏n
i=1 h
−aδxivirhabδxivi
1
δI h−abδxivi
1
δI ha
′
ivirh
a′ivib
δI
= hab
∏n
i=1(h
−aδxiha′i)vi(r+b
I
δI
) = hab
∏n
i=1(h2,i)
vir˜.
Following the definition of KeyGen algorithm, the private key of
vector ~v is defined as (k1, k2, k3, ~v) where k1 = h
ab
∏n
i=1(h2,i)
vir˜h1
R
,
k2 = h
r˜, and k3 = h
R with uniform and independent r˜, R ∈ Z∗p.
The generated key (k1, k2, k3, ~v) matches the definition and is sent
to A as a valid private key for the vector ~v.
– Re-encryption key query (ORe-KeyGen (~v,~w)): A submits ~v
and an attribute vector ~w in a re-encryption key query. Again,
we consider only the case where < ~x∗0, ~v >=< ~x∗1, ~v >. In this case
B sends ~v to OKeyGen oracle and obtains SK~v R←− (k1, k2, k3, ~v).
In order to obtain a re-encryption key corresponding to ~w, B
randomly chooses r′, R′ ∈ Z∗p and computes RK~v,~w as:
RK1 = h
ab
∏n
i=1((h2,i)
rih
αβd
r′ )r
′
h1
R′ ,RK2 = h
r,RK3 = h
R′ .
Moreover, it computes CT~w corresponding to ciphertext [h
αβd],
that is CT~w = Encrypt (PK, [h
αβd], ~w). Finally, B sends the re-
encryption key along with CT~w to A.
– Re-encryption oracle (O
Re-Encrypt (~v, ~w′,CT~x)
): for the same
reason as in OKeyGen (~v) and ORe-encrypt (~v,~w), we only consider
the case where < ~x∗0, ~v > 6=< ~x∗1, ~v >, then B submits < ~w′, ~v >
to the re-encryption key query O
Re-encrypt (~v, ~w′) and received the
re-encryption key RK
~v, ~w′ . Then, B proceeds according to the
corresponding algorithm.
• Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it sends B two
messages M0 and M1 ∈ GT . Then, B picks a random bit b and responds
with the following ciphertext:
CT~xb = (Mb.T, g
c, (gc)z
′x1+a′1 , . . . , (gc)z
′xn+a′n , (gc)γ
′
).
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Let z = z′ + aδ and s = c. Since (gc)z′xi+a′i = (gc)z′xi+aδxi−aδxi+a′i =
(gc)z
′xi+aδxi(gc)−aδxi+a′i = g0xis(g2,i)s for 1 6= i 6= n, we have:
CT ~xb = (Mb.T, g
s, g0
x1s(g2,1)
s, . . . , g0
xns(g2,n)
s, g1
s), which is a valid
encryption of Mb with attribute vector ~xb.
- If A sends two messages, M0 and M1 for Level-2 challenge cipher-
text with a challenge vectors ~xb, ~x
∗
b = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and ~y. B ran-
domly choose b ∈ {0, 1} and a random d ∈ ZN to output the cipher-
text CT~w = (Mb.T, g
s, Cˆ,CT~x) along with C (the ciphertext of [habd]).
Then, B computes C and Cˆ as the following:
C = (T · [habd], gc, (gc)z′x1+a′1 , . . . , (gc)z′xn+a′n , (gc)γ′),
Cˆ = e(
∏n
i=1((g
c)z
′xi+a′i )
vi ·e(gcγ′ ,hR˜)
e(gc,hab
∏n
i=1 (h2,i)
vir˜h1
R˜)−1
= e(g, h)czr˜< ~xb,~v>.e(g, h)−abc.e(g, h)−cabd.
For the ciphertext C, B simplicity sets s = c and z = z′+aδ. Therefore,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have C = ([habd] ·T, gs, g0x1s(g2,1)s, . . . , g0xns(g2,n)s,
g1
s) that is a valid ciphertext of [habd] with an attribute vector ~x∗b .
Since < ~xb, ~v > 6= 0 for any private key query ~v, the e(g, h)czr˜< ~xb,~v> is
a random value in the adversary view.
• Guess. A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. B concludes its own game by
outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′, then B outputs “1” mean-
ing that T = e(g, h)abc = e(g, hab)
c
, i.e., when B’s 7 tuple input is
sampled from PA, then C is valid encryption of M under the at-
tribute ~x initially chosen by the adversary. Thus A is playing game
Γb,0. Otherwise it outputs “0” meaning that T is uniform and inde-
pendent in GT i.e., when B’s 7-tuple input is sampled from RA, then
C = (B,C1, . . . ,Cn,D) for a random R. In this case A playing game
Γb,1.
Hence, if A has an advantage  in distinguishing game Γb,0 from game
Γb,1, then B has the same advantage  against DBDH.
4.4.3 Performance Evaluation
This section presents our evaluation results corresponding to the proposed
efficient inner-product proxy re-encryption (E-IPPRE ) scheme and the com-
parison with previous methods in terms of computation and communication
overhead. We present both theoretical results and the experimental results.
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4.4.3.1 Theoretical Results
Here, we analyze and compare our E-IPPRE scheme with previous attribute-
based proxy re-encryption and inner-product encryption schemes [51, 52, 57,
10, 65, 67] in terms of the size of keys and ciphertexts, and computational
overhead as the results can be seen respectively in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
To the best of our knowledge, Backes’ [67] scheme is the only one based
on inner-product proxy re-encryption method. As shown in Table 4.4, their
scheme provides a shorter ciphertext compared to the others because the
length of ciphertext is independent of the length of attribute vector. Our
protocol achieves a shorter private key size that is independent of the length
of attribute vector.
As shown in Table 4.5, the computation overhead of the schemes in [51]
and [52] increases linearly with the number of attributes. In these schemes
the number of pairing operations increases with the number of attributes,
resulting high computational overhead for the Decrypt and Re-Decrypt al-
gorithms. Promising results have been achieved by Seo et al. [57] whose
scheme requires a constant number of pairing operations for the Decrypt
and Re-Decrypt algorithms and, therefore, reduces the computational cost
compared to [51] and [52]. The inner-product scheme proposed in [10] is
based on bilinear groups with a composite order (N = pqr). The length of
its keys and ciphertexts are three times larger than others in low efficiency.
The scheme of Okamoto et al. [65] introduced additional overhead due to
the fact that it is based on dual pairing vector spaces. Therefore, its En-
crypt and Decrypt algorithms take O(n2) and O(n) pairing computations,
respectively. Our proposed scheme requires a constant number of pairing
operation for the Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms.
As indicated in Table 4.5, the computation overhead of Backes et al.’s
Encrypt algorithm is slightly better than the one of our scheme. However,
Backes et al.’s scheme does not provide the attribute-hiding property.
From the above comparison in terms of storage and computational over-
head, we conclude that our scheme is more efficient and secure compared to
the ones shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 because the private key size and
the number of pairing operations are independent of the length of attribute
vector. Hence, our Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms require
fixed pairing operations, which is more appropriate addressing the challenge
of secure data sharing among multiple users in critical applications such as
healthcare.
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Scheme Public Key Private Key Ciphertext
Liang et al. [51] (6n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (2n+ 1)|G| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Luo et al. [52] (N + 2n+ 4)|G|+|GT | (4n+ 1)|G| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Seo et al. [57] (3n+2)|G|+|GT |+3n|Z∗p| (n+1)|G|+|Z∗p| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
Katz et al. [10] (2n+ 3)|G|+|GT | (2n+ 1)|G| (2n+1)|G|+|GT |
Okamoto et al.
[65]
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)|G|+|GT | (n+ 3)|G| (n+ 3)|G|+|GT |
Backes et al.
[67]
(n+ 2)|G|+|GT | (n+ 1)|G| 3|G|+|GT |+n|Z∗p|
Ours (n+ 3)|G|+|GT | 3|G|+n|Z∗p| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
|G|: bit length of element in G, |GT|: bit length of element in GT, n: the number
of attributes, N : the total number of possible values attributes, |Z∗p|: bit length of
element in finite field Z∗p.
Table 4.4: Comparison of the size of keys and ciphertext
Scheme Encrypt Decrypt Re-Encrypt Re-Decrypt
Liang et al. [51] (n+ 2)E + ET (n+ 2)P (n+ 1)P (n+ 3)P
Luo et al. [52] (n+ 2)E + ET (2n)P (2n+ 1)P (2n+ 1)P
Seo et al. [57] (n+ 2)E + ET (3n+ 2)E +
2P
(3n)E + 2P (3n)E + 3P
Katz et al. [10] (4n+ 1)E + ET (2n+ 1)P − −
Okamoto et al.
[65]
(n+2)(n+3)E+
ET
(n+ 3)P − −
Backes et al.
[67]
(n+ 3)E + ET nE + 2P (n−1)E+2P nE + 5P
Ours (2n+ 2)E + ET nE + 3P nE + 3P nE + 7P
E: exponentiation in G, ET : exponentiation in GT, P : pairing computation, n:
number of attributes.
Table 4.5: Comparison of computation overhead
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4.4.3.2 Experimental Results
In order to show the practical viability of our approach, we implemented
our scheme in C using Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC ) library [70]. The ex-
periments permed on an Ubuntu machine with 16 GB RAM and Intel i7-
4720HQ 2.60 GHz CPU.
We measured the execution time of our scheme on 3 different types of
elliptic curves with 80 bits of security level: SuperSingular (SS ) curve (type
A), MNT curves (type D) and Barreto-Naehrig (BN ) curve (type F ) [70]
(parameters of each curve has indicated in Table 4.1). Table 4.6 shows the
execution time of each algorithm of our scheme considering an increasing
number of attributes from 5 to 30 over 100 runs. As shown in Table 4.6,
the execution time of each algorithm increases linearly with the number of
attributes.
The computation overhead of Encrypt algorithm is dominated by ex-
ponentiation operation on group G1. Hence, the elliptic curves with small
based field size of G1 are more efficient than others and this results in shorter
ciphertext size. As Table 4.6 indicates the curves MNT159 and SS with the
smaller and larger base field size of G14, respectively have the best and
the worst encryption performance. More precisely, the time to encrypt five
attributes using MNT159 and SS curves is 7.9ms and 11ms, respectively.
However, the computation overhead of KeyGen and Re-KeyGen algorithms is
dominated by exponentiation operation on group G2. Table 4.6 shows that
BN curve with the smaller base field size of G25 among other curves has
better performance in terms of the execution time.
As we can see in Table 4.6, SS curve with embedding degree 2 and
BN curve with embedding degree 12 have the lower and higher execution
time, respectively for the algorithms Re-Eecrypt, Decrypt and Re-Decrypt,
since the embedding degree of elliptic curves directly influences the size of
GT and increases the complexity of pairing computation. Specifically, the
Decrypt and Re-Decrypt algorithms take about 9ms and 12.6ms for the SS
curve and about 9.2ms and 23.2ms respectively for the MNT159 curve in
the case of five attributes. For ten attributes these algorithms take about
11.5ms and 18.7ms for SS curve and 15ms and 25.3ms for MNT159 curve.
4The base field size of G1 MNT159, BN, MNT201 and SS curves are 159 bits, 160 bits,
201 bits and 512 bits, respectively [70].
5The base field size of G2 BN, MNT159, SS and MNT201 curves are 320 bits, 477 bits,
512 bits and 603 bits, respectively [70].
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Curve SS MNT159 MNT201 BN
Attribute.num 5 10 30 5 10 30 5 10 30 5 10 30
Encrypt 11 20.3 50.3 7.9 11.8 27.5 9.7 14.8 34.8 10.2 18 42.6
KeyGen 5.5 6.8 12.2 12.9 14.3 19.8 16.4 17.8 23.2 4.5 5.8 11.3
Decrypt 9 11.5 20.5 9.2 15 28 12.6 15.6 28.9 50.9 52.9 62.1
Re-Encrypt 8.9 11.4 20.4 9.2 15 28.1 12.6 15.7 29 50.2 52.7 61.4
Re-KeyGen 21.1 30.8 70.3 34.2 38.4 59.6 44.7 51.5 77.3 14.5 19.7 40.8
Re-Decrypt 12.6 18.7 43 23.2 25.3 34.9 31 34.1 48 66.3 68.6 77
Table 4.6: Execution Time (ms)
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two secure proxy-based techniques adopting
inner-product encryption method (IPE ) to share data among users with
different ciphertext vector set. Our proposed schemes provide the proxy
server with a transformation key with which a ciphertext associated with
an attribute vector can be transformed to a new ciphertext associated with
a different attribute vector. We showed that the proposed schemes pre-
serve the confidentiality of the message and the attributes associated with
the outsourced ciphertexts. We also showed that the second protocol E-
IPPRE is more efficient than the first proposed IPPRE since in E-IPPRE
only the attribute is computed as an exponent and not the predicate, this
reduces the number of pairing computations. Therefore, adopting E-IPPRE
scheme delivers a fast attribute vector update for sharing data. It requires
a constant number of pairing operations for Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-
Decrypt algorithms and ensures a short size of the public key, private key,
and ciphertext. This advantage makes the scheme most efficient and prac-
tical compared to other proxy-based schemes in terms of computation and
communication time.
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Chapter 5
Secure Data Sharing in the
Internet of Things
The Internet of things (IoT ) is a modern computing and communication
technology consisting a wide range of heterogeneous network devices (things/
objects) that allows us to generate and share data more easily and faster.
In the IoT environment, billions devices interact with each other and co-
operate with other devices and sensors to create new and innovative appli-
cations/services ranging from smart metering to remote health monitoring.
The goal of IoT is to enable things to be connected anytime, anywhere with
anything and anyone ideally using any path/network and any service [71].
According to the Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG) [72],
by 2020 around 50 billion IoT devices will be installed to the Internet, that
is more than 6 devices for every human on the earth. Note that this estimate
dose not take into account rapid advances in Internet or device technology.
Therefore, by having billions of connected devices in the Internet, the future
IoT will shift toward autonomous cyber-physical environments where the
Internet and users are closely integrated and the operations of connected
things are controlled by computer-based algorithms.
However, this massive connectivity in future will generate a huge amount
of data that requires high performance computing capabilities and storage
infrastructure for storing and real-time analytics/processing in an efficient
and cost-effective way. All these requirements are not possible with the
resource-constrained IoT devices. Therefore, cloud-based IoT (called as
Cloud IoT ) has emerged as a new paradigm that enables the resource-
constrained IoT devices to be connected to the cloud through the Internet in
order to get the benefits from cloud such as unlimited storage and process-
ing capabilities with scalability and on-demand accessibility from anywhere.
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The convergence of cloud and Internet of Things will provide new applica-
tion services to end-users in the various areas such as smart homes, smart
cities, smart grids, smart agriculture, smart transportation, smart medical
and healthcare systems to improve all aspects of people’s life. For instance,
the Cloud IoT can be used in healthcare application where patients whose
health status requires close attention can be constantly monitored using IoT
devices. This requires sensors to collect physiological information of patients
and uses gateway and cloud to analyze and store the information, and then
send the analyzed data wirelessly to care practitioners for future analysis
and remote monitoring. The major objective of this technique is to improve
quality of patients care who need permanent monitoring to avoid unneces-
sary healthcare costs and the right medical support at the right time.
Moreover, the Cloud IoT enables sharing of data among things and users
in order to achieve particular goal. In such a sharing environment, the in-
formation may contain personal and sensitive data that it is necessary to
support anonymity and confidentiality of them. Therefore, the satisfaction
of privacy and security requirements plays a fundamental role in the Cloud
IoT environment. These requirements include data confidentiality, access
control, security and privacy policies [73] that can be achieved using cryp-
tographic encryption techniques such as public key encryption. However,
traditional public key infrastructure is not appropriate for applications of
Cloud IoT where data is shared among different entities, due to its draw-
backs related to the key management and distribution. Therefore, to manage
secure data sharing in these applications a flexible and fine-grained access
control scheme should be used. Attribute-based encryption (ABE ) scheme
is a promising encryption method, which allows a data owner to encrypt
his data without knowing the identity of all users and binds a fine-grained
access control policy to his encrypted data to define access right over the
data. In this scheme, the data is encrypted once regardless of the number of
users in the system and only authorized users with the desired attributes are
able to decrypt the data. Due to the expensive operations of ABE scheme,
a pure ABE is not suitable for the resource-constrained IoT devices.
This issue can be dealt with by using a technique called hybrid encryp-
tion. Basically, a hybrid encryption scheme uses public key encryption tech-
niques to derive a symmetric key that is then used to encrypt the data using
standard symmetric key techniques [74]. Therefore, this technique provides
the performance of the public key encryption scheme and the benefit of
the symmetric key encryption scheme while enables strong security and low
computational complexity. Hence, hybrid encryption techniques with high
security, fast speed, and low memory requirements are more suitable for the
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Cloud IoT environments.
The main goals of this chapter are to make the expensive ABE operations
affordable to resource-constrained IoT devices and enhance the encryption
speed by providing a secure cryptographic-based access control mechanism
using a hybrid encryption scheme. We combine the flexibility and expres-
siveness of the proposed E-IPPRE (see Section 4.4) with the efficiency of
symmetric key encryption technique and propose a light inner-product proxy
re-encryption (L-IPPRE ) to guarantee secure data sharing between different
entities in the Cloud IoT environment.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 re-
views some existing techniques regarding to employ ABE scheme on resource-
constrained IoT devices. In Section 5.2, we present a proposed architecture
in the Cloud IoT environment. Then, in Section 5.3, we propose a light
inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme. Finally, Section 5.4 introduces a
use case that the proposed protocol can apply on it.
5.1 ABE on Resource-constrained IoT Devices
With the advance of IoT devices, the feasibility of cryptographic techniques
(e.g., attribute-based encryption) on resource-constrained devices has be-
come an important issue in the context of privacy-preserving access con-
trol mechanisms. Attribute-based encryption (ABE ) scheme is a promising
technique that can be used to satisfy the privacy and security of user’s
data confidentiality and fine-grained access control in the IoT. However, its
cost and complexity makes its implementation hard to employ on resource-
constrained IoT devices. Therefore, obtaining acceptable performance in
the Internet of Things by using ABE scheme is a great issue that recently
has been studied by the research community [75, 76, 9].
In [75, 76], the authors measured the performance of ABE scheme on
smartphones. Wang et al. [75] evaluated the performance of two major
types of ABE schemes, key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE )
[11] and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE ) [9], on a
laptop and Android smartphone devices. They implemented these two ABE
schemes with the Java library and analyzed their results in terms of exe-
cution time, data overhead, energy consumption, and CPU /memory usage.
They concluded that the performance of ABE scheme is unacceptable on
mobile platforms even for the lowest security level (mainly in terms of exe-
cution time and energy consumption).
Later, Ambrosing et al. [76] showed that this conclusion depends on the
specific implementation provided in [75]. They presented an implementa-
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tion of KP-ABE [11] and CP-ABE [9] schemes as a C library for Android
smartphones and considered a comparative analysis similar to Wang et al.’s
[75]. This implementation is considerably faster and provides better perfor-
mance in terms of execution time, energy consumption and CPU /memory
usage compared to [75]. Their resulting execution time for KP-ABE and
CP-ABE schemes is significantly lower than obtained results in [75]. Their
results prove that achieving acceptable performance for the ABE operations
on Android smartphones and similar devices is feasible.
A seminal paper presented by Green et al. [77], improved the efficiency
adopting an attribute-based encryption method for resource-constrained de-
vices by outsourcing expensive decryption operations to the cloud. In their
scheme, the ciphertexts are stored in the cloud and each user has two keys:
a transformation key and an ElGamal-style key. The proposed scheme dele-
gates the re-encryption capability to a semi-trusted proxy that can transform
any ciphertext satisfied by user’s attributes/access policy into an ElGamal-
style ciphertext using the transformation key. The proxy learns nothing
about the underlying plaintext and the associated attributes in the cipher-
text. The ElGamal-style ciphertext is then transmitted to the user who can
decrypt it with his ElGamal-style key. This manner incurs less computa-
tional overhead at the user side so that user can save significantly on both
bandwidth and decryption time, without increasing the number of transmis-
sions. Although this scheme increases the performance of ABE scheme on
resource-constrained devices, it does not address computational load reduc-
tion for the encryption operation.
Later, Asim et al. [78] proposed a new CP-ABE scheme for resource-
constrained devices with encryption and decryption outsourcing capabilities.
The proposed scheme uses two independent semi-trusted proxies: one for
outsourcing computationally expensive encryption operations (Proxy A) and
another for outsourcing decryption operations (Proxy B). In the encryption
process, the data owner creates a partial ciphertext which consists of an
encrypted message, the encrypted private key for the policy creation and
an access policy. Then this partial ciphertext is outsourced to the Proxy A,
who encrypts the encrypted message according to the given access policy.
In this way, the proxy learns nothing about the partially ciphertext. The
decryption process is realized by deploying the idea of Green et al.’s scheme
[77]. A user who wants to decrypt a ciphertext outsources the ciphertext and
his transformation key to the Proxy B, who checks if the attributes in user’s
key satisfy the access policy associated with ciphertext, if yes, returns a
partially decrypted ElGamal-style ciphertext that can be further decrypted
by the user. This proposed scheme reduces significantly the computational
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overhead at the data owner and user sides and it is suitable for applications
where both the data owner and users are using resource-constrained devices
(e.g., mobile devices).
Touati et al. [79] presented a cooperative approach for reducing the
computational overhead of ABE operations on resource-constrained sensor
nodes in the IoT environment by delegating expensive operations of encryp-
tion process to the unconstrained trusted neighbor nodes called “assistant
nodes”. For each sensor, there are at least two unconstrained devices in its
neighborhood which assist the sensor during the encryption process. When
a sensor wants to encrypt a message, it looks for its powerful neighbor nodes
and sends to them the expensive operations and shares pairwise keys with
them. Each assistant node shares pairwise keys with the remote server,
then computes the blinding factor and some operations and encrypts them
with the shared key. The encrypted blinding factor and other encrypted
operations are sent to the sensor and server, respectively. When the sensor
receives a response from the assistant nodes, it decrypts the blinding fac-
tor and uses it for hiding message and sends the result to the server after
encrypted it with the shared key. On the other hand, when the server re-
ceives the encrypted operations from the assistant nodes, it decrypts them
with the shared key and applies them to compute other operations. Finally,
the ciphertext is constructed by using all these parts. Although, this pro-
posed scheme reduces the computational overhead and energy consumption
in the encryption process of ABE scheme, but data could be disclosed to
unauthorized entities if some of the assistant nodes have been compromised.
5.2 Proposed Architecture in Cloud-based IoT
In this section, we provide a high-level view of our proposed architecture
to address the challenge of secure data sharing between users with different
access policies in the cloud-based IoT. The proposed architecture is scalable
and able to store a large amount of data generated by sensors. Since these
data are sensitive, we propose a new security mechanism basing on ABE
scheme to guarantee data confidentiality, flexible and fine-grained access
control, and scalable key management in the cloud-based IoT.
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, we propose the archi-
tecture described in Figure 5.1. This architecture including six entities Data
Source Devices, IoT Gateway Device, Data Storage Server, Trust Authority,
Proxy Server, and Data Consumer Devices works in four phases as follows:
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Figure 5.1: Overview of our proposed architecture
• Phase 1. Initial configuration
This phase (Figure 5.1- À) is run by Trust Authority who is respon-
sible for attributes management and key issuing (e.g., private keys for
Data Consumer Devices and re-encryption key for the Proxy Server).
In this phase, the IoT Gateway Device and Data Consumer Devices
communicate with the Trust Authority to obtain both public param-
eters and their private key, respectively. Firstly, the Trust Authority
generates “master secret key” and “public key” by running the Setup
algorithm, then distributes the public key and a set of attributes to
the IoT Gateway Device, so that this entity can perform the Encrypt
algorithm for protecting its data. Next, the Trust Authority runs the
KeyGen algorithm to generate private keys for authorized data con-
sumers based on their associated attributes and the “master secret
key”, then sends the private keys to the Data Consumer Devices.
• Phase 2. Encrypt and Store Information
This phase (Figure 5.1- Á) is run by IoT Gateway Device, when the
Data Source Devices are willing to store and share their data to the
IoT-Cloud Platform. Since the Data Source Devices (e.g., sensors) are
resource constraints in terms of energy consumption, processing, and
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memory, they cannot directly perform expensive hybrid cryptography
operations for protecting their data. Therefore, they sense data and
send it to the powerful IoT Gateway Device. This entity encrypts the
data using a hybrid encryption scheme which combines a key encap-
sulation mechanism (KEM ) with a symmetric key encryption scheme
(SKE ). For this purpose, first, a key encapsulation mechanism gener-
ates a random “session key” underlying the ABE system and drives
a 128-bit symmetric key by hashing the generated “session key” using
the underlying key derivation function (KDF ). Then, this mechanism
uses the ABE scheme to ”encapsulate” (encrypt) the generated sym-
metric key using the set of attributes and the public key provided
by the Trust Authority in Phase 1. Next, an efficient data encapsu-
lation mechanism (DEM ) runs a symmetric key encryption scheme
(e.g., AES ) to encrypt the actual data using the generated symmetric
key. Finally, both the “encapsulated symmetric key” and the “AES -
encrypted data” form a ciphertext and are stored in the Data Storage
Server.
• Phase 3. Recover Ciphertext
In this phase (Figure 5.1- Â), the Data Consumer Devices commu-
nicate with the Data Storage Server to obtain the ciphertext. If the
set of attributes associated with the “encrypted symmetric key” and
the set of attributes associated with the “data consumer’s private key”
form orthogonal, the Data Consumer Device can recover the “session
key”. Then, this party recovers the 128-bit symmetric key by hashing
the obtained “session key” using the same key derivation function ap-
plied in Phase 2. Finally, the Data Consumer Device is able to decrypt
the original data using this symmetric key.
• Phase 4. Re-encrypt Ciphertext
In some cases, it is necessary to share encrypted data among different
data consumers with different access policy in the cloud-based IoT. To
achieve this goal, in this phase (Figure 5.1- Ã), the Trust Authority
generates a re-encryption key for the Proxy Server who transforms a
ciphertext associated with a set of attributes into a new ciphertext
with the same plaintext but under a different attributes set without
revealing the underlying plaintext and data consumer’s private key.
Then, the re-encrypted ciphertext will be sent to another data con-
sumer who has different access policy. Finally, this data consumer can
recover the message with his private key.
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5.2.1 Assumptions
Our proposed architecture relies on the following assumptions:
• we assume that the Data Storage Server and Proxy Server are honest-
but-curious. On one hand, the honest servers always follow their tasks
to execute the required operations; on the other hand, the curious
servers try to gain any information about the user’s sensitive data.
Note that the honesty feature is assumed to ensure service availability
and data integrity, but not for the confidentiality of sensitive data.
• we assume that communication channels between all involved entities
are secured by a security protocol such as SSL 1.
• we assume that Data Source Devices (e.g., sensors) are resource con-
straints and are not able to generate the keys and encrypt their data.
• we assume that the IoT Gateway Device is a powerful entity to perform
expensive ABE operations.
• we assume that the Trust Authority is a fully trusted party.
5.3 Light Inner-product Proxy Re-encryption
Scheme
In this section, we present a formal description of our light inner-product
proxy re-encryption (L-IPPRE ) scheme in the cloud-based IoT, which is
attribute-hiding under the Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH ) and P-Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (P-DBDH )
assumptions (see Section 2.5). The scheme encrypts a message M as well
as the attributes ~x ∈ Σ, where we assume that Σ = (Zp)n for some positive
integer n and M ∈M, where M = GT .
5.3.1 The L-IPPRE Framework
Our proposed light inner-product proxy re-encryption (L-IPPRE ) scheme
for cloud-base IoT environment has six algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
Re-KeyGen, Re-Encrypt, and Decrypt.
1Secure Sockets Layer
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5.3.1.1 Scheme
We are given a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT over a bilinear group pair
(G1,G2) of prime order p with respective generators g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2.
The size of p is determined by security parameter. The proposed scheme
works as follows:
(PK,M SK) ← Setup (λ, n). This algorithm is run by Trust Authority. On
input a security parameter λ and the number of attribute n. It picks a
random (α, β, a1, · · · , an, z) ∈ (Z∗p)n+4, and sets:
g1,1 = g
a1 , · · · , g1,n = gan , g0 = gz ∈ G1,
h1,1 = h
a1 , · · · , h1,n = han , hαβ ∈ G2.
Then, the Setup algorithm outputs the public key PK and master secret
key MSK as:
PK = (g, g0, g1,1, · · · , g1,n, Y = e(g, hαβ)) ∈ Gn+21 ×GT ,
M SK = (hαβ, h, h1,1, · · · , h1,n) ∈ Gn+22 .
SK~v ← KeyGen (M SK,PK, ~v). This algorithm is run by the Trust Au-
thority. Let ~v ∈ F be the predicate for the Data Consumer Device which
requests for the corresponding private key SK~v from the Trust Authority.
Given the master secret key MSK and the Data Consumer Device’s predi-
cate ~v with the public key PK, this entity chooses a random value r ∈ Z∗p. It
then computes the Data Consumer Device’s private key SK~v = (K1,K2, ~v) ∈
G22 × (Z∗p)n as:
K1 = h
αβ
∏n
i=1(h1,i)
vir, K2 = h
r.
(CT~x ,CTM)← Encrypt (PK, ~x,M). This algorithm is run by the IoT Gate-
way Device. On input the public key PK, a vector ~x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈
(Z∗p)n, and a message M ∈ GT . The algorithm outputs a hybrid ciphertext
(CT~x ,CTM) by combining a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM ) with a
symmetric key encryption (SKE ) scheme as the following:
• Key encapsulation mechanism (KEM ). This mechanism runs the
KEM-Encryption algorithm to generate a 128-bit symmetric key and a
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ciphertext CT~x. The encryption algorithm (K,CT~x)← KEM-Encrypt (
PK, ~x) takes the public key PK, along with the vector ~x as input,
and outputs a key/ciphertext pair (K,CT~x). First, this algorithm
picks a random value s ∈ Z∗p and computes the session key as: D =
Y s = e(g, h)αβs. Then, uses an underlying key derivation function
(KDF ) to derive a 128-bit symmetric key K by hashing the gen-
erated “session key” as: K = KDF (e(g, h)αβs). Next, it encap-
sulates the generated symmetric key by computing the ciphertext
CT~x = (C1, C2,i) for 1 6 i 6 n, as follows:
C1 = g
s, C2,i = g
xis
0 (g1,i)
s for 1 6 i 6 n.
• Symmetric key encryption scheme (SKE). This scheme uses a
symmetric key encryption scheme (e.g., AES ) and encrypts the mes-
sage M under the generated symmetric key. It runs the encryption al-
gorithm CTM ← SKE-Encrypt (K,M) and obtains the ciphertext CTM.
(RK~v,~w ,C)← Re-KeyGen (M SK, ~v, ~w). This algorithm is run by the Trust
Authority. On input the master secret key MSK, the vector ~v, and a vector
~w. The algorithm outputs (RK~v,~w ,C) as the following:
a. First, it picks a random value d∈ Z∗p and sets hαβd, where α, β are
value randoms defined in the Setup algorithm. It then encrypts hαβd
with the vector ~w to obtain C← Encrypt (PK, ~w, [hαβd]), where [hαβd]
denotes the encoding of hαβd as an element of GT.
b. Then, it calls the KeyGen algorithm and picks a random value r′ ∈ Z∗p
to compute the re-encryption key RK~v,~w = {RK1,RK2}, where RK1
and RK2 are computed as below:
RK1 = h
αβ
∏n
i=1((h1,i)
vi h
αβd
r′ )r
′
, RK2 = h
r′ .
CT~w ← Re-Encrypt ((RK~v,~w ,C), (CT~x ,CTM)). This algorithm is run by
the Proxy Server. On input (RK~v,~w ,C) and the hybrid ciphertext
(CT~x ,CTM) = ((C1, C2,i),CTM), it computes:
a. In the first step, the algorithm computes Cˆ as follows:
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Cˆ = e(C1,RK1)
e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,RK2)
= e(gs, hαβ
∏n
i=1((h1,i)
vih
αβd
r′ )r
′
) · e(∏ni=1(gxis0 (g1,i)s)vi , hr′)−1
= e(gs, hαβ
∏n
i=1h
aivir
′
hαβd) · e(∏ni=1(gzxivisgaivis), hr′)−1
= e(gs, hαβh(~a,~v)r
′
hαβd) · e(gzs(~x,~v)g(~a,~v)s, hr′)−1
= e(gs, hαβ) · e(gs, h(~a,~v)r′) · e(gs, hαβd) · e(gzs(~x,~v), hr′)−1 · e(g(~a,~v)s, hr′)−1
= e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)sr′(~a,~v) · e(g, h)αβds · e(g, h)−zsr′(~x,~v) · e(g, h)−sr′ (~a,~v)
= e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)αβds · e(g, h)−zsr′(~x,~v)
b. In the second step, the algorithm outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext
CT~w = (C
′
0, C
′
1, Cˆ, C ′3), where C ′0 = CTM, C ′1 = C1, C ′3 = C and Cˆ
as computed in Step a.
M ← Decrypt (SK~v, (CT~x ,CTM)). This algorithm is run by the Data Con-
sumer Devices. On input the private key SK~v and the hybrid ciphertext
CT = (CT~x ,CTM), the algorithm proceeds differently according to Level-1
or Level-2 access:
- Level-1 access. If CT is an original well-formed ciphertext, then
algorithm decrypts ciphertext CT = (CT~x = (C1, C2,i),CTM) using
the private key SK~v = (K1,K2, ~v) to output message M :
M ← e(C1,K1)
e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,K2)
∈ GT .
Correctness. To see that correctness holds, let CT and SK~v be as
above. The Decrypt algorithm decrypts the message M as the follow-
ing:
a. In the first step, it runs the decryption algorithm
K ← KEM-Decrypt (SK~v,CT~x) which takes the private key SK~v
and the ciphertext CT~x as input and outputs the 128-bit sym-
metric key as below:
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e(C1,K1) · e(
∏n
i=1(C2,i)
vi ,K2)
−1
= e(gs, hαβ
∏n
i=1(h1,i)
vir) · e(∏ni=1(gxis0 (g1,i)s)vi , hr)−1
= e(gs, hαβ
∏n
i=1h
aivir) · e(∏ni=1(gzxivisgaivis), hr)−1
= e(gs, hαβh(~a,~v)r) · e(gzs(~x,~v)g(~a,~v)s, hr)−1
= e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)(~a,~v)sr · e(g, h)−zsr(~x,~v) · e(g, h)−(~a,~v)sr
= e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)−zsr(~x,~v).
If (~x,~v) = 0, then e(g, h)αβs, which is equal to the “session
key” from the Encrypt algorithm. Then, it uses the same key
derivation function applied in the Encrypt algorithm to derive
a 128-bit symmetric key K by hashing the “session key” as:
K = KDF (e(g, h)αβs).
b. In the second step, the message M will be decrypted under the
generated 128-bit symmetric key using the decryption algorithm
M← SKE-Decrypt (K,CTM).
- Level-2 access (from here on referred to as Re-Decrypt). If CT~w is
a re-encrypted well-formed ciphertext, then it is of the form CT~w =
(C ′0, C ′1, Cˆ, C ′3). The algorithm first decrypts C ′3 using SK~v′ to obtain
hαβd as:
hαβd ← Decrypt (SK~v′ , C ′3).
Then, it computes C¯ = e(C ′1, hαβd) = e(gs, hαβd) = e(g, h)αβds to
recover the message as:
M← Cˆ
C¯
Correctness. The Decrypt algorithm decrypts the message M as the
following:
a. In the first step, the 128-bit symmetric key recovers as:
Cˆ · C¯ = e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)αβds · e(g, h)−zsr′ (~x,~v) · e(g, h)−αβds
= e(g, h)αβs · e(g, h)−zsr′ (~x,~v).
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If (~x,~v) = 0, then e(g, h)αβs, which is equal to the “session
key” from the Encrypt algorithm. Then, it uses the same key
derivation function applied in the Encrypt algorithm to derive
a 128-bit symmetric key K by hashing the “session key” as:
K = KDF (e(g, h)αβs).
b. In the second step, the message M will be decrypted under the
generated 128-bit symmetric key using the decryption algorithm
M← SKE-Decrypt (K,CTM).
5.3.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed light inner-product
proxy re-encryption scheme.
5.3.2.1 Security Model
Our architecture for sharing data between different users with different ac-
cess policy in the Cloud IoT environment is composed of many devices (e.g.,
Data Source Devices, IoT Gateway Device, and Data Consumer Devices),
Data Storage Server, Trust Authority, and Proxy Server. We assume that
the communication channels between thesis entities are secured by a security
protocol such as SSL. Although SSL guarantees data confidentiality and in-
tegrity during outsourcing data, we have to encrypt data at the users’devices
because we assume that the servers (e.g., Data Storage Server and Proxy
Server) are honest-but-curious. Moreover, we consider that the Data Stor-
age Server and Proxy Server might collude with some malicious or revoked
users for illegally accessing data. In our architecture, the Trust Authority is
responsible for key issuing and access policies management, Therefore, we
consider that this entity is trusted and secured. Finally, we assume that the
IoT Gateway Device and Data Consumer Devices have a public/private key
pair and the public key can be easily obtained by other entities.
5.3.2.2 Security Services
Our architecture guarantees fine-grained access control, integrity, and con-
fidentiality during outsourcing data with the secure SSL protocol.
The data is encrypted by a randomly generated 128-bit symmetric key
using a standard symmetric key encryption scheme (e.g., AES ) and this
key is encrypted by the proposed public key encryption scheme, E-IPPRE
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scheme, which has been proved secure under DBDH assumption in Sec-
tion 4.4.2. Then the Data consumer Device decrypts the generated 128-bit
symmetric key, using the E-IPPRE scheme, and decrypts the data using
this key. The combination of encrypted techniques provides the efficiency
of symmetric key encryption scheme with the performance of public key
encryption scheme. The public key encryption techniques rely on expen-
sive mathematical computations making them more inefficient and slow.
On the other hand, the symmetric key encryption techniques provide faster
encryption/decryption processes, hight security, and low memory require-
ments. Therefore, we improve the security and performance of our proposed
L-IPPRE scheme by combining the proposed E-IPPRE scheme with the
symmetric encryption scheme (e.g., AES).
Especially, the proposed L-IPPRE scheme is resistant against collusion
attacks and ensures that encrypted data cannot be accessed by unauthorized
users. From this, we deduce that the random symmetric key is confidential
and can be accessed only by authorized users. Consequently, the data con-
fidentiality is guaranteed by the standard symmetric encryption security.
5.3.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed lightweight
inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme and compares it with the previous
proposed protocols, IPPRE and E-IPPRE in terms of computation and
communication overheads.
5.3.3.1 Theoretical Results
We theoretically analyze L-IPPRE scheme and compare it with the previous
proposed protocols (i.e., IPPRE and E-IPPRE ) in terms of the size of keys
and ciphertext and computation overhead.
As shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, all result values despond on the number
of attributes n in the system. Due to this purpose, we can not make com-
munication size, encryption time, and decryption time a constant. Hence,
the best way to improve performance is to make the coefficient of n as small
as possible.
As the comparison results indicate from Table 5.2, the IPPRE scheme
requires at least four times higher computation overhead than E-IPPRE
and L-IPPRE. Moreover, the IPPRE scheme requires (4n+ 2) pairing com-
putations, which is not suitable for practical scenarios, while E-IPPRE and
L-IPPRE protocols need a constant number of pairing operations. On the
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other hand, the L-IPPRE scheme is relatively efficient than E-IPPRE be-
cause it needs just two pairing operations for Decrypt and Re-Encrypt al-
gorithms. As indicated in Table 5.1, L-IPPRE has the shorter size of the
public key, the private key, and the ciphertext compared to the other pro-
posed schemes. Observing these results, L-IPPRE scheme is considered as
an efficient one where almost all coefficient of the values are one and the
private key size and the number of pairing operations are independent of the
number of attributes, it needs only two pairing operations in the decryption
process.
Scheme Public key Private Key Cipertext
IPPRE (8n+ 6)|G|+|GT | (4n+ 2)|G| (4n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
E-IPPRE (n+ 3)|G|+|GT | 3|G|+n|Z∗p| (n+ 2)|G|+|GT |
L-IPPRE (n+ 2)|G|+|GT | 2|G|+n|Z∗p| (n+ 1)|G|+|GT |
|G|: Bit length of element in G, |GT|: Bit length of element in GT, n: number of
attributes,N : the total number of possible values for attributes, |Z∗p|: Bit length of
element in finite field Z∗p.
Table 5.1: Comparison of the size of keys and ciphertext
Scheme Encrypt Decrypt Re-Encrypt Re-Decrypt
IPPRE (12n+2)E+ET (4n+ 2)P (4n+ 2)P (4n+ 3)P
E-IPPRE (2n+ 2)E +ET nE + 3P nE + 3P nE + 7P
L-IPPRE (2n+ 1)E +ET nE + 2P nE + 2P nE + 6P
E: exponentiation in G, ET : exponentiation in GT, P : pairing computation, n:
number of attributes.
Table 5.2: Comparison of computation overhead
5.3.3.2 Experimental Results
We implemented our scheme in C using the Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC )
library [70]. The experiments were carried out on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with
2.60 GHz 8x Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4720HQ CPU and 16 GB RAM.
We tested the execution time of our L-IPPRE on 3 different types of
elliptic curves with 80 bit of security level: SuperSingular (SS ) curve (type
A), MNT curves (type D) and Barreto-Naehrig (BN ) curve (type F ) [70]
(parameters of each curve has indicated in Table 4.1). Table 5.3 shows the
execution time of each algorithm of our scheme considering an increasing
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Curve SS MNT159 MNT201 BN
Attribute.num 5 10 30 5 10 30 5 10 30 5 10 30
Encrypt 9 18 45.2 6.5 9.5 25 7 12 32 8.2 16 40
KeyGen 2.8 4 9.4 5.4 6.5 12 6.5 7.6 13.4 2.4 3.7 9
Decrypt 5.2 9.5 17 7 10 18.8 10.7 12.9 25.2 32.6 34.7 43.5
Re-Encrypt 6.3 9 16 7 10 18.8 9.4 12 25 32.2 35.5 43.2
Re-KeyGen 17.2 27 66.3 25.9 32.2 51.9 34.7 40.6 67 12 17.6 38
Re-Decrypt 10.4 16.6 38 20.7 22.3 30.7 28 30.7 44 49 50.2 58
Table 5.3: Execution Time (ms)
number of attributes from 5 to 30 over 100 runs. As shown in Table 5.3,
the execution time of each algorithm increases linearly with the number of
attributes.
According to the benchmark of PBC library [70], elliptic curves with the
group size l = 512 and the embedding degree k = 2 results in the fastest
bilinear pairing as compared to those with k > 2 for SS curves. The case
is on the opposite for MNT curves. Based on our simulation, the execution
time of one pairing operation is about 1.41ms for the SS curve with l = 512
and k = 2, while for the MNT159 curve with l = 159 and k = 6 and BN
curve with l = 160 and k = 12 it takes about 2.8ms and 16ms, respectively.
Therefore, we believe that SS curve is suitable for our proposed protocol.
As we can see in Table 5.3, for five attributes, the Decrypt and Re-
Decrypt algorithms take about 5ms and 11ms for the SS curve and about
7ms and 22ms respectively for the MNT159 curve. For ten attributes, these
algorithms take about 9ms and 17ms for the SS curve and 10ms and 24ms
for the MNT159 curve.
In Figure 5.2, we compare the computation time of IPPRE, E-IPPRE,
and L-IPPRE schemes for each algorithm on SS curve with 80 bit of security
level, where we assume n is set to 5, 10, 15 attributes, respectively. As we
can see in Figure 5.2, the IPPRE protocol takes a significant amount of
time for Decrypt and Re-Decrypt algorithms because it requires (4n+ 2) and
(4n+3) pairing computations, respectively. While these algorithms take less
time for E-IPPRE and L-IPPRE protocols due to require constant pairing
operations in their Decrypt and Re-Decrypt algorithms (according to Table
5.2). The IPPRE requires about three times more time than L-IPPRE.
Our the lightweight IPPRE scheme takes the shortest amount of time in its
Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt algorithms due to low coefficient values
of the leading terms and constant pairing operations.
From Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3, we can conclude that our lightweight
IPPRE scheme is the most efficient and practical compared to IPPRE and
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E-IPPRE by comparison in terms of communication and computation over-
head.
(a) n= 5 (b) n=10
(c) n=15
Figure 5.2: Comparison of the computation time between three proposed protocols
5.4 Use Case: EVOTION
The above architecture has been specifically conceived to address privacy
and security issues for sharing data in the EVOTION 2 project.
The goal of EVOTION is to develop an integrated platform incorporat-
ing a big data (Hearing Aids (HA), sensors, mobile application) to collect
and analyze data related to hearing loss (HL) patients to improve and man-
age HL treatments including: (i) to increase HA usage efficiency; (ii) to
improve access of HA users to audiology care services and reduce the cost;
(iii) to improve the wider health system for the perspective of HL, the safety
of HL patients, policies for improving access to HA related health services
for HL patients. However, the use of mobile health technologies arises sig-
2A research European proposal for big data supporting pubic health policies.
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nificant security concerns related to confidentiality and privacy of personal
health data.
5.4.1 Data repository
There are different data sources for feeding HL data into EVOTION frame-
work as shown in Figure 5.3 3:
- Existing Clinical Repositories: including personal, medical, and
occupational data already available from the clinical partners of the
EVOTION framework.
- Enhanced Hearing Aids (HAs): enabling the capture and provi-
sion of HA usage-related data (e.g., rating of HA ease or difficulty of
use in different listening conditions, frequency and type adjustments
of HA controls).
- Wearable device: supporting the collection of real-time contextual
HA user physiological data (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, skin con-
ductance).
- A mobile application: with components supporting the acquisition
and transmission of behavioral (e.g., recording of HA user daily activ-
ities such as participation in conversations, watching TV ), contextual
(e.g., HA user’s location), cognitive (e.g., verbal reaction time) data
as well as the notification and acceptance/rejection of decisions by the
HA user and/or their carers (decision selection component), and the
execution of periodic audiological and cognitive to collect the related
data (audiological and cognitive test components).
5.4.2 System Model Overview
Here, we extend our system model to EVOTION framework for adopting
L-IPPRE scheme presented for IoT environments. As shown in Figure 5.4,
the system model is composed of the following entities:
- HL Patient, who is equipped with EVOTION HAs, sensors, and a
smartphone which acts as “IoT Gateway” and has EVOTION mobile
application.
3This figure has borrowed from EVOTION Manual Report.
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Figure 5.3: Physical architecture of EVOTION
- Clinicians, who are able to connect to the EVOTION platform and
access to the HL Patient ’s data and send existing and periodically
update their encrypted reports or diagnostics (medical data).
- Honest-but-curious Cloud, which contains different types of data
(HA usage, noise episodes, audiological, physiological, clinical, and
medical data) provided by five different organizations (4 large hospitals
and 1 HA manufacturer) and real-time data produced by sensors and
HA used by HL patients in the encrypted form.
- Trust Authority, which is responsible for key issuing and attributes
management.
- Proxy server, which enables to re-encrypt the outsource data under
a different access policy.
Figure 5.4: The system model developed to EVOTION framework
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In our system, the HL patient is the data owner whose health status
is monitored by a group of wearable sensors and HAs. The sensors gather
sensitive data and send it to an IoT Gateway that forwards the data to
the Cloud storage server. Since the data is sensitive it must be protected
from unauthorizes users adopting lightweight encryption techniques (e.g.,
L-IPPRE ). The keys of our system are provided by a Trust Authority, as
key generation center. Each user (Clinicians) receives its corresponding key
from the Trust Authority that holding the master key for the system. The
HL patient sends data to the IoT Gateway (smartphone, EVOTION ap-
plication), which aggregates the periodically collected data. The Clinicians
act as the data users that provide health-care services for the HL patient
by querying and retrieving his/her encrypted health data from the Cloud
storage server. There are some cases where the Clinicians need to share
the HL patient ’s medical data with a group of care professionals in another
hospital holding a different access policy. In this situation, the Proxy server
gets a re-encryption key from the Trust Authority to update the Clinicians’
access policy by re-encrypting the original encrypted medical data.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future
Works
In this chapter, we conclude this thesis by summarizing our contributions
and discussing directions for future work.
6.1 Conclusion
The major contribution of this thesis is to address the issue of secure data
sharing between users with different access policies while providing the pri-
vacy and security of user’s data confidentiality and fine-grained access con-
trol policies in cloud computing and Internet of Things. We investigated the
challenge pertained to this issue and realized that one of the best solutions
is to embed secure mechanisms into the data itself and the keys instead of
relying on secure communication channels or a trusted third party for enforc-
ing data access policies. We address this concern by designing encryption
schemes based on attribute-based encryption (ABE ) technique. An ABE
scheme provides data confidentiality and enforces fine-grained access con-
trol policies over the encrypted data, while at the same time supporting
scalability requirement by eliminating the need for sharing private keys be-
tween senders and recipients. Thus, Attribute-based encryption schemes
have desirable functionality, but a common limitation of these schemes is
that the attributes associated with a ciphertext do not conceal; therefore,
these schemes do not satisfy the attribute-hiding property. According to our
knowledge, this issue has not yet been addressed satisfactorily in previous
secure data sharing schemes. Therefore, to provide a full-fledged crypto-
graphic basis for secure data sharing on untrusted cloud computing storage,
we proposed two inner-product proxy re-encryption schemes (namely inner-
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product proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) and efficient inner-product proxy re-
encryption (E-IPPRE )) that are secure under well-known standard assump-
tions and satisfy the attribute-hiding property. In our proposed protocols, we
particularly considered practical application scenario, healthcare application
where we assume a semi-trusted proxy is available. With this assumption,
we combined attribute-based encryption scheme with a cryptographic tech-
nique known as proxy re-encryption (PRE ) and enabled the authority to
delegate most laborious tasks to the proxy server.
In the first proposed protocol, we proposed an IPPRE scheme derived
from a well-known inner-product encryption scheme [1]. This protocol dele-
gates the re-encryption capability to a semi-trusted proxy who transforms a
ciphertext under an access policy to a new ciphertext with the same plaintext
but under another access policy without learning the underlying plaintext
and the associated attributes in the ciphertext as well as the private key.
Our proposed scheme is provably secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in
the standard model under Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH ) and
Decision Linear (D-Linear) assumptions. We analyzed the proposed proto-
col in terms of computation, communication and storage overhead and we
also tested the execution time of its algorithms on three different types of
elliptic curves and achieved some encouraging experimental results. The
execution times hint that our protocol is the first step towards a promis-
ing direction. To improve the performance of IPPRE protocol in terms of
storage, computation, and communication costs, we proposed an efficient
inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme (namely E-IPPRE ) based on the
inner-product encryption (IPE ) method in [2]. In this proposed scheme, the
number of pairing operations used for Decrypt, Re-Encrypt, and Re-Decrypt
algorithms are constant and do not depend on the number of attributes
in the system. Furthermore, it reduces the length of the public key, private
key, ciphertext and time needed for key/re-key generation because each pred-
icate is not computed as the exponent of a group element. The proposed
protocol is proven selective attribute-secure against chosen-plaintext attacks
in the standard model under two assumptions, Asymmetric Decisional Bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman and P-Asymmetric Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman.
The execution time of each algorithm of our protocol was measured on three
different types of elliptic curves. The experimental results show that the pro-
posed scheme is the most efficient and practical compared to first protocol
in terms of storage, computation, and communication.
The above proposed IPPRE protocols support the evaluations of poly-
nomials, disjunctions, conjunctions, CNF formulas, DNF formulas, and
threshold, which are appropriate for applications that require more fine-
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grained access control to encrypted data. Moreover, they are suitable for
dynamic environments where the access policy for controlling access to the
encrypted data changes frequently (e.g. healthcare application). Further-
more, they satisfy attribute-hiding, fine-grained access control, and collision
resistance properties.
In the future Internet of Things (IoT ) billion devices can be connected
with each other and cooperate with other devices to share their data. How-
ever, the connected billion devices on the Internet will generate a huge
amount of sensitive data that requires privacy and security requirements
including data confidentiality, access control, privacy, and enforcement of
security and privacy policies. Therefore, to achieve secure data sharing in
the IoT environment while preserving the privacy and security of user’s data
confidentiality, a flexible and fine-grained access control techniques such as
public-key encryption schemes (e.g., ABE ) should be used. The main chal-
lenge, in this case, is that the most existing ABE schemes are expensive for
resource-constrained IoT devices due to the expensive pairing operations
and the number of such operations increases with the number of attributes
in the system. To tackle this issue, we combined the flexibility and ex-
pressiveness of the proposed E-IPPRE scheme with the efficiency of sym-
metric key encryption technique and proposed a lightweight inner-product
proxy re-encryption scheme (L-IPPRE ) to guarantee secure data sharing
between different entities with different access policies in IoT environment.
We tested the execution time of each algorithm of L-IPPRE protocol on dif-
ferent types of elliptic curves. The performance evaluation shows that the
system complexity in our proposed L-IPPRE scheme is reasonable in prac-
tical IoT scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, the L-IPPRE protocol
is the first inner-product proxy re-encryption scheme that provides a secure
data sharing mechanism for distributed fine-grained data access control in
the IoT.
6.2 Future Works
The results obtained of this thesis point to several interesting directions for
secure data sharing on untrusted storage as the future works:
Multi-authority Fine-grained Access Control. The primary attribute-
based encryption schemes are based on single trust authority to manage user
attributes and their corresponding private keys, which will be vulnerable to
security attacks. Recently, some research efforts have been proposed multi-
authority schemes supporting fine-grained access control policies [80, 81, 82].
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Therefore, one interesting future work would be integrating the proposed
protocols with other schemes targeting multiple authorities to avoid collu-
sion among users sharing data.
Combining with Trusted Computing Technologies. In this thesis,
the cloud and proxy servers are assumed to be “honest-but-curious” i.e.,
the cloud and proxy servers execute the pre-defined protocols correctly, but
may try to learn as much private information as possible during the pro-
tocol execution. In practical application scenarios, it would be desirable to
remove this assumption to provide a stronger level of security protection for
the cloud and proxy servers. For this purpose, one interesting future work
would be combining trust computing techniques with the data access control
mechanisms.
Key Management. Key management involves creating, renewing, and
managing private keys. With the growing amount of shared data in cloud
computing and IoT environments, the data consumers could have an abun-
dant number of keys, which might be difficult to manage cases where keys
are lost, stolen, and expired. These cases may compromise security. There-
fore, one interesting future work would be integrating proposed protocols
with key management schemes in order to further improve performance.
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